Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

458. Summary of Discussion⁰

Undated.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS AT HONOLULU CONFERENCE JULY 23–24, 1962

I. Plenary Session with Secretary McNamara

Thai Military and Paramilitary Forces

McNamara questioned whether more Border Patrol Police were needed. Ambassador Young said an additional 2,000 were required and could be profitably utilized. In reply to a similar question regarding the Volunteer Defense Corps, the Ambassador said this organization needs to be beefed up. The VDC is included in the Thai countersubversion plan, but the name may have to be changed for political reasons.

McNamara inquired concerning the strength of paramilitary forces in the eleven Mekong provinces. Ambassador Young said there were 1500 to 1800 BPP and a maximum of 5,000 provincial police. McNamara said this seemed totally inadequate for a 1,000-mile frontier and for an area including probably 2 million people. Police and the VDC are spread too thin. In addition, subversion will not necessarily follow the river. Thai forces must also be built up in the interior areas.

McNamara said as a first step we must lay out a skeleton of our ultimate program and identify the steps toward this goal. It is essential that we see the whole package from the border police through the army. We must list all countersubversion forces and decide what we want. We should work out 1) the number of people desired in each type of organization, 2) first steps toward achieving these goals, and 3) responsibility within the US Government.

McNamara said he assumed the BPP and National Police would remain the responsibility of AID. The VDC would be the responsibility of MAAG for training and equipment. This would be true regardless of whether the VDC was under the Interior or Defense Ministry.

McNamara said he would be willing to consider the reserve division which MAAG had previously recommended, but that he was critical of this concept.

Bundy suggested that the provincial police might possibly be the central organization for our countersubversion effort. He suggested that AID support for this organization might be raised substantially. McNamara said our package program would probably require a huge expenditure. Perhaps we don’t want to pay this much. However, we can’t talk to the Thai until we get our own house in order. Moreover, at some point we may wish to suggest to the Thai that they must do more for themselves or else we will find it necessary to reduce our expenditures.

Describing further the type of report he wanted, McNamara said we should assume that the US would provide forces to aid Thailand in case of overt attack. What he wanted was a listing of what the Thai needed for their own efforts to counter subversion or insurgency.

Communications Equipment

Communications equipment should be included in the new concept. We agreed to provide some communications facilities; did we go far enough? Ambassador Young outlined the program to provide 243 village transceivers. He said an additional 2,300 would be required in critical areas. McNamara said these should be included in the FY 63 program. He said DOD would fund them under MAP in order that production could be started now.

Regarding SEATELCOM, McNamara requested that his staff provide him with frequent reports on the progress of this project with particular emphasis on whether deadlines were being met.

$12.6 Million Commitment

McNamara asked whether we actually have a commitment. Ambassador Young said we do have one of a general nature. McNamara said this is impossible; either we have a commitment or we don’t Ambassador Young said we do.

McNamara then suggested that we hot discuss further whether or not we have a commitment. What we must do is lay out a program which will fulfill the obligation. This should include whatever we expect from the RTG. Ambassador Young said the Thai agreed in their discussions with the Vice President to provide 10% of $50 million as their contribution to the joint effort.

General Johnson said the Thai believe the $12.6 million commitment was to be an annual expenditure for an indefinite period. McNamara said we obviously could not agree to this. He suggested we might tell the Thai that we believe the commitment was for one year, but since they have a different understanding we would be willing to phase down the expenditure over a two or three year period. It might be done on a basis of $12 million the first year, $6 million the second, and $2 million the third or some such arrangement. (At another point the Secretary suggested $12 million–$6 million-0 as a possible solution.) He suggested we have as our objective the use of this commitment to establish units needed for countersubversion work.

Admiral Felt said the airborne group and similar units are very expensive. We need to decide now that we will follow through on these units. McNamara said if we start them, we will carry out the program.

US Troops in Thailand

Harkins and Felt expressed the view we should get our forces out of Thailand as soon as possible. They said, however, that they would like to send smaller units of troops in for periodic training in the future. McNamara and Ambassador Young agreed.

McNamara expressed the view that we should reduce our troops to the absolute minimum in Thailand, then we could build them up for training the VDC or other purposes. We could also add people to carry out construction of the recently approved logistic programs. He asked Felt and Harkins to prepare a paper for the JCS which would then be cleared with State and the President.

McNamara suggested that equipment for the battle group be left in Thailand if the battle group pulls out. He said it took four weeks to get the equipment in place. We should store it there in case we need to increase our forces in Thailand at some future date. General Johnson said he believed this would be acceptable to the Thai.

Mr. Johnson said pulling out US forces had political implications both in Thailand and in Laos. He felt it would be preferable to maintain a battle group in Thailand at least for the next few months. He said he would discuss this with the Secretary of State.

US-financed Logistic Facilities

McNamara expressed the view we should have a written agreement with the Thai that we can use the rolling stock and other facilities if the need arises. Mr. Johnson suggested there should be an exchange of notes and asked Ambassador Young to work out a draft with Harkins.

Harkins said he was dissatisfied with the pipeline proposal. The line to be built was a temporary facility which would last three or perhaps a maximum of five years. A member of Admiral Felt’s staff said it might last up to ten years, but agreed that this was not a permanent facility. It was designed primarily to get a line in quickly. Building a permanent pipeline to Korat had been rejected as too expensive and too time-consuming.

McNamara said that at least the portion through Bangkok should be permanent. The CINCPAC representative suggested that this could be permanent and that pipe for the extension to Korat could be stockpiled in Thailand. In case of need, this line could then be laid above ground in about ten days’ time. McNamara said this was a good idea and suggested that it be discussed with the RTG.

AID Programs for Thailand

Following a discussion of the AID Program for FY 63 the CINCPAC representatives expressed dissatisfaction over the absence of any funds for military construction. AID said this could not be funded by them since it involved local currency. Following a discussion, the local currency needs for FY 63 in Thailand were outlined generally as follows:

$10 million	for military construction
8 million	possible FY 63 portion of the $12.6 million
2 million	internal costs of the logistic projects
4 million	baht portion of ISP
$24 million

McNamara said Thailand and South Viet-Nam would have first priority on any foreign exchange expenditures by Defense. He said DOD might be able to divert funds from elsewhere. Bundy suggested Defense might transfer money to AID which could then procure local currency. McNamara said DOD would study this suggestion.

[Here follow sections II and III, accounts of a discussion among Admiral Felt’s staff and a working meeting among U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador Young, William Bundy, and other officials.]

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/7–2362. Secret. Drafted by Masters. At President Kennedy’s request, McNamara, U. Alexis Johnson, and William Bundy met at Camp Smith in Honolulu with military and diplomatic officials responsible for Southeast Asia. The meeting was primarily about Vietnam; see vol. II, pp. 546–556.