Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

399. Despatch From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

No. 554

Bangkok, April 3, 1961.

REF

• Deptel 1442, Embtel 1724, and Deptel 1473¹

SUBJECT

• Assurances to Thailand

I have the honor to enclose a copy of an Aide-Mémoire which I handed to the Foreign Minister today, pursuant to the referenced telegrams and after consultation with the Secretary and Admiral Felt.

A copy of the Aide-Mémoire has also been given directly to Admiral

Felt.

After reading the Aide-Mémoire the Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction and said he would discuss it with the Prime Minister. He noted that the Aide-Mémoire was related in time to the “present measures of Thai-United States cooperation and assistance to the Royal Lao Government.” I said that this was also my understanding.

There was no discussion of the question of the President’s ability or willingness to act with or without the consent of Congress.

U. Alexis Johnson

Attachment

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In his conversation with His Excellency the Prime Minister on March 28, 1961, the American Secretary of State expressed to His Excellency the appreciation of the United States Government for the relations of friendliness and frankness that exist between the two Governments and for the effective cooperation that exists in developing their common interests.

The Secretary of State further stated that he had been authorized by the President to endorse in his name the assurances of United States support of Thailand contained in President Eisenhower’s letter of November 8, 1960 to His Excellency the Prime Minister and in the Ambassador’s letter of November 3, 1960 to His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs.² The President wishes the Prime Minister to know that this is a complete commitment.

The Secretary of State also stated that he was authorized by the President to inform His Excellency the Prime Minister that Thailand can count on the full military support of the United States pursuant to its obligations in the event that present measures of Thai-United States cooperation and assistance to the Royal Lao Government should result in a Communist armed attack on Thailand. The Secretary of State noted that whereas this commitment is pursuant to formal United States obligations under the Manila Pact,³ it is not conditioned on the prior unanimous agreement of all SEATO Members. In this connection the Secretary of State noted that the current deployment of United States forces in Asia is such as to deter air attacks against Thailand because under present conditions, Communist air strikes against Udorn, Takli or other such target would require a direct military response by the United States. It is believed that the Communists cannot fail to recognize this and that the posture and capability of United States Forces in the Far East, including the ability of the Seventh Fleet to retaliate swiftly against North Vietnam, constitutes the most effective deterrent of Communist action against Thailand.

The Secretary of State is confident that the Prime Minister will agree that the exchange of views between heads of Government on matters of such delicacy as this should not be made public.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.5/4–361. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson.
1. Telegram 1442 is printed as Document 398. In telegram 1724, March 23, the Embassy in Bangkok suggested wording for incorporation into the aide-mémoire to be given Sarit before seeking his consent to U.S. B–26s operating from Thailand into Laos [text not declassified]. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2361) In telegram 1473, March 24, the Department authorized giving Sarit the aide-mémoire with some minor language changes. The Department was not prepared to offer written assurance that the United States would act promptly if Thailand were subjected to Communist armed attack even if other SEATO members were unprepared to do so. Johnson was authorized to substitute an oral assurance to that effect at his discretion as an alternative to the language that “U.S. action is not conditioned on prior unanimous agreement of all SEATO Members.” (Ibid., 792.5/4–361)
2. See footnote 1, Document 396, and footnote 3, Document 398.
3. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), signed September 8, 1954, was ratified by the Senate on February 1, 1955, and entered into force on February 19, 1955. (6 UST 81–86) The text is printed in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, pp. 912–916.