Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII: Southeast Asia

265. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, May 12, 1962.

McGB:

Sukarno’s representative or no, I am utterly convinced that the crux of getting a WNG settlement before we have another peanut war on our hands is to force the Dutch to buy Indonesian administration. We’re all agreed on this strategy, but our tactics are often wavering and inconsistent.

Next round of talks will be crucial; if they fail I see no alternative to stepped up fighting before mediation will be feasible again. And once emotions on both sides have been inflamed to this point, bringing both parties together again will require us to be infinitely tougher than at present. Strong talk now is cheap compared to this alternative. Therefore, I urge the following scenario:

1. Send JFK letter to DeQuay¹ as soon as Indos indicate readiness to resume talks. It must be tough—only clear Dutch understanding we won’t back them will force their hand.

2. Further force Dutch hand as soon as talks resume by leaking outline of Bunker formula. Announcement of resumption will naturally lead to press queries. We then background in terms of great optimism, saying both sides have agreed to consider compromise formula combining Indo administration with adequate guarantees of Papuan rights. We’ve been toying with this idea for some time; let’s get things ready and all hands in line (I’ve pressed Rice on this).

3. Dutch stalling is based largely on hopes that economic stresses, kidney ailment or something will remove their bete noir, Sukarno. One means of damping these hopes would be for US to make forthcoming noises now about new economic aid. Dutch would be outraged, but read us loud and clear.²

4. If Dutch will genuinely commit themselves to Bunker formula, I’m confident we can get through concessions from Indos to save Dutch face (using, prospective US aid as leverage).

Let me end as I began. To be tough now may prevent the spiral of deterioration which will face us with infinitely greater headaches later. This is statesmanship to me.³

Bob K

0. Source: Kennedy Library National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer 5/62. Secret.
1. Komer drafted a Presidential letter to de Quay at Bundy’s request and sent it to Bundy under cover of a May 7 memorandum. In that memorandum, Komer also lobbied strenuously for pressure on the Dutch. (Ibid.)
2. Next to this paragraph, Komer wrote “P.L. 480”.
3. At the end of the memorandum, Komer wrote the following note: “Note scary Hague 860 about far-reaching Soviet deal with Sukarno. This almost unbelievable (except as Indo psywar), but no doubt Soviets will gain if we can’t settle WNG on our terms.” Telegram 860 from The Hague, May 12, is in Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–1262.