343. Memorandum of Conversation0
Washington, October 16, 1963.
PERSONS PRESENT
- Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Sir
Howard Beale (Australian Ambassador) and
Michael V. Forrestal
SUBJECT
- ANZUS Treaty and Malaysia
At 5:15 pm today Ambassador Beale came to Mr. Bundy’s office for a discussion of U.S. obligations under
the ANZUS Treaty with respect to
Australian armed forces stationed in Malaysia.
Mr. Bundy handed to Sir
Howard a paper (copy attached) outlining the United
States interpretation of its obligations under the ANZUS Treaty. Mr. Bundy
explained that the President desired that the information contained in the
paper be conveyed to Prime Minister Menzies, so that there would be no misunderstanding between
allies who were so close and intimate as the United States and Australia.
Mr. Bundy emphasized that the paper
was not an official communication and did not require formal acceptance by
the Australian Government, although he would certainly wish to hear any
comments the Ambassador or the Minister of External Affairs might have.
Sir Howard said that he understood completely; and that
the paper would surely reach the Prime Minister, since it would be carried
back to
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Canberra by Sir Garfield Barwick. The Ambassador said
that, speaking personally, the paper accurately reflected his understanding
of the situation; and that he would show it to Sir Garfield this evening and drop by in the morning before
the meeting with the President to Mr. Bundy’s office if the Minister, for External Affairs had any
comments. Mr. Bundy observed that in
the midst of a political campaign in Australia, there might well be
occasions where allusions were made to U.S. obligations under the ANZUS Treaty in connection with Malaysia. It
would be helpful to us if we were informed of the nature and scope of any
such statements before they were made.
Ambassador Beale replied that he was certain that responsible members of the
Australian Government were fully aware of the problems and would act with
great discretion. He could not, however, speak for all of the campaigners.
He agreed that consultation in advance would be wise.
The meeting was extremely cordial and appeared to give the Ambassador a
chance to correct any impression that the Australian Government had pushed
its interpretation of the ANZUS
obligations too far.
Attachment1
Paper Presented to the Australian
Ambassador (Beale)
The ANZUS Treaty provides that in the
event of an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties,
including their armed forces, public vessels or aircraft, each party
would “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes.” In view of the present situation with respect
to Malaysia, it is deemed desirable to set forth the nature of the
obligations of the parties to the Treaty as defined in recent
discussions between representatives of the United States and the
Commonwealth of Australia.
Conversations held between the Prime Minister of Australia and the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs on June 7, 1963, between the
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Prime Minister and the
President of the United States on July 8, 1963, and between the Minister
of External Affairs and the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs on October 14, 1963 dealt with the possibility of armed attack
against Australian forces stationed in Malaysia. In the context of those
conversations it was confirmed that the United States would act under
Articles IV and V of the Treaty in the event of an armed attack by
Indonesian armed forces on the armed forces, public vessels or aircraft
of Australia in Malaysia. In those conversations it was also understood
that the Treaty relates only to overt attack and not to subversion,
guerrilla warfare or indirect aggression. It was agreed that it was not
feasible to define in advance when subversion, guerrilla warfare or
indirect aggression becomes armed or overt attack, but that this matter
would be decided jointly by the parties to the Treaty.
The United States understands that Australia has its
own honorable obligations but would consult with it before
Australia makes further military commitments in the Treaty area. The
Minister of External Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia assured
the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on October 14 that
Australia would consult with the United States before stationing armed
forces in Sarawak or Sabah.
Since the Treaty does not define the kind of action the parties must take
in the event of an armed attack, the response of the United States would
be determined in consultation with the other parties to the Treaty. It
was agreed that there was a whole, range of measures which might be
appropriate including political and diplomatic activities and in an
extreme situation, the use of armed force. In view of the extensive
commitments of the United States throughout the world, however, further
consultations would be necessary before any United States armed forces
were committed. In case it was decided that such forces were necessary
in support of Australian forces engaged in the
defense of Malaysia, the United States would be prepared to
commit air and sea forces and to provide logistic support. It was
understood that any of the foregoing actions would be subject to the
constitutional processes of the United States.
It was recognized that the interests, commitments and responsibilities of
the ANZUS partners in the Pacific area
require that all parties concerned in the Malaysia controversy avoid
political actions or statements which might lead to precipitate military
action involving one or more of the ANZUS partners. The United States therefore wishes to
stress the need to use all available diplomatic and political means to
prevent any provocation, real or imagined, which would lead to an
acceleration of hostilities. To this end the United States urges that
there be the closest consultation among all parties concerned with
respect to political and military actions taken and statements made so
that the United States will be continuously in a position to give prompt
consideration to the action it should take in support of its partners
under the Treaty.
