I transmit herewith (Tab A) a paper outlining the background and history of
the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West New Guinea (West
Irian), and suggesting a United States course of action for dealing with it
This would be for the United States to seek the agreement of the states
concerned to the establishment of a United Nations trusteeship for the area.
We would first attempt to promote a trusteeship to be exercised by Malaya,
which has taken an active interest in finding some way of settling the
dispute. It would have to be assisted, financially and otherwise, by a
consortium of powers. If we cannot work out a trusteeship by Malaya, which
appears the most suitable candidate, we would intend to fall back upon a
proposal that the United Nations organization might itself become the
trusteeship authority.
I approve this line of approach. It has been discussed with Senator
Fulbright, and also has his general approval.1
Tab A
THE PROBLEM OF WEST NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN)
West New Guinea is the one part of the Netherlands East Indies,
redesignated Indonesia in 1948, which the Netherlands refused to
transfer to the Republic of Indonesia at their 1949 round-table
conference. They agreed then to decide its future status by negotiations
within a year. These negotiations failed, with West New Guinea remaining
under Dutch sovereignty, and Dutch-Indonesian relations have been
deteriorating ever since. Indonesia resorted to direct pressure,
successively expropriating Dutch properties, expelling many Dutch
residents, and breaking diplomatic relations. It also took the matter to
the UN, last in 1957 when the growing
Afro-Asian bloc lined up behind a resolution which in effect urged
further negotiations on the Dutch. It won a majority but failed of the
necessary two-thirds vote.
West New Guinea comprises 150,000 square miles of perhaps the most
primitive territory in the world, part of it unexplored
mountainjungle-swampland. Most of the estimated 700,000 inhabitants are
seminomadic, stone-age, Papuan tribesmen, speaking a couple hundred
mutually-unintelligible tongues. Half have had no contact with the
Netherlands administration. About 16,000 work in the employ of the
government or economic enterprises (there are also about 17,000 Dutch,
18,000 Chinese and some immigrants, mainly Eurasian, from Indonesia).
The indigenous inhabitants are closely related to the people of adjacent
Australian-administered territories but to no inhabitants of the
Republic of Indonesia excepting some on nearby islands. West New Guinea
is an economic and fiscal deficit area for which the Netherlands
recently initiated a program of economic and educational development
intended to culminate in self-determination within ten years.
The continuing dispute over West New Guinea far transcends in importance
the object of the dispute. It has permitted Sukarno, as leader of a popular national crusade, to
make any challenge to his leadership appear unpatriotic; helped enable
the Communists to undermine the conservative influence of Army leaders;
and diverted attention from urgent internal problems. Externally, it has
embroiled third powers in a series of related disputes; resulted in a
drift by Indonesia towards the Soviet bloc; and threatened hostilities.
We long tried to stay neutral, though Secretary Dulles did promise the Dutch some kind
of support in case of Indonesian attack.
The US hands-off policy towards the dispute over West New Guinea was
abandoned consequent to Secretary Herter’s approval of a Policy Planning
Staff paper of October 12, 1960, in which the dispute and alternative
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approaches to its solution
were considered in detail.3 The recommended course
was to seek a trusteeship to be exercised by the UN organization itself. Implementation, however, did not
proceed beyond preliminary discussion with the Australians before the
difficulties of the UN and its Secretary
General in and over the Congo raised the question of whether effort
should really be made to get the UN to
attempt this new task.
Meanwhile, Indonesia had responded to the sending of a Dutch aircraft
carrier and reinforcements to West New Guinea by carrying out armed
infiltrations; contracting for about $500 million of Soviet military
aid; and issuing belligerent statements. We discount the likelihood of
major military operations in the next six months, but expect the
military balance to shift in favor of Indonesia by late 1961.
Accordingly, the problem has become more urgent.
We believe: (1) Most nations of the world community are increasingly
unwilling to back politically the exercise of tutelage by a white
colonial power over any large overseas area inhabited by non-white
people. (2) Attempts to maintain it must therefore increasingly depend
on deterrent military force. (3) The Netherlands is not a power which
can maintain unchallengeable deterrent force half a world away from its
shores. (4) Indonesia doubtless hopes that the threat of superior force
coupled with political and diplomatic action will suffice, but fighting
between an Indonesia backed by the Soviets and the Netherlands is a
growing possibility. (5) Such hostilities would be a catastrophe for the
Free World; could disrupt NATO unity;
would set colored peoples against whites in and out of the UN; and might cause Indonesia—whose external
orientation and internal political trends already are a cause for grave
concern—to land wholly in the Communist camp.
We accordingly believe that recent developments only reinforce the
conclusion that the Netherlands should withdraw from West New Guinea. We
believe that the last proposal the Netherlands would accept would be
that it turn West New Guinea over to the Republic of Indonesia. We seek
rather a means whereby it may be able to meet the parliamentary and
other problems involved, and retire gracefully. We can see no
alternative except a UN trusteeship and
hope that both the Netherlands and Indonesia can be persuaded to agree.
(We do not expect the neighboring Australians to be happy about it, but
hope they will come along.) It seems to us that the Dutch might agree,
since their professed aim is self-determination for the native peoples,
and as that principle is inherent in a trusteeship. Indonesian agreement
is likely to be more difficult: they have so far indicated only that
they might accept a brief trusteeship
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intended to lead to their acquisition of the
territory. They should, however, regard Dutch departure as a favorable
development, and need not feel that self-determination would rule out
determination for a union with the Republic of Indonesia.
Malaya, as the country nearest to Indonesia geographically,
linguistically and racially, should be the prospective trustee most
acceptable to Indonesia, and it is not antagonistic to the Netherlands.
It could not be expected to undertake the task except in consequence to
the agreement of the two disputants, as it would not want to inherit
Indonesian animosity from the Dutch. Nor could it be expected to bear
the financial and other burdens without outside help: a consortium of
states interested in a solution would have to help finance costs, and
outside (perhaps UN) personnel assistance
would doubtless be required.
If such a trusteeship cannot be worked out, we could fall back on the
original proposal for a direct UN
trusteeship. The added burden on the UN
Secretary General might be minimized if an administrator of world
stature were found whose prestige would rally support, and if he were
made directly responsible to the Trusteeship Council. West New Guinea
does not present a situation quite like the Congo where rival regimes
pit armed forces against one another, and only police and constabulary
forces should be required to maintain internal order in those areas
which are now administered. If Indonesia is willing to accept and live
with a UN trusteeship, external defense
should present little problem; if it challenges the trusteeship
authorities with the threat of armed force, such a threat should at
least be easier to handle than one aimed at Dutch colonialists. The
UN would, of course, have to foot the
bill and we our share of perhaps $15 million a year, as we would under a
consortium of financing powers. If it be argued that a UN trusteeship would alter the terms of the
West New Guinea problem without settling it, we can only observe that
those terms need to be altered and that we can see no really good
solutions.
