Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹

Saigon , January 21, 1964—1 p.m.

1352. Deptels 1083 and 1092.² This relates to meeting with Minh, Kim, Tho and Lam attended by DCM, Gen. Harkins, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and myself on Monday, Jan. 20,³ insofar as it pertains to recent French actions.

1. I had sensed at lunch on USS Providence that Tho and Kim were disturbed. On returning to office, was told that Info Min, Gen Do Mau, was going to be at the afternoon meeting, which made it evident that they thought I had asked for the meeting in order to discuss the AFP article.⁴ I felt this would put us in the position of building up the French. I therefore telephoned Tho and stated topic of our meeting was military and secret and had nothing to do with anything in Do Mau’s department. I also decided not even to mention De Gaulle or France at the meeting but to leave it to the Vietnamese to do so if they wanted to.

2. I believe Harriman and Rusk decision, as revealed in Deptels, to make it crystal clear in private that we are totally opposed to the French line and totally uninfluenced by it, and in public to “play it cool”, is absolutely right. If we here in Vietnam do not in any way enlarge the importance of the French action (which we could easily do), it will fizzle out very fast.

3. During the discussion, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Gen Kim brought up AFP story (of which he had an elaborately annotated copy) and solemnly spoke of the dangers inherent in the seeking of a “cease fire”. I brushed it aside by saying that De Gaulle had no real chips to play in SEA—neither men, nor arms, nor money of any significance, and that if one wanted to play in this poker game, one had to buy a seat at the table. Quoting our English proverb that “sticks and stones can break my bones, but words will hurt me never”, I characterized De Gaulle’s pronouncements on SEA and AFP expose of French policy as “baragouinage”, which could neither affect US policy nor the fundamentals of the SEA situation. They grinned with pleasure when I said that the French were indulging in a favorite national pastime of “garglingwords” and that, of course, US policy was unchanged.

4. Generals Minh and Kim appeared greatly reassured and relieved that we did not take the French maneuvers too seriously. They stressed that regardless of the points of detail [document number not declassified],⁵ the big fact of the day which emerged [document number not declassified] was the US determination to win the war. In fact, as we were leaving, Minh said he hoped I understood that GVN had “not been overly impressed with AFP story.”⁶

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis.
2. In telegram 1083 to Saigon, January 18, Harriman informed Lodge that intelligence reports, which Lodge would have seen, suggested that “one element French negotiations with ChiComs was latter’s agreement accept neutralization Southeast Asia.” Harriman informed Lodge that he had spoken bluntly to the French Ambassador in Washington about the French acceptance of a connection between recognition of the People’s Republic of China and the promotion of neutralism in Southeast Asia. Harriman stated that in spite of his private language, “public expression will be to play a restrained key.” He instructed Lodge to inform the MRC that the United States still supported the Republic of China, and to state explicitly that the French diplomatic moves would not alter U.S. commitments in Vietnam. (Ibid., UN 6 CHICOM) In telegram 1092 to Saigon, January 19, Harriman told Lodge that the contents of telegram 1083 to Saigon should give him “necessary ammunition to talk with General Minh et al.” (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
3. See Document 14.
4. See footnote 5, Document 14.
5. Reference is to the telegram described in footnotes 2–4, Document 13.
6. In telegram 1105 to Saigon, January 21, the Department informed the Embassy that the “line” which Lodge took was “just right.” The United States was “180 degrees opposed” to the recommendations in the Agence France Presse article. It believed that the war could be won and considered the “French approach as avenue of disaster which could lead to Communist control of all Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia.” The Department instructed the Embassy to try to dissuade the Vietnamese from breaking diplomatic relations with France over recognition of the People’s Republic of China, should they be so inclined, because it “would blow up French action beyond its real significance” and would complicate U.S. efforts to convince the Republic of China to “also play matter cooly.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)