Office of the Historian

217. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, December 27, 1961.

McGB:

SUBJECT

  • Next Moves on New Guinea

Now that bilateral talks seem about to begin (a very hopeful development), we can’t rest on our oars. Initial positions of Dutch and Indos are still so far apart that we’ll have to do a lot of behind the scenes maneuvering to force a satisfactory outcome:

1.
We’ll still have to lean more on the Dutch. The time to do it is now, before the 2 January debate in Dutch parliament. Only if Dutch know we favor Indo case will they be forthcoming in new talks. Perhaps Harriman ought to talk with Van Roijen again.
2.
Harriman’s talk with Beale (to Canberra 300, 23 [20] December)1 shows Aussies still unreconstructed on WNG. True, Sukarno would like [Page 499] to get WNG on the cheap and hopes that current negotiations will move things his way without necessity of shooting. But he is not “bluffing”; he’s already so committed that he’ll have no alternative but to start a fracas of some kind sooner or later if talks fail.
3.
On the other hand, Sukarno at long last seems to feel we are moving toward his side. We must build on this impression, bearing in mind that the whole purpose of the WNG exercise is not just to avert a crisis but to use our shift on WNG as a lever to influence Indonesian orientation.
4.
If U Thant is to be “third party” at talks, Harriman or someone should go to New York and clue him on where we stand.2
5.
Finally, we must find some way to permit Dutch to save face, before the clamor about “self-determination” boxes us all in. Why not urge Indonesians to offer such gestures to Dutch as restoration of diplomatic relations, inviting Dutch to participate in Indo’s economic development, even restoring some Dutch assets, if Dutch will give on WNG? This thought is spurred by Hague 448,3 which points out that offering to restore relations “would surely cause majority public opinion here to press the Government for more action to seek out bilateral accommodation. ..”. If Sukarno could be persuaded to make such noises before 2 January, it would help a lot in Netherlands.

Something like the above, which we would legitimately propose to Indos, might just break the log jam. I’ll feel out State.

Bob K.
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 11/61–12/61. Secret. Copies were sent to Kaysen and Schlesinger.↩
  2. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–2061)↩
  3. On the copy to Schlesinger, Komer wrote at this point: “Arthur, is A[dlai] S[tevenson] clued on this?” (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Classified, West New Guinea)↩
  4. Dated December 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–2061)↩