Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

220. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the Special Assistant (Bundy)⁰

Washington, January 12, 1962.

Mac:

The attached from Bob Komer on the discussion in the President’s meeting yesterday¹ seems to me worth some attention. I found the first item in today’s Daily Staff Summary on the Indonesian situation not very reassuring.² I suspect that, while FE is perfectly clear on the point that our task is to facilitate the achievement of the inevitable outcome in a way which minimizes the Dutch defeat, the rest of the Department may not be. They are still concerned with the rightness or wrongness of Sukarno’s behavior rather than whether an issue will arise in which we are put into a difficult position in the UN and which we will lose in substance whatever happens in appearance.

CK

Attachment³

Washington, January 12, 1962.

Carl—

I’m worried by drift of Roger Hilsman’s response to JFK question last night about how soon Indos might actually attack West New Guinea. Roger felt Indos wouldn’t be ready for some time to achieve a quick Goa-style take-over, though of course they could mount lesser landings at any time.

Roger’s answer may have been falsely reassuring to JFK in implying that we still have substantial turnaround time before a show-down. I am not at all convinced. Intelligence community has consistently estimated that Indos would not really try for a military conquest (how can you conquer WNG anyway?), but would go for a military demonstration designed to force the issue, and get it to UNGA where they’d hope to win on a straight colonial/anti-colonial vote. Since they could do this any day now, we can’t afford to relax.

Unquestionably, Sukarno is attempting to scare Dutch (and us) into capitulating on his terms. But he is now so committed that I doubt he could call off military action if this gambit fails. I don’t see how he can back down after all his big talk.

President also asked whether Australians would fight in support of Dutch. No one gave a good answer but my hunch is they would follow US lead. It we supported Dutch logistically, they would too; hence it might be wise to tell them pronto that we won’t.

In sum, my hunch is that we must keep up pressure on Dutch or we’ll have a full-blown crisis on our hands. And it is up to WH to keep pushing, since by my reading State is still ambivalent and unlikely to push hard enough on its own.

Bob K

0. Source: Kennedy Library National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. II, 1/21–3/62. Top Secret. Bundy wrote the following note on the source text: “Carl, Noted, discussed with Pres & Harriman this A.M. Averell is satisfied heat is adequate for now—so is Pres.”
1. The President met with McGeorge Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Phillips M. Talbot, Hilsman, William Gaud of the NSC Staff, Bowles, Rostow, Ball, and Ambassador to India Kenneth Galbraith. The meeting lasted from 5:05 to 6:45 p.m. and was “off the record.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) No other record of the discussion, which probably dealt with India as well as West New Guinea, has been found.

2. The first item of the Daily Staff Summary, January 12, reads:

   “1. Indonesia Seeks Talks on West New Guinea—Our Ambassador at Djakarta reports that Foreign Minister Subandrio accepted without argument our refusal to pass the Indonesian proposals on West New Guinea to Dutch Prime Minister de Quay. In response to our suggestion for an approach through U Thant, Subandrio replied: ‘Not yet.’ He would welcome the Secretary General’s participation in formal talks but did not want to involve him in preliminary explorations. For the present, Subandrio thought that secret exploratory talks held in a spirit of good will, with no third party present, could accomplish much to overcome the ‘psychological block’ between the Dutch and Indonesians. Subandrio suggested that we might be willing to ask van Roijen, the Dutch Ambassador here, whether the Dutch would accept a public statement on self-determination by Sukarno, prior to the opening of talks, in exchange for a clear definition of the purpose of the talks as leading to the transfer of the administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia. Subandrio kept reverting to the subject of secret ambassadorial talks during his conversation with our Ambassador. He again mentioned Adam Malik, Indonesian Ambassador at Moscow, as his candidate for secret bilateral talks. Our Ambassador recommends we consider an approach to van Roijen to sound him out on the idea of a public statement by Sukarno. As for Malik, our Embassy knows him well and regards him as a moderate leftist capable of handling any preliminary negotiations.” (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 142)

3. Secret.