65. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State0

377. For Harriman from Byroade. Deptel 181.1 Grateful indeed for urtel and your interest in the current situation Burma. It came at a time when I was conscious, and indeed hoping, that Washington would be wondering what actions we might take to further our cause here. The American press has been overly optimistic as to successes for the West here locally recently, but it is indeed a fluid time of change in which we should be ever alert for opportunities to affect the very delicate balance of things.

All of my efforts so far have been to prepare myself for the opportune time to start working on Ne Win personally. The Burmese way of things being what they are, I did not feel it in US interests to attempt to push myself upon him too fast and in the midst of his all-consuming internal peace negotiations with the Communist insurgents. Now that these are out of the way (and I think not unhappily for us) it has seemed to me that this week was the ideal time to attempt to start straight talk with Ne Win. I realized that following such talks recommendations to the Dept would be essential, and am grateful mood seems so receptive. Unfortunately I shall not be able to carry through this plan myself because of my medical evacuation back to Washington regarding which I am communicating separately to the Secretary.

I believe that the reporting from this post during this uncertain period in internal affairs has been good. It has sought to be factual and probably errs mostly in length which prohibits complete high level digestion. It has not been long on recommendations as we couldn’t tell with enough certainty which way the tail would point after this internal crisis. I shall have to leave it to the regular Embassy staff to continue reporting in my absence. This is an extremely complex situation in which the press usually misses the point, and which only poorly fits the excellent counter-insurgency school training which I attended before assignment here. As an example, some of the insurgents (notably the Shans but also I think the Kachins) are undoubtedly more pro West than the present Government of Burma.

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If Ne Win could somehow reverse patterns re the ethnic minority groups that have grown up partly as a reaction to the British preferential treatment of minorities there would be room for much more hope. If he could establish common cause with these ethnic minorities and turn a united Burma against the Communist insurgents we would have our classical insurgency situation in which, if accepted we could provide telling assistance. I doubt that his mind runs in this direction, but this I had hoped to explore. We have of course already done much to increase the RGUB capability for counter-insurgency through our Military Assistance Program.

What has happened here of late is better than the various alternatives that seemed possible only a month ago. It unfortunately does not mean a turn to the right and away from the far left in domestic affairs. The US role in helping correct this situation, if indeed there can be one, is still not susceptible to concrete recommendations as to what the Washington level might do to assist us at this juncture.

Our everyday presence is a factor which I believe pays dividends, but any overt attempt on our part to exploit the failure of the peace talks not preceded by a change in outlook by Ne Win personally would be sterile at best, and could boomerang. In absence of the chance to get through to Ne Win the Embassy can only wait, but when it sees opportunity for a greater US role its recommendations will be properly forthcoming.

Byroade
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 BURMA. Secret; Priority.
  2. In telegram 181, December 3, Harriman asked Byroade to keep in mind the U.S. special interest in counterinsurgency in light of the breakdown of internal peace negotiations and the possibility of augmented Communist guerrilla capacity. Recognizing the delicacy of the Burmese political situation, Harriman stated that the Department would depend heavily on Byroade’s judgment. He asked for an assessment and recommendations for policy. (Ibid.)