185. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0
SUBJECT
- Indonesia (with particular reference to West New Guinea)
West New Guinea
Attached is a telegram (Djakarta 370 of August 28)1 containing the latest Indonesian reaction to our suggestions with respect to the West New Guinea issue. This is not an encouraging message. Subandrio says that before Indonesia will commit itself to a UN solution it will want to know whether the Dutch really want to get rid of West New Guinea or whether they are simply talking about “internalization” as a delaying action, or as a means of keeping West New Guinea out of Indonesian [Page 417] hands. He must know that the Dutch do not really want to give up West New Guinea to Indonesia and that our real hope, in suggesting that the matter be referred to a UN Commission for recommendation, is that this may provide a vehicle through which Indonesia might hope to achieve its objectives without a direct frontal attack on known Dutch views.
It is clear that the Indonesians are very reluctant to take the issue to the UN, perhaps because they fear a muddle or the possibility that this will widen the degree of opposition to their position. It is also just conceivable that some sort of sub-surface negotiation is going on between the Indonesians and the Dutch, although we have no evidence whatsoever to support such a theory. State interprets Subandrio’s response as an effort to keep the dialogue going without committing Indonesia to the UN solution.
We have still not received any kind of direct reaction from Sukarno himself. It is conceivable that the Indonesians are deferring a decision on what action to take until they have had an opportunity to take soundings at the neutralist conference in Belgrade. The State Department considers it unlikely that Indonesia will take the West New Guinea issue to the UNGA unless Sukarno himself comes to the UN session. Whether Sukarno will come to New York is still uncertain but looks somewhat less likely than it did a week or so ago. Sukarno has hoped to come to the UN as the designated spokesman of the Belgrade group. He will obviously have a good deal of competition for this role from such as Tito, Nehru and Nasser.
The British and the Australians are opposed to our proposal on the grounds that, if the issue were taken to the UN in this way, the Afro-Asians would run away with it. Meanwhile the Dutch are approaching various Western European countries on the basis of a UN Trusteeship proposal which is obviously not going to get any place.
In the light of all this, the State Department is rather puzzled as to what, if anything, we can do next. We surely do not want to take the issue to the UN ourselves in the absence of any support from any of the interested parties. Yet we cannot just sit still and let the dispute continue to simmer along. My own feeling is that if we do not succeed in getting any support for our proposed UN Commission at the upcoming General Assembly meeting, we ought to reconsider our position following the meeting, giving thought once more to the possibilities of (a) stimulating bilateral talks between the Dutch and Indonesians; (b) at some appropriate time shifting our own public position to one of clearer support for the Indonesians; or (c) reviving the suggestion we made to State last May for a gradual phase-out of the Dutch Administration, to be replaced by a temporary administration by the UN or a group of neutral states, and with ultimate disposition to be determined by the UN itself at the end of the phase-out period. This last proposal was, you may recall, rejected by [Page 418] the Secretary of State on the grounds that it involved too complicated a maneuver. We have therefore gone for a simple UN Commission to make recommendations on the subject.
The Saleh Visit
Saleh is now definitely scheduled to come to Washington. He will be here with his wife for the period approximately September 24 through 27 and will be in the U.S. through October 8. State would like very much to have you get together with him for lunch sometime during his visit. Would you be agreeable? The U.S. economic mission to Indonesia should be back sometime in the next week or so but it seems doubtful whether we will be able to talk very specifically with Saleh about economic aid by the time he arrives. Recent reports indicate that Djuanda is quite seriously ill. It seems most unlikely that he will make his scheduled visit.
Visit by the Head of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce
A Mr. Soebchan, head of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, will be here for about a week beginning September 3. He is a second-level individual in Indonesia but a representative of what there is of private enterprise in that country. He is a member of the Moslem Scholars Party (NU). He has been helpful to the West in international economic conferences where he has done good work within the Indonesian delegations to moderate anti-Western views.
The Indonesian Embassy in Washington would like to have him visit you. State does not plan to approach you on the matter, recognizing that you have a very busy schedule. I volunteered, however, to ask you whether you would like for reasons of your own personal interest, to see Mr. Soebchan. He is described as a person who is knowledgeable not only with respect to the Indonesian economic situation but also with respect to the political situation. Would you be interested in seeing him?
Addendum
Saleh has asked whether it would be possible for him to make a brief call on the President during his visit here. State is of the view that the President should not be asked to see Cabinet Ministers and therefore does not plan to initiate any request in response to Saleh’s inquiry. I am informed that, generally speaking, the President has not received such callers except in unusual circumstances—for example, when a Cabinet Minister is bringing a message to the President from his Chief.