Office of the Historian

478. Memorandum From the Commanding Officer of the U.S. Naval Support Force, Antarctica (Reedy) to the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Antarctica1

Washington, July 16, 1963.

SUBJ

  • Commercial Carriers in Antarctica
1.
The purpose of this paper is to outline recommendations which should become prerequisites for U.S. commercial carriers to operate in or through Antarctica.
2.
Matters related to personnel support and habitability:
a.
Berthing. Facilities at McMurdo Station and satellite stations normally are utilized to capacity. Therefore, under normal circumstances, berthing facilities will not be available to commercial carrier crews and passengers. In event of an emergency, and should facilities become available, charges would be in accordance with current U.S. Navy policies and rates.
b.
Messing. Food requirements are carefully determined in advance of the operating season to support known personnel requirements. Providing for messing civilians and issuing flight rations would raise shipping and purchasing requirements considerably. There is no provision in our budget for such additional support. In event of an emergency, limited messing would be made available and charges would be made in accordance with established procedures and prescribed rates. If the emergency persisted for more than 24 hours, the only alternative would be to evacuate crews and passengers to New Zealand in military aircraft at the expense of the carrier.
c.
Sanitation. Facilities are limited and primitive by stateside standards and there are no special facilities available for ladies.
d.
Medical. Facilities and assistance are generally limited, and rudimentary at satellite stations. Humanitarian treatment would be provided in emergencies. It must be understood by the carrier and his insurance company that, in event of an aircraft crash or major disaster, the U.S. Navy does not have the capability to handle a large number of casualties, and that the capability for rapid emergency evacuation is very limited. The Task Force’s mission does not provide for improving the medical assistance capability beyond that required to support Deep Freeze operations.
3.
Services:
a.
POL. Requirements in Antarctica are computed and procured according to operational requirements with a contingency reserve for emergency. This does not provide specifically for any other operations than those directly connected with the Deep Freeze mission. Requirements beyond the present ones will necessitate increasing established POL levels with a resultant increase in shipping requirements and cost. No provisions for this is made in the Support Force budget. Therefore, prior to departing for Antarctica:
(1)
Aircraft must make their exact requirements known in advance and receive confirmation that fuel is available.
(2)
Ships should be required to depart for Antarctica with sufficient amounts of fuel to assure that refueling in Antarctica would not be required, and that there is sufficient reserve on board to sustain the ships’ needs should tanks be damaged by ice, or should ships become beset.
b.
Water. Supplies are extremely limited. For the foreseeable future, carriers should be self-sufficient. In an emergency, MSTS ships and icebreakers, if in the area, probably could furnish a very limited amount of water. Here, again, ships should be required to carry sufficient reserves in event of ice damage to tanks. Temperatures and distances preclude “water lines from the beach” as ships are accustomed to arranging in most ports.
c.
Electricity. There are no means of providing this to ships. They must provide their own.
d.
Crash. Facilities to handle aircraft crashes are very limited generally, and practically non-existent at satellite stations. There is no proper way to provide the services needed in crashes involving large numbers of people. Therefore, the U.S. Navy cannot be responsible for providing adequate crash equipment. It is also not within the mission, or funds available to Commander Task Force 43 to provide the additional equipment necessary to support commercial carriers in this matter. Naturally, existing facilities would be made available. Additionally, there are no crash boats, tugs, etc., to assist ships which may be distressed by ice damage.
e.
Vehicular transportation. These facilities are limited but could be made available for special occasions of short duration. There is not sufficient equipment to support “cruises” and sightseers. The Task Force is unable, under present funding, to provide proper transportation to support commercial carriers. Likewise, should commercial carriers desire to provide their own mode of transportation, the adequacy, in severe climatic conditions and rugged terrain, of such vehicles should be approved by an appropriate government agency in advance.
f.
Ground support. Commercial ships must provide their own line handlers, make available and install their own dead men for mooring or turning, carry additional mooring lines to guard against severe weather conditions which are rather unpredictable, and provide their own brows and accommodation ladders. Air carriers are required to determine the availability of starters, engine heaters, etc., prior to clearing the flight. Ladders for disembarking passengers and the crew must be carried as standard equipment of the aircraft, as must all means of securing the aircraft to protect it against high winds and blowing snow.
g.
Special cold weather clothing. Commercial carriers will be required to have adequate cold weather clothing to protect passengers and crews in Antarctica.
4.
Search and Rescue: Would be provided on a humanitarian basis in accordance with established conventions. Here, again, the capability is extremely limited, and any employment for this purpose, of the aircraft or ships severely affects the Task Force Mission.
5.
Control of aircraft:
a.
ICAO procedures should be extended to include Antarctica.
b.
U.S. commercial air carriers will be required to comply with local traffic control procedures which CTF-43 has established to protect military aircraft at its Antarctic stations.
c.
U.S. Navy can make available weather and ice information on a “non-interference-with-operations” basis.
6.
Special requirements:
a.
Pilots of aircraft must be currently experienced in landing on ice and snow. Ship masters should be experienced in operating in waters where ice threatens the safety of a ship and its embarked personnel.
b.
Aircraft must be FAA and ICAO certified.
c.
Ships should be required to have reinforced hulls to protect them from ice hazards prior to certifying them for Antarctic operations.
d.
Aircraft intending to land at U.S. stations other than McMurdo will be required to be ski-equipped.
e.
The U.S. Navy will not accept designation as investigator for any accident involving commercial carriers in any manner other than in the case of such an accident involving the Navy anywhere else.
7.
Several major problems require resolution:
a.
The Department of the Navy has established rates and procedures covering services furnished by military personnel and purchases by civilian enterprises. Existing rules provide for reimbursement for use of military personnel, for POL, for landing fees, for subsistence, etc. Regulations normally require a deposit in advance to cover potential costs. The amount of the deposit would be determined according to the [Page 1088] extent and the nature of the services to be provided. This should be resolved in advance of any flight, or trip by ship. It should further be understood that, although CTF-43 purchases these items from allocated funds, payment by the civil carrier is to the Navy Department. The Task Force is NOT, in turn, reimbursed by this amount. The Task Force stands the loss. The exception to this is messing.
b.
The problem of jurisdiction regarding the protection of historic landmarks, conservation of wildlife, etc., is a much more complicated issue. Likewise, the problem of handling felonies and misdemeanors is a related problem. At present, the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides adequate jurisdiction over military personnel. On board ships and in the air, admiralty and maritime laws appear to provide adequate jurisdiction in these areas. This probably extends to the edge of the ice shelf. At this time, there does not appear to be a way of applying legal jurisdiction over civilians who might commit an offense in Antarctica. If a serious crime were committed, it would be prudent to take steps to protect others, but there does not appear to be established any means for disposing of civil criminal cases. If historic landmarks were damaged, it is considered that the matter would have to be resolved between the governments of the nationals involved. This can become complicated in the instance where U.S. carriers are carrying foreign nationals. The commission of certain offenses is not provided for in the Antarctic Treaty, and this further complicates the matter of jurisdiction over foreign nationals carried by U.S. carriers when the governments of these nationals are not signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. Therefore, at this time, Commander Task Force 43, as senior U.S. representative in Antarctica, cannot be responsible for offenses committed by civilians in Antarctica.
J.R. Reedy
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander Task Force 43
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 69 D 169, Antarctica Files, Policy 1963. Official Use Only.↩