Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

14. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Secretary of State ¹

Saigon , January 21, 1964 .

[document number not declassified]. 1. Accompanied by DCM, Gen Harkins [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] I spent two hours with Generals Minh and Kim, Prime Minister Tho and For Min Lam late yesterday on plan for expanding operations against North Vietnam [document number not declassified].² Discussion of recent French actions and of Laotian matters in separate telegrams.³

2. I opened discussion with following statement:

“The United States Government has drafted a plan, which has been approved at the highest levels, for expanded operations against North Viet Nam. The first phase would begin February 1. We desire your agreement and that you should carry it out. The execution of the whole plan would take 12 months.”

“As an example of what is contemplated, there would be clandestine, aggressive and daring attacks, principally in the nature of sabotage, against the port of Haiphong; and destruction of petroleum reserves and of naval installations.”

“The goal is to convince the rulers of North Vietnam that if they continue their war-like actions in South Vietnam, there will be reactions from our side which will be more and more expensive and destructive for them. After operations at an accelerated rate, the word would be gotten to the chiefs of North Vietnam that they ought to cease fire and that this could be done without loss of face. They should know that South Vietnam, with the tacit approval of the United States, intends to increase the rate and the extent of operations against North Vietnam, thus causing immense destruction on the economic and military installations of North Vietnam, if that becomes necessary.”

“The operations are in three phases of increasing intensity. President Johnson, assuming the agreement of the Government of Vietnam, has approved the commencement of the first phase on February 1 for four months, under the direction of MAC/V.”⁴

“Suggest it be made clear in subsequent conversations our view that phase 2 and 3 operations not intended to be launched until after we begin make headway in Delta and it becomes increasingly clear to all concerned that Vietcong are losing any chance of gaining loyalty of SVN population. In the first place, phase 2 and 3 operations prior to beginnings of headway in Delta would likely be interpreted by North Vietnamese as act of desperation and therefore would not be effective in bringing change in their policies. In the second place, phase 2 and 3 actions launched prematurely would greatly increase pressure from Western allies and certain segments of U.S. opinion for international conference since U.S. involvement with North is principal fear of neutralist sentiment. Purpose of phase 1 operations is to maintain threat in interim period until we begin to make progress in Delta and to lay groundwork for launching phase 2 and 3 operations at a time when they most likely to result in Viet-Nam backdown.” (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files, TIGER Basic File)

“We consider that you have great assets here and that the personnel of the Vietnamese special branch which has been so well trained can serve as a foundation on which a more extensive organization can be built. Perhaps you will want MAC/V to make a contact with the special branch of your Special Forces High Command. It goes without saying that we are at your disposal.”

3. Reaction Gen Minh and others was thoughtful and constructive and consisted exhaustive canvass various eventualities and problems which could result implementation first phase. Most important questions raised and our responses were:

a. As past experience with intelligence and propaganda operations in North had been largely failure, did this plan offer anything new which promised greater chance success? We said risk to personnel remained high but possible achievements particularly in sabotage operations far greater. Lessons had been learned from past, and targets this plan now quite different and more far reaching.

b. What was our real motive? In seeking “cease fire” was there not possibility this in reality only disguised step toward neutrality conference? Gen Kim here raised AFP story-handling of which subject separate telegram through State channels.⁵ I countered this extreme sensitivity any idea “cease fire” by assuring Minh that what we all wanted here was unilateral “cease fire” by Viet Cong on orders from Hanoi resulting from our increasing pressure against North Vietnam. Once VC had stopped fighting GVN and U.S. would decide what to do next.

c. What would be UN and world reaction? I pointed out operations envisaged would be clandestine and implication GVN and U.S. would be publicly denied, though of course Ho Chi Minh would be left in no doubt as to what was happening and why. Should GVN and/or U.S. eventually become publicly involved our actions would be portrayed as self-defense against North Vietnamese aggression. I believed this could be effectively done.

d. Reactions of North Vietnam and ChiComs. Here Gen Minh and others cited following as possible eventualities for which provision should be made in course detailed prior planning each operation contemplated.

1. Greatly intensified Viet Cong activity, particularly in sabotage of installations in South. We agreed RVNAF could meet this threat. I said our reaction could also be stepped up operations in North.

2. If economy, especially agriculture, in North as fragile as reported Hanoi might resort to directed mass flight South hungry refugees including many subversives and combatants. Minh said trained division could easily be hidden in million refugees. How could GVN hope to cope with this? They could not prevent such a march; they could not put people into camps; they would be overwhelmed. We agreed contingency plan meet this possibility should be developed.

3. Two North Vietnamese divisions presently in north Laos might be moved south to “protect refugees”. Gen Harkins pointed to impossible logistical problems involved and expressed view RVNAF could adequately meet any overt invasion this quarter.

4. How could RVNAF effectively meet air attacks launched from North Vietnam or China and what would U.S. be prepared do in this eventuality? Minh suggested hostile aircraft could be jets flown by Chinese and carrying either North Vietnamese markings or no markings. I said entirely new war would result.

5. Gen Minh asked whether U.S. public prepared support USAF retaliation against North Vietnam and possible Chinese targets. Would U.S. retaliate at all?

e. Would actions contemplated involve men and materials which could more effectively be employed against Viet Cong or against Cambodia? Very fast boats were badly needed in war in South Vietnam. We replied that only 200–400 men would be involved and equipment contemplated not of type needed against Viet Cong.

f. Tho said they would prefer act against Cambodia than North Vietnam. Minh agreed this preferable from military but not psychological standpoint. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] explained equipment designed for operations against North Vietnam not equally appropriate for use against Viet Cong.

g. On own initiative Minh suggested any activities against North should be paralleled by some form of intensified effort against Viet Cong. We agreed.

h. In conclusion Gen Minh stressed he was not trying to pick plan to pieces but merely wished canvass all possible eventualities so as to be ready to meet them. He felt plan fully deserved penetrating and constructive study and would assign Gens Don, Kim, and Chieu to proceed forthwith. Finally he emphasized fact we presenting such plan at this time demonstrated continued U.S. determination vigorously pursue war in Vietnam.

4. Gen Don has just contacted Gen Harkins and suggested that he [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] meet with Gen Kim on 23 January to discuss military details this plan.

5. Would appreciate joint State-DOD-CAS comments all points raised and in particular on 4. d and e.⁶

6. Gen Harkins has read and concurs in this message.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, TIGER Basic File. Top Secret. Repeated to JCS and CINCPAC for POLAD. Sent over CIA channels.
2. Reference is to the telegram described in footnotes 2–4, Document 13.
3. See Document 15; the message on Laotian matters has not been found.
4. On January 22, Hilsman, who was en route to Australia and New Zealand, sent the following message from Honolulu over other-agency channels:
5. Reference is to telegram 1337 from Saigon, January 19, in which Lodge informed Harriman of a call he received from Foreign Minister Lam, who complained about an Agence France Presse article of January 18 entitled “The Asian Policy of France.” The article suggested France planned to use its recognition of China to bring about a settlement in Indochina, equated U.S. actions in South Vietnam with those of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, and called for a cease-fire in South Vietnam. Lam thought the article was “obviously inspired by the Elysee or Quai d’Orsay” and expressed grave concern over it. (Ibid.. Central Files. POL 27 VIET S)

6. In telegram [document number not declassified] to the Station in Saigon, January 22, the CIA made the following observations on these concerns as expressed by the Vietnamese:

   • “1. The tenor of thoughtful MRC questions, particularly in paragraph 4d of reference, suggests that their first reaction to your presentation was one of apprehension that the U.S. might be headed for a major enlargement of the war, both geographically and physically, and that the GVN might somehow be left holding the bag. This may have derived from their focusing on the statements quoted in paragraph 2 of reference regarding accelerated rate of operations, three phases of increasing intensity and the prospects of immense destruction.”
   • “2. In any case, it is suggested that through the medium of the working meeting noted in paragraph 4, which will get down to the actual details, you will be able to put the matter in perspective. It will then be plain that we have approval at this time for only a modest program, and not one which, in itself, will result in immense destruction or which should entail the broad questions raised by the Generals. While planning for broader actions should proceed, we have no approvals beyond the specific actions listed in [document number not declassified].”
   • “3. A summary of the Board of National Estimates evaluation of the approved program is being transmitted to you separately. It addresses the general matter of DRV and international reaction. While it does not discuss, in detail, the specific contingencies raised in paragraph 4d, it estimates that there will not be a strong reaction to the approved actions.” (Ibid.)

   For the Board of National Estimates summary, see Document 16. The document referred to at the end of paragraph 2 is the one described in footnotes 2–4, Document 13.