Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, September 13, 1964—2:36 p.m.

654. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Believe strongest private representations to all key personalities should be made ASAP as USG attitude toward events of last few hours in Saigon:

(a) it is imperative that there not be internecine war within South Vietnamese armed forces, whose energies and resources are needed for victory over a common enemy, the Viet Cong;

(b) the picture of petty bickering among Vietnamese leaders has created an appalling impression abroad and causes friends of South Vietnamese freedom all over the world to wonder how serious South Vietnamese are about their freedom and security and what there is for others to support; Communist capitals are already expressing their glee over most recent news from Saigon;

(c) the US has not provided massive assistance to South Vietnam, in military equipment, economic resources and personnel, in order to subsidize continuing quarrels among South Vietnamese leaders. The use of US equipment and resources to pursue quarrels is an outrageous abuse of such assistance and raises the gravest issues for the USG and people;

(d) The US has pledged its full commitment to the security and independence of South Viet Nam in the face of the massed manpower of Hanoi and Peiping. It is we who stand between the free peoples of Southeast Asia and that potential tide sweeping down from the north. But what can be the purpose of this commitment and the massive US force in position to meet it if South Vietnamese leaders themselves cannot declare a moratorium on personal rivalries and secondary differences about the details of government until such time as their country is secure;

(e) South Vietnamese leaders need not look among themselves for enemies; they all have a common enemy in the Viet Cong. Remind them of Viet Cong plans for their liquidation and of Benjamin Franklin’s remark that if they do not hang together they will surely hang separately;

(f) we believe that tactical units should return to their assigned areas and that General Minh should be permitted to continue with his task of constituting a council of representatives of major groups which can get to work on the constitution of a government which, with the support and participation of all major element can lead the country to victory. In this preparatory state we believe the Triumvirate with Prime Minister Khanh, General Minh and General Khiem should continue to direct affairs in order to avoid confusion and a reduction of effort against the Viet Cong.

(g) emphasize that Vietnamese leaders must not take the US for granted. We have tried to exercise the greatest patience because of difficulties which have been bravely faced by the Vietnamese people² but patience and understanding are being drained away by disputes which seem to us to be intolerable in the face of our common dangers and tasks. The American people are already beginning to ask what are we supporting and why when they hear of these repeated internal differences among comrades in arms.

2. In line with above you should make it emphatically clear, wherever useful, that we do not believe a Phat/Duc Government can effectively govern the country or command the necessary popular support to carry forward the effort against the VC. US support for the GVN is based on the triumvirate and its efforts to bring about a broadly based and effective government satisfactorily reflecting the interests and concerns of all groups

3. Since Catholic sentiment may be crucial to resolution present crisis, you should exert all possible efforts ascertain degree of responsible Catholic sense of grievance and how it can be met so that government and program would have endorsement and support of key Catholic leaders such as Apostolic Delegate and Archbishop.

4. Above drafted before receiving your 836.³ Your line was right and you should draw on above to continue stressing it.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and cleared in substance by Rusk and the White House. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. According to a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, September 14, this telegram was approved at a 1 p.m. meeting at the White House attended by the President, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Wheeler, and McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 94E.
2. For Rusk’s comments along these lines during his new conference on September 14, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 996–999.
3. Document 348.