Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

352. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 14, 1964—8:45 p.m.

857. CINCPAC for POLAD. Alex Johnson and I went to Vung Tau today at Khanh’s invitation to hear his account of the events of the last 24 hours. We sent word ahead that we would also like to see General Minh whom we knew to be there. Somewhat to our surprise, we found the two of them ready to receive us as a team, the first time such a thing has happened in my experience.

Asked to interpret the meaning of the recent coup, Khanh, with Minh in agreement, explained it as primarily a power play by two ambitious officers, Duc and Phat. Although Colonel Ton, the Dai Viet commander of the Seventh Division was involved with them, Khanh does not consider that it was either pro-Dai Viet or pro-Catholic.

The coup failed primarily because it got no popular support. Phat’s broadcast was badly received by the public with whom Phat enjoys no popularity. Many junior officers in the troop units which came to Saigon did not know what the purpose was. Their troops became demoralized by the radio broadcasts directed at them by government sources and by indications of public indifference. Realizing that they were involved in a losing operation, the troops withdrew in the course of 14 September leaving the leaders to save such face as they could.

Duc tried to salvage his face in the course of the press conference reported in Embtel 848.² Khanh says that Ky and Duc met together to discuss the situation prior to the press conference which was originally planned to be exclusively Ky’s. However, as the conference with Duc terminated at the time for the initiation of the press conference, Duc became involved and took advantage of the occasion to try to salvage his prestige. The result was the confused series of statements by Ky, Duc and Thi reported in the cited Embtel.

We asked Khanh what warning he had of the coup. Apparently some rumors had been floating about for several days including a rather specific one which reached Khanh on the evening of 12 September. He did not become aware of the troop movements toward Saigon until early the following morning and was surprised by the involvement of Duc and Phat.

He got definite word of the coup at the Dalat airfield where he was about to bring back the five Generals to Saigon in his plane. He explained that he was bringing them down just to see how they would be received, as a trial balloon to their possible assignment later to active military posts. Both Khanh and Minh agreed that the government needed their talent and described their attitude as one of cooperation and willingness to serve in any military or civilian capacity.

I asked about reports that dissatisfaction with slow promotion among junior and middle grade officers was a factor in the coup. Khanh and Minh did not directly agree that it was but conceded a need for an overhaul of the promotion system in the military services.

We asked what happens now. Khanh indicated that they intended to review the past events in cold blood and determine what to do with the errant senior officers—Duc, Phat, and Ton. He indicated that in all probability they would be required to leave the country. I expressed my view of the seriousness of their offenses and the need to impose appropriate punishment.

We then changed the subject and I reported on my trip to Washington. I transmitted President Johnson’s letter to General Khanh³ with the comment that it had been signed prior to the events of 13 September; otherwise there would probably have been some changes in the Presidential text.

I mentioned my discussions with the President, his advisors and reps of the Congress, stressing the difficulty in Washington of understanding the confused political events of August. I reported the general consensus on all sides that by far the greatest problem facing South Vietnam was the formation of the provisional government as envisaged in General Khanh’s announced plans. However, it had also been agreed that as a reminder to Hanoi of our continued vitality, we would resume the DeSoto patrols almost at once and follow them by 34–A actions which General Westmoreland would soon be discussing with the appropriate Vietnamese officers.

I then turned to a discussion of the seriousness of the events of 13 Sept and their impact upon US Governmental and public opinion, following in general the thoughts contained in Deptel 654.⁴ I solemnly pointed out it seemed to us Americans tragic that politics had been allowed to split the armed forces which heretofore had been regarded as the solid bulwark of legitimate government. After the disorders of August, yesterday’s coup would raise even more serious doubts in the US as to the reliability of the Vietnamese ally and would shake public confidence in our combined ability to achieve ultimate success. Under such circumstances, it would be a mistake to count indefinitely on unlimited US support in the light of the clear evidence of repeated internal differences among senior officers of the armed forces.

Khanh and Minh in chastened tones replied that no one could be sadder than they over recent events. They believed, however, that a lesson had been drawn by all participants and observers which would help in the future and that meanwhile they are resolved to push ahead with their announced program for consulting the Supreme National Council and the subsequent provisional government.

I asked whether I could help in emphasizing to senior officers and officials the risks they were running of losing US and international support by in-house feuding and bickering. Khanh suggested that I might pass the word through Gen Westmoreland’s MACV channels to the senior Generals and that Embassy representatives might talk to the Buddhists, Catholics and certain unspecified politicians. I promised to undertake these contacts with the help of appropriate US representatives.

When the meeting broke up, Khanh took off by helicopter for Saigon to hold a press conference and to attend a cabinet meeting. He intends to return to Vung Tau thereafter. As a parting shot, I reminded him that things always seemed to go better when he stays in Saigon.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. Also published in Declassified Documents 1979, 95B. Taylor arrived back in Saigon at 7 a.m. on September 14.
2. Telegram 848, September 14, 4:40 p.m., reported on a press conference at 7:45 a.m. on September 14 at which Duc explained the reasons for the attempted coup, and Ky and Thi made individual statements on their actions. Taylor described the proceedings as “unreal” and leaving “many important questions unanswered.” (Department of State. Central Files. POL 27 VIET S)
3. See footnote 9, Document 343.
4. Document 349.