Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

180. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)⁰

Washington, July 10, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Indonesia

Following your inquiry this morning, I have been in touch with the State Department (Lindquist, the desk officer) in order to get up to date on Indonesia.

West New Guinea

There have been four conversations between the State Department and the Dutch Ambassador.¹ State promised to send us the memos of conversation within the next two or three days. In these conversations the U.S. proposal (to send a UN commission to West New Guinea to study the problem and to make recommendations) was not submitted as a firm U.S. position, but rather as a suggestion that the Dutch might consider.²

There was no meeting of minds in these conversations, but the Dutch are finally convinced that something has to be done. The Ambassador has now returned to the Netherlands. On Friday he left with the State Department a proposed draft UN resolution. The resolution proposes a visiting mission to West New Guinea but also continues to call for a plebiscite. The proposed mission would report in one year. The Dutch have proposed such a visiting mission before and it is not clear on the basis of State’s preliminary examination of the Dutch draft how much progress the resolution represents. It does state that the mission will make recommendations and indicates that any recommendations made would receive a good deal of attention from the Dutch. This is a new idea and represents some progress. Previous Dutch proposals for a visiting mission appeared to be designed to whitewash the Dutch Administration.

State is generally encouraged by the fact that for the first time in ten years the issue of West New Guinea is no longer stagnant. The very process of discussion has a value in forcing the Dutch to think rationally about the problem. Moreover, even though it may not be possible to get the Dutch to go any further than they so far have, once the issue gets into the UN the whole character of the problem will change.

The Dutch will probably never agree to our proposal because, for domestic political reasons, they must appear to be defending strongly the Dutch position on West New Guinea. But by agreeing to take the question into the UN they will be deliberately removing it from their jurisdiction and thus taking an action which may ultimately result in Indonesian control.

FE is presently pushing within State for initiation of similar talks with the Indonesians. FE doesn’t want to leave the impression that we are springing a proposal on the Indonesians after getting together with the Dutch. The general approach in the conversations with the Indonesians would be to ask them what they would find acceptable as a solution. In the course of the conversation the U.S. proposal would probably be exposed, but we would not begin the talks by advancing this proposal. As you know, Nasution made some unofficial contacts with the Dutch recently.

It seems to me that the situation is proceeding satisfactorily. I agree with FE on the desirability of early talks with the Indos.

Economic Mission

Professor Humphrey of the Fletcher School has agreed to head the economic mission and a search is now going on for other people to fill it out. I think it is a little too bad that State couldn’t have found a somewhat more prestigious figure to head this group.

We must recognize, Lindquist says, that when Saleh and Djuanda come to the U.S. in the late fall, they are likely to be seeking some kind of dollar aid commitment. As you may know, an initial plan to have Saleh and Djuanda come in mid-September had to be cancelled because of Sukarno’s plans to attend the Conference of Uncommitted Nations. State will send over to the White House today a memo requesting approval in principle for a visit in November. State is most anxious to get a decision in principle as quickly as possible since the arrangements for the visit have dragged out considerably. If we can do anything to help it will be appreciated.

The Attorney General has accepted the Indonesian invitation for a visit to Indonesia but left the date open for subsequent negotiation.

The Helicopter

State is pushing Defense for an early decision on the helicopter for Sukarno. The problem at the moment is the question of financing. Defense wishes to avoid, if possible, financing the purchase through MAP (though it has the money) for fear of antagonizing Congress. State thinks that eventually Defense will come around to the view that this is the only way procurement can be financed.

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. I, 5–8/61. Secret. Copies were sent to Bromley Smith, Komer, and Samuel Belk of the NSC Staff.
1. Regarding the first conversation, see Document 179. The other conversations were among Bowles, van Roijen, and others on June 29; Tyler, van Roijen, and others on June 30; and Tyler, van Roijen, and others on July 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/6–2961, 656.9813/6–3061, and 656.9813/7–361, respectively)
2. The proposals handed to the Netherlands Embassy on July 7 were headed “Thoughts on the possibility of creating an International Development Authority for Netherlands New Guinea.” Attached was a “Memorandum on Some Modalities Regarding an International Development Authority for Netherlands New Guinea” and a draft U.N. General Assembly resolution establishing the authority. (Ibid., 656.9813/7–2161)