Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

477. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, June 28, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Responsibility for Carrying out Inspections in Antarctica

I.

Mr. William C. Foster, in a memorandum of June 26 to you,² recommends that ACDA have responsibility for the implementation of Antarctic inspections. He raises three questions in his memorandum:

1. That letters designating observers for the inspection operation in Antarctica be signed by you as Secretary of State. I recommend that you agree to sign these letters. (There may be about a dozen of them.)

2. That ACDA have primary responsibility for the implementation of the inspection operation in Antarctica. On this proposal I raise some questions below.

3. That the Department of State and ACDA consult with one another prior to making proposals to foreign Governments concerning inspection matters. This should of course be standard operating practice.

II.

Our relations with ACDA work very well these days, and I have no doubt that the Agency would do an excellent job of managing the Antarctic “observers” operation (we should probably stick to the Treaty language rather than by calling the “inspectors”) if you ask Mr. Foster to assume responsibility for it. However, I do believe there are significant policy questions that should be considered before deciding that Antarctic Treaty responsibilities should be handled as an aspect of arms control and disarmament. I regret the need to raise an essentially jurisdictional question; I do so only because I think real matters of policy are hidden behind the issues of bureaucratic parochialism.

The policy issues are four:

1. There is no example of international harmony and cooperation anywhere in the contemporary world to compare with that presently prevailing in Antarctica. The Cold War has not intruded; the territorial claims and aspirations of the Antarctic powers have been placed in abeyance; and an extraordinary tradition of scientific cooperation has been established. The achievement of this condition of international harmony and cooperation is the result of many years of patient effort on the part of the United States, and its preservation should remain a primary objective of the national policy of the United States. One of the high points of this effort was the conclusion of the Antarctica Treaty in 1959, largely as the result of United States initiative, which provides in Article I that “Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.” The “observation” provision is an important element of the Treaty, and it should not be allowed to atrophy from disuse. At the same time, the exercise of this right should not disrupt the very harmony and international cooperation which it is the primary purpose of the Treaty to preserve.

2. If you now give ACDA the responsibility for “observers” in Antarctica, it would be hard to avoid the whole operation being publicly presented as an exercise on arms control. Because of the statutory objectives of ACDA and its very name, its identification with inspections in Antarctica would place the program in a military context which could do damage to United States objectives under the Antarctica Treaty. ACDA should certainly participate actively in developing and carrying out the inspection program; something of value may be learned about inspection techniques in general. But the responsibility for the implementation of this program, and for the control of public information about it, might better reside in the Department of State.

3. The inspection provisions of the Antarctic Treaty involve something quite distinct from the kind of inspections contemplated in the case of nuclear testing and disarmament. Inspections in Antarctica are bound to look rather “soft” to persons thinking in terms of disarmament inspection. The other nations will have plenty of notice, the names of the observers will be fixed well in advance, the inspection will not result from suspicious “events” as contemplated in the nuclear testing field; altogether the Antarctica inspections will not have (and in the absence of some suspicious event should not have) the character of adversary proceedings that will be inevitable in the case of nuclear testing and disarmament. Consequently to identify the Antarctica inspections too closely with arms control and disarmament might give Congress and the general public an entirely erroneous impression of the depth and seriousness of ACDA’s plans in other fields.

4. We have no grounds for believing that other nations have arms of any significance in Antarctica. Indeed, the United States has more military personnel and guns in Antarctica than any other nation does. The Soviet Union reports (and there is no contrary evidence) that they have no military personnel and are not using any armed naval ships in the area. In contrast, the United States has about 3,000 military personnel in the area and our logistic support is entirely military including seven armed ships with 6”/50, 5”/38 and 3”/50 guns as well as machine guns. The United Kingdom has one ship with two 4” guns as well as machine guns. An inspection which emphasized the arms control aspect would only serve to attract attention to United States military forces in an Antarctica dedicated by Treaty to peaceful purposes.

III.

ACDA has done excellent work in helping to develop the planning for this program, and it should continue to participate in the program. However, for the reasons cited above, the Department of State should retain the over-all direction of the program, and ACDA’s role should be to assist the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in carrying out the inspection program. The Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee on Antarctica, which is chaired by our Bureau, should serve as the coordinating committee for this inspection program as it does with respect to all other United States activities in Antarctica, including the $7,000,000 scientific exploration program. The Commander of the United States Naval Support Force, Antarctica will have responsibility for logistics for this program as he does for other programs in Antarctica.

The Antarctica experts in the Departments of Defense, Commerce and Interior have separately expressed to us their concern on some or all of the above scores; my impression is that they would agree with the substance of this memorandum and with its recommendations. I am sending a copy to Mr. Foster, but making no other distribution.

Recommendations

1. That you authorize the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to carry out the recruitment and supervision of observers under the Antarctica Treaty.

2. That you request ACDA to participate actively in the development and carrying out of the inspection program in Antarctica.

3. That you direct the Bureau of Public Affairs to coordinate all public information on the plan for and activities of American observers in Antarctica.³

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 69 D 169, Antarctica Files, Inspection 1963. Confidential. Drafted by James Simsarian and concurred in by Greenfield (P).
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. There is no indication on the memorandum if the recommendations were approved or disapproved.