410. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State 0
2149. Deptel 1839.1 Following is preliminary assessment requested reftel. As Dept aware, Mission now giving urgent attention whole problem security of Thailand and will be submitting report soonest including new proposals for action.
In reply reftel, would like emphasize at start that I do not think the Communist bloc will attempt or has any intention attempting “to repeat Laos pattern subversion in Thailand”. Thailand is not Laos; it is a united, fundamentally stable nation, economically viable and making steady, if slow, progress in improving welfare people. The nation is composed of a relatively homogeneous population, large majority of which identifies its welfare with the nation and the King. There are no serious ethnic, economic, social or cultural cleavages among the people which can be successfully, exploited by the Communists in a manner which they have attempted with success elsewhere. There are areas of weakness and serious problems for US and Thais to face now and in future, but pattern Communist campaign against Thailand will be one based on realities Thai situation. We must devote serious attention to these problems, anticipate Communist intentions and study military, economic, social needs of Thailand in order come up with realistic plan action aimed at thwarting Communists before they make any headway. With reference numbered points:
- (1)
- Do not believe that there is at present time a Communist underground in Thailand of any importance. There are number disaffected residents and opportunists who would like see present government overthrown and who would be ripe for recuritment by Commies, but they scattered and unorganized. Recent round up in area Udorn in northeast does not seem have turned up any evidence extensive subversive operation, despite publicity given it by government. Likewise, arrest Russian “spy” Bulgakoff in Bangkok has not revealed any signs effective Commie organization here in city.
- (2)
- This point will be covered in detail in report now under preparation. Requires joint assessment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] attachés and JUSMAG. If required before my June 5 visit will cable next week.
- (3)
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Major weak spot is northeast, chronically depressed area with long record neglect by central government and which center only important Thai left wing activity. Northeast way of life closely resembles that Laos and many people, particularly those living along Mekong, identify selves with Lao people more than with central plains Thais (although these do not tend identify selves with any government or political faction in Laos). Northeast problems seriously complicated by existence well disciplined, Viet-Minh-controlled pockets Vietnamese refugees; totalling about 50 to 60 thousand, and constituting potential fifth column of considerable strength. Northeast is area where tactics similar those used in Laos might be used among scattered remote villages with poor communications. Although at present time there is little evidence pro-Communist or anti-Bangkok sympathies among these people, their isolation, provincial outlook and poverty make them vulnerable infiltration and subversion. My brief visit Udorn May 25 impressed me with remoteness and vulnerability northeast and northern areas.
There also exists potentially serious security problem in other outlying areas Thailand. Throughout northern border areas there many non-Thai hill tribes whose ties to central Thailand very tenuous. Many live in isolated villages, unable speak Thai and lack any strong attachment to Thai nation. Excellent opportunity provide for Chinese use similar groups infiltration activities across borders.
Large Chinese population also problem although in opinion of Embassy current situation probably best since World War II. Existence actively anti-Communist government, banning trade with Red China, suppression propaganda within Chinese community, closer control Chinese schools, vast improvement relations with Republic of China and sound assimilation policies of RTG have reduced proportions this problem. Although leftist influences remain, they are less prominent than before. In long run Chinese situation likely depend more on events outside Thailand (e.g., recognition Red China, admission UN, Communist gains or losses) than on those inside country. Approximately 600,00 Thai Moslems in south have never been completely absorbed, despite long period Thai rule. Given independent status of Malaya, activities of Communist terrorists, and lack rapport between Moslems and local Thai officials, there is danger future serious unrest which might provide opening for Communist gains.
Another element weakness might be described as “Bangkok leftist pseudo-intelligentsia” composed largely newspapermen, former politicians rendered inactive by present government, and opportunists various kinds who might emerge as political force under Communist influence. These groups could be expected try ally selves with economically depressed workers and increasing number university graduates unable find suitable employment.
[Page 865]Other areas weakness which must be watched are university students (although problem here much reduced from previous years) and Buddhist clergy.
- (4)
- In opinion of Embassy present lack overt means political expression does not constitute serious problem. Strict control of government over formerly irresponsible (and unrepresentative) press and banning political activity lessens that vulnerability to subversion and political activity. One need only look at situation existing before 1957 coup d’etat when govt had been attempting “democratize” Thailand. Communists at that time were making significant gains, particularly in northeast and among economically depressed lower classes in Bangkok. Most of thinking Thais still thoroughly disillusioned with democracy and not anxious permit return of irresponsible, uneducated and opportunistic politicians to positions authority. In Bangkok there is some evidence dissatisfaction among intellectuals, especially those educated in Europe and America, with delay Sarit government in drafting new Constitution and planning new elections, but even among these there is no desire rush head-long into undisciplined democracy. Essential remember basic conservatism Thai people, their long period under benevolent absolute monarchy, their conspicuous lack success with even watered-down democracy and their real fear of Communism. These factors combined with an effective political alliance (at least for time being) between major conservative groups (military, civil servants and pro-monarchists), a general awareness of government’s sincere efforts improve economic conditions have combined extend period general satisfaction with Sarit government. In conclusion I would like emphasize fact that in Thailand we have extremely important asset. Country is going concern, fundamentally stable, genuinely anti-Communist and capable of making important economic, political and social gains. While not a “bastion”, it can become an area of stability if initiative, imagination and effort undertaken all sides.
As has too often been true in past, we are not faced with immediate desperate situation. We have that most important of advantages: time. Let us use it wisely but vigorously before it is too late. There is a real opportunity for us, with the help of the rest of the free world (which we must encourage) to seize the initiative, to protect and strengthen Thailand before the Communists have time to make any significant progress.
There must, however, be no business as usual attitude. Thailand has serious vulnerabilities and soft spots lying ahead. Neglect of them—especially in educated groups in Bangkok and remote settlements along frontier—will answer the hows and wheres of Communist penetration. We must seek out, identify and assess Communist target areas. It seems to me most likely that the Communists will move into a number of areas simultaneously (as they were doing in 1956–58). Therefore, we must be prepared immediately to deal with a wide range of problems and deny [Page 866] the enemy a chance ever to exploit any of them. Otherwise Southeast Asia’s “golden bowl” will sour fast.
I am pleased to know that a study of Communist bloc attempts to subvert Thailand is being undertaken in the Department. We would like to know more about it, as studies and proposals now being prepared here will contribute to that effort. As part of your assessment, I would like to present them during my June 6–9 consultations in Washington.