Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

468. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 2, 1962, noon.

SUBJECT

• US Troops in Thailand and State of US-Thai Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• H.E. Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand
• H.E. Visutr Arthayukti, Ambassador of Thailand
• Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Gov. W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• V. Admiral Herbert D. Riley, Director, Joint Staff, JCS
• Mr. William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
• Mr. Henry L.T. Koren, Director, Office of SEA Affairs
• Mr. Michael V. Forrestal, Senior Staff Member, NSC
• Mr. Edward E. Masters, Officer-in-Charge, Thai Desk

The Foreign Minister first raised the matter of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between the United States and Thailand.¹ He said his government would like to issue notification under the present Treaty of its intention to terminate the agreement in one year. The Thai Government would like to take this action in order to strengthen its hand in dealing with other countries on FCN matters. The Foreign Minister said his government was still awaiting US comments on the counter-draft of a new FCN Treaty which had been given to our Embassy at Bangkok in February 1962. Mr. Johnson said he would look into the possible termination of the present agreement as well as the status of negotiations on the new Treaty and inform the Foreign Minister further.²

Turning to the US troop presence, Mr. Johnson said we wished to explore this with the Foreign Minister. We would not attempt to reach any decision at this time, but wished to exchange views fully and frankly. Detailed discussions would be held later in Bangkok.

Mr. Johnson said there are two important aspects to this matter from our standpoint. These are the internal implications of these troops within Thailand and, secondly, their impact on Laos.³ He said we believe the presence of allied forces in Thailand serves to maintain pressure on Laos. We would not want to give the impression through withdrawal of our forces immediately after October 7 that we have lost interest or that we necessarily approve developments in Laos. We do not wish to keep these troops in Thailand indefinitely, but at the same time withdrawal should be accomplished at such time and in such manner as to create no adverse effects in Thailand or in Laos. We both have the same interests in Laos; US troops in Thailand have furthered these interests, and we need to ensure that withdrawal of these forces does not have a counter-productive effect in Laos.

Mr. Johnson mentioned Prime Minister Sarit’s desire to maintain the US air units in Thailand. Mr. Johnson said we had always considered our air and ground forces together. The air units are particularly flexible and could be returned even more rapidly than ground forces in the event of an emergency. It might therefore be possible to remove them at the same time the ground forces are taken out. However, we want Thailand’s views on this and will discuss the Prime Minister’s suggestion further with him. Mr. Johnson mentioned also that to hasten the reaction time of our ground units it might be possible to leave the heavy equipment for the Battle Group in place at the time of withdrawal.

The Foreign Minister said the troop presence was purely a matter between friends; Thailand is the host and the US the guest. He said his government would like to know our plans so we could concert our actions and policies. The Foreign Minister agreed that the presence of US forces had contributed to stability in Laos. He said his government was fully aware of US responsibilities in Southeast Asia and desired to strengthen our hand in the area. He said we need to work together to stabilize the situation in the region and at the same time reduce the onus on Thailand from a foreign military presence.

The Foreign Minister said his government did not fear the US troops becoming “occupiers.” US forces had created a favorable impression within Thailand and he was not aware of any local resentment against them. He said it was the foreign repercussions of this troop presence that bothered Thailand. Some Asian states are accusing Thailand of being an “occupied” country. Thailand is afraid of losing its independent status and its international prestige.

Gov. Harriman said the important thing is for us to work together. A favorable solution of the problems in Southeast Asia is possible only if the US and Thailand work closely with one another.

The Foreign Minister agreed and said we should have in mind a mutually agreeable target date for withdrawal of the troops. He suggested October 15 on the grounds that trends in Laos may be more apparent by that time. If in the meantime there were a renewal of fighting, a Pathet Lao offensive, or some other serious development, a continued US presence in Thailand would of course be desirable. However, if the present “twilight situation” continues, we should at least be able to announce by that time that the US and the Thai Governments have agreed to withdrawal at some future date.

Mr. Johnson said we would look at the situation by October 15 and would discuss the matter with the Thai Government with a view to reaching agreement on a target date for eventual withdrawal which would take account of developments in the area. The Foreign Minister indicated his agreement to this suggestion.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.927/10–262. Secret. Drafted by Masters and approved in G on November 13.
1. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, signed at Bangkok on November 13, 1937, and entered into force on October 1, 1938. (53 Stat. 1731; TS 940)
2. According to an October 3 memorandum from Johnson to Harriman, Johnson confirmed to Thanat on the night of October 2 that the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok would negotiate, termination of the treaty. The Embassy’s problem was Thai, unwillingness, to accept International Court of Justice jurisdiction in a new treaty, but Thanat made it clear, that Thailand could not accept such a provision. Usually the existing treaty would be terminated by a provision of the new treaty, but Johnson understood that Thailand wanted to terminate it sooner for tactical reasons, which it was entitled to do. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.9242/10–362)
3. Thanat Khoman discussed Laos in a separate conversation with Harriman on October 2. Harriman stated that events in Laos since the signing of the Geneva Agreements on July 23 were about what was expected. When asked by Thanat if the United States would withdraw its MAAG from Laos by October 7, the deadline for withdrawal of foreign troops according to the agreement, Harriman answered affirmatively. Thanat asked what the United States would do if the “Viet-Minh” did not withdraw, and Harriman suggested that the United States would use maximum diplomatic pressure. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–262)