225. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)0
Carl—
Djakarta’s powerful 13491 on Jones’ talk with Subandrio makes clear that we are at a critical point in our effort to prevent WNG issue from ascending into full blown crisis. With all due allowances I don’t see how we can ignore Jones’ judgment that now may be our last chance to get a peaceful settlement.
Even if not our last, it is certainly our best chance. This is critical enough a point and important enough an issue to justify another JFK-Rusk confrontation if State unwilling to move.
What is needed is a two-pronged effort: (a) to get Indos to conference table by hinting that we think they’ll make their number; (b) pressing Dutch, who seem at the brink, to take the jump. On the first, we ought to tell Jones to see Subandrio again along lines of 838 to Djakarta (attached).2
Assuming that we can get Indos to U Thant’s conference table, however, latest from The Hague suggests that we still have to convince Dutch to capitulate. Despite my reservations as to accuracy of any Dutch Foreign Office source, I suspect that Dutch have not yet made high policy decision to give up.
If Jones is right, we must give Dutch another push, lest we lose best chance to get a relatively peaceful settlement. After hinting around at it for so long, we must tell Dutch openly that our reading is they have no realistic alternative but to accept basic idea of Indo administration of WNG, with as many qualifiers as they can get to assure reasonable self-determination option later. I can’t blame Dutch for doubting that Indos have any intention of allowing genuine plebiscite five years or so from now. But the important thing is that some such Indo promise is the essential face-saving device Dutch have been seeking. We must get them to take it as best they can expect.
[Page 513]Our line with Dutch should be that U Thant talks offer perhaps last chance at a peaceful settlement before WNG crisis gets blown up to point where neither side can retreat with good grace. Do the Dutch really want to risk an escalating series of military demonstrations, of which torpedo boat incident is a harbinger? They must face up to the fact that current talks may be their last chance to get out with honor and avoid a Goa or Angola-type situation.
We must also press upon the Dutch the importance of retaining a Western presence in Indonesia, where other side is already far better entrenched than we. They keep looking at this as a WNG issue, whereas to us it is Indonesia’s future orientation which is at stake. For example, if all Western powers have to cut off aid to Indo because of mounting WNG crisis, this simply forces them to turn even more to Bloc. Instead, why don’t Dutch use WNG concessions as means of getting back some foothold in Indonesia—by asking Indos to re-establish diplomatic relations, release Dutch investments and permit some Dutch to return?
It will be a flat failure of our foreign policy if, having pushed Dutch this far, we cannot get through a compromise before WNG issue blows up into a major crisis, I’ll be talking to Ed Rice again, but our problem is not with FE and Harriman; it is with EUR and Rusk. This is worth getting President to talk with Rusk again if necessary. In fact, JFK letter to DeQuay may be what’s needed.3
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 2/62. Secret. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy.↩
- In telegram 1349, February 1, Jones reported that Subandrio had told him that Indonesia was at the end of its rope. It had shown restraint after the naval engagement, but if talks did not begin the next week the result would be a policy of military confrontation. Jones did not consider Subandrio’s statement as bluff. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–162)↩
- Document 224.↩
- At this point Komer wrote the following marginal note: “Rice [of FE, not Ambassador Rice at The Hague] agrees and will try out above line.”↩
- Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩