Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII: Southeast Asia

239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, February 23, 1962, 7:27 p.m.

2343. Eyes only for Attorney General from Secretary. We have been giving considerable thought to what you should say to the Dutch re West New Guinea and we feel that the best thing would be for you initially to confine yourself to soliciting their estimate of the situation and eliciting from them any suggestions they might have on next steps leading toward start negotiations with Indonesians. We recognize you are to be in The Hague only briefly and that Foreign Min is coming Washington early in March.

Your discussions will offer good opportunity seek from Dutch their thoughts as to ultimate outcome negotiations. Do the Dutch really believe that WNG could ever be viable as an independent state? Do they really believe that there can be any outcome ultimately other than the transfer of administration to Indonesia? Do they believe that it is wise for them to concentrate on the question of possible future independence of WNG, rather than on the establishment of friendly relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia?

FYI: It is extremely important in context of the NATO alliance and of our relations with the Dutch, that they themselves come to the inevitable decision regarding the transfer of administration to Indonesia, without ever being in the position of ascribing this decision to pressure on them by the US Government. We recognize that this makes your assignment delicate. End FYI.

In broader context world situation, it clearly in interest of West that WNG dispute be resolved peacefully in order provide minimal opportunity for Communist encroachment Indonesia.

As you probably aware, both Dutch and Indos have in past expressed to us their desire that we assume role of moderator as third party in negotiations. We are reluctant to play this role, which might well result, in the event of failure, in our being damned by both sides. However we recognize that, in view of the present stalemate, we are probably the only country which could attempt to play an active role, with any likelihood of moving things off dead center. Therefore, should the Dutch revert to their previously expressed desire and hope that the United States inject themselves directly into this issue, suggest you reply along following lines:

1. We have been very leery assuming this role because:

a. Agenda of US Government is very heavy and problem is one we could do without. We regret that it was not possible to settle this problem in the late 1940’s.

b. We fear day might come, if our efforts failed, when we would be blamed by Dutch for loss WNG.

c. We value our alliance with Dutch too highly to incur the risk lightly of jeopardizing it.

d. We are also reluctant to run the risk of having the Indos blame us for thwarting their aspirations in WNG.

2. However, it is now clear that it will be necessary to obtain prior agreement on an agenda, if formal negotiations are to take place.

3. Sukarno has suggested secret informal negotiations at Ambassadorial level for purpose of developing formulation of satisfactory agenda as a preliminary to formal negotiations. We would be prepared to have U.S. representative participate as moderator in the secret talks.

As condition to such participation however we would need prior assurances from Dutch that they would be prepared to accept formulation of an agenda which includes an item relating to transfer of administration of WNG to Indonesia in a form which would preclude alternative solution such as Independent Papuan state, or any solution other than ultimate transfer of administration to Indonesia.¹ We would also insist as condition our participation that both Dutch and Indonesians agree to negotiate formulation of question of self-determination in a manner to permit a genuine expression of the will of the people.

4. We would envisage our role as being confined to a period of preliminary talks on the agenda. The fact that such talks were being held would be kept secret as well as the substance of the talks themselves.

5. We would therefore envision that at such time as an agreed agenda has been established, formal negotiations would then take place under the auspices of the Acting Secretary General.

As appropriate and without regard to question U.S. mediation, suggest you use following arguments in pointing out to Dutch why peaceful compromise so urgently in interest of West in general. (We fear Dutch focusing too much on WNG itself rather than on larger problem of where Indonesia goes.)

(1) US efforts achieve peaceful compromise not based on pros or cons of WNG issue or on supposed anti-colonial bias; dependent rather on our acute concern over further undermining of Western position in Indonesia, which in turn could affect whole Free World strategic position in Far East. US, as ally which bears brunt of Free World defense in Far East, is presently fighting to hold on to mainland Southeast Asia. This position would be outflanked if Indonesia brought within Bloc orbit. So we greatly disturbed by drift Indonesia into closer Bloc relations, which actively exploiting WNG issue to that end. Massive nature Bloc aid to Indonesia, plus great strength of Indonesian Communist Party, amply demonstrate Bloc regards Indonesia as prime target. Hence West too must focus on larger problem; we cannot afford to let WNG become an East-West issue, with Bloc backing Indos while (as Moscow and Peking obviously hope), we back Dutch.

(2) We are also fearful that WNG will escalate into another major crisis in Southeast Asia, at a time when we are pre-occupied with Laos and South Vietnam. While US well aware of how Sukarno has blown up WNG issue for his own reasons, we think he may have pushed past point of no return. Some denouement in 1962 seems almost inevitable. We not reassured by any estimates of unreadiness Indonesian forces to mount full-scale attack before end of 1962. Indonesians could take many harassing actions short of this to precipitate shooting incidents. Indeed Indonesian strategy may be aimed primarily in this direction.

(3) Thus we see good chance of further military action and counteraction following torpedo boat incident; risks of escalation high in this situation, even if neither side intends to let things get out of hand. We do not wish run such risks or jeopardize Western position in Asia, particularly as WNG issue already narrowed almost to point of settlement. We do not see wisdom of risking military confrontation over possession Dutch have already decided to give up.

(4) On the other hand, we are under no illusions that peaceful resolution WNG issue will automatically recoup West’s competitive position in Indonesia. What we do fear is that Sukarno has let his momentum carry him to point where failure to reach peaceful compromise will almost inevitably drive him into even closer ties with Bloc. This particularly likely if crisis erupts into military confrontation in which Bloc backs Indonesians.

(5) Moreover, where do Dutch expect to come out eventually on WNG? Is a viable WNG feasible even over time and with continued substantial Dutch aid? Indonesian efforts unlikely to stop, for example, just because WNG became independent; indeed this prospect would only egg them on to forestall it.

(6) We share Dutch view that adequate provision should be made for self-determination, and Indonesians seem agreeable. We convinced that compromise settlement can be reached which will permit Dutch to disengage with honor, while resolving WNG issue in a way which enhances Western position vis-à-vis Communists.

(7) Indeed, it important that Dutch, with their long experience and past ties to Indonesia reassume a major role in maintaining this Western position. Therefore, we anxious to see Dutch use WNG settlement as leverage for re-establishing Dutch presence in Indonesia. Sukarno seems quite willing to re-establish diplomatic relations, and may go further if this made part of bargain. Thus Dutch may have real opportunity here.

Your use of the above arguments should help put US position in perspective. We would hope you could in addition to Luns talk directly to De Quay to make sure US view gets directly to high-level in Netherlands Government.

Please tell Luns we are looking forward very much to his visit in Washington on his way to Japan.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–2362. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Tyler, Stone, Komer, and Ball; cleared by Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, and Tyler; and approved by Rusk. Regarding the drafting and clearing process of this telegram, see Document 238. Repeated priority to The Hague and to Djakarta and USUN.

   On February 23, McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of the State draft of this telegram to the President in Palm Beach, Florida. Bundy observed that “it is based on premise that Sukarno’s more forthcoming position on willingness negotiate justifies our putting real heat on Dutch. This draft goes further than anything we’ve said yet to Dutch in telling them we believe only satisfactory solution will be one resulting in effective transfer WNG Administration to Indonesia.” Bundy also noted that it expressed U.S. willingness to act as moderator for the secret talks. Harriman, Ball, and the NSC Staff strongly favored this approach, Bundy stated, while Rusk was skeptical. Bundy also noted that he and Komer felt that the State draft needed “more ammo” to convince the Dutch to accept it and provided additional arguments. The telegram as sent combined the State draft with Komer’s and Bundy’s suggestions. (Telegram CAP 5078–62 to, Palm Beach, February 23; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 2/23/62–2/24/62)

1. On February 23, Assistant Secretary of State Cleveland sent Rusk a memorandum dissenting from this cable on the grounds that it “would not serve the national interests of the United States.” Cleveland could see no reason why the President and his brother felt they had to “take on the onus of forcing the Dutch to capitulate completely.” (Department of State, Central Files, 696.9813/2–2362)