155. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency (Bissell) to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
Washington, March 27,
1961.
I am sending you herewith a rather long-promised paper on Indonesia.
Inevitably this is a mixture of an intelligence estimate and some analysis
of the implications of this estimate for U.S. policy (this is not, of
course, a formal national intelligence estimate). I would hope for an
opportunity for some discussion of the issues raised in this paper on an
appropriate occasion (either one of the Tuesday lunches or any other group
that is reviewing policy toward Indonesia).
Attachment2
Washington,
March 22,
1961.
SUBJECT
- 1.
- Indonesia’s growing vulnerability to communism stems from the
distinctive bias of Sukarno’s
global orientation, as well as from his domestic policies. The
former propels that country toward the Soviet orbit. The latter sap
the political foundation of any organized attempt to deny the
Communist Party a mass base, strive to neutralize the Indonesian
Army as a force opposing communism, and permit economic
mal-administration to stifle all constructive impulses toward
improving the lot of the Indonesian people. Dissident movements on
Java and the outlying islands, which have a basically anti-Communist
orientation, have been permitted to wither from lack of sustenance.
They are now virtually
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on
their last legs and no longer represent a viable force in being. In
Attachment B to this paper, entitled “Countervailing Forces?”,3 we attempt to shed light upon
the factors which render the Indonesian Army progressively more
ineffectual in its containment of communism, and present an estimate
of dissident strength upon which we base our conclusion that as a
political power factor it no longer counts.
- 2.
- Economic factors are likely to play a decisive role in making
Indonesia ripe for a Communist takeover. While it can be argued that
the vast majority of the rural population of Indonesia are
impervious to the hardships of life on a bare subsistence level, the
urban proletariat, especially in Java, may be found less supine. An
Eight-Year Plan has been launched, predicated on the availability of
foreign loans on an unrealistic scale of magnitude. A growing
budgetary load will have to be borne in order to fund Indonesia’s
preparations for a showdown over West Irian. The expansion of
Indonesia’s military establishment is bound to make heavy inroads
into Indonesia’s financial resources. Consequently, a continuing and
accelerated decline in the economic life of Indonesia is very
probable. While economic atrophy may set the stage for a Communist
uprising, we consider it more likely that (barring completely
unforeseen developments) Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” will be permitted by
the PKI to run its natural course. This would enable the Communist
Party to take over the leadership of Indonesia at a time when
radical changes in the methods of administering Indonesian domestic
affairs become the inescapable alternative to perpetual chaos. Even
achievement of a modus vivendi between the United States and
President Sukarno could not
stave off such a development.
- 3.
- While many factors of the Indonesian situation remain objects of
contention, it would be hard to deny Sukarno’s responsibility for the economic decline of
Indonesia. That his dictatorship may possibly endure as long as he
lives strikes us as the crux of the Indonesian problem. In
Attachment A of this paper, entitled “President Sukarno—Key to the Indonesian
Situation,”4 we are attempting to throw into more striking
relief the many insoluble problems besetting Indonesia, which can
directly be traced back to Sukarno’s personality and to the political
philosophy that animates him. As we see it, Sukarno’s continued leadership of
Indonesia—irrespective of his momentary friendships with the Bloc or
the West—renders Indonesia increasingly more vulnerable to PKI
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strategy, which is to make
its decisive bid for legal power under circumstances of economic and
political chaos with all other political solutions evidently
exhausted.
- 4.
- The forthcoming talks between Presidents Kennedy and Sukarno will take place in the shadow
of a threat of war between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West
Irian. The United States, having thus far observed “impartiality”
regarding this issue, may be forced to abandon this stance, should
the crisis deepen. With abandonment of “impartiality” connoting
involvement, the United States Government will have no choice but to
take a position regarding the validity of Indonesia’s claim to
sovereignty over West Irian.
- 5.
- This paper does not intend to address itself to the legal merits
of the respective claims advanced by Indonesia and the Netherlands.
Both nations have made it abundantly clear that they do not consider
the ownership issue as “sub judice” but as a bare contest of power,
with Indonesia claiming that its national independence will
necessarily remain incomplete and in permanent jeopardy as long as
the Netherlands maintains its hold over West Irian. We realize that
this may be considered a simplification of an issue which has become
a highly sensitive internal political question in both countries,
complicated by considerations of national pride and “face” and by
the entire history of Dutch-Indonesian relations.
- 6.
- Without suggesting that other factors can be ignored in
determining United States policy regarding West Irian, we believe
that one important aspect has not as yet been given sufficient
consideration—namely, how United States interests will be affected
if Indonesia carries the day and ownership of West Irian is awarded
to her. We believe that accession to Indonesia’s claim as long as
Sukarno is in power would
not serve the best interests of United States security in that part
of the world. We consider it likely that Indonesia’s success in this
particular instance will set in train the launching of further
irredentist ventures already foreshadowed in lectures given by
Professor Yamin, an avowed extremist who, however, is a member of
the Indonesian cabinet close to President Sukarno. Success would be bound to cement relations
between Indonesia and the USSR,
which, in addition to throwing the full weight of its political
support behind the West Irian campaign, is liberally providing
Indonesia with military aid specifically designed to enable her to
oust the Dutch from West Irian by force of arms. President Sukarno’s prestige and power in
Indonesia and in Asia as a whole would grow immeasurably, since
nothing succeeds like success. Even assuming that it were the weight
of United States power and prestige which gained Indonesia a
bloodless and prestigious victory, we would not gain that country’s
respect, let alone affection. Indonesia’s leadership would see to it
that the true record of events would be slanted to substantiate the
boast that it
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was the
threat of USSR intervention, the
leadership of President Sukarno
and the unflinching support given him by the Communist Party which
combined in making this victory possible. Predictions that the
Indonesian armed forces, once freed from their preoccupations with
the Dutch threat, would be able to concentrate upon dislodging
communism from positions of influence tend to ignore the
demonstrated effectiveness of President Sukarno’s tactics of never allowing the army a
sufficient breathing spell to consolidate and methodically deploy
its political strength in combatting communism. There is nothing to
encourage the belief that President Sukarno intends to abandon those tactics once West
Irian has been annexed. In sum, by backing Indonesia’s claim to
sovereignty over West Irian, we may inadvertently help to
consolidate a regime which is innately antagonistic toward the
United States.
- 7.
- The proposal of a United Nations trusteeship, which the Department
of State appears to favor, would go a long way toward de-fusing the
West Irian time bomb which President Sukarno himself has primed. It would present an at
least temporary solution of the problem, permitting the United
States to escape the opprobrium of having sided with the Netherlands
on a “colonialist” issue. However, unless confronted with
unmistakable manifestations of United States resolve not to permit a
settlement of the West Irian issue by force of arms, and of our
vigorous opposition to turning this area over to the Indonesians
without any observance of self-determination procedures, the
Sukarno regime would be
unlikely to acquiesce in the imposition of such a
trusteeship.
- 8.
- It has been argued (Djakarta Embassy Telegram No. 1861, dated
December 28, 1960)5 that the
new policy of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Indonesia leaves us with
only one practicable alternative, namely, “to continue a moderate
program of economic and military assistance sufficient to bolster
the political position of our friends within Indonesia and to enable
those who are willing to stand on principle to do so without being
submerged by the overwhelming temptation of and pressures engendered
by Soviet offers.” The foregoing alternative would seem to epitomize
policies that have been tried by the United States Government since
Indonesia gained her independence and that have failed in the
attainment of their set objectives to keep Indonesia out of
Communist hands. We are disposed to argue that our national policy
should be to treat Indonesia as a case in which appeasement, whether
by word or by deed, will buy us nothing. Hence to propose stepped up
aid as a blueprint, for future action simply begs the question
whether Communist ascendancy in Indonesia can be curbed as long as
Sukarno remains in power.
We believe it cannot.
- 9.
- It would be gratifying to be able to propose an alternative course
of action by the United States which would stand a good chance of
turning the course of events in Indonesia in a constructive
direction. Unfortunately, this is a situation in which the influence
that the United States can exert, at least in the short run, is
extremely limited, if (as must be assumed) crude and violent
intervention is excluded. Any “carrot” in the form of economic or
military aid or diplomatic support that is freely given will (for
reasons set forth above) be used simply to consolidate an
essentially unacceptable regime. Any “stick” the United States would
be willing to use would be too feeble to destroy the regime and
would simply accelerate the process of disorganization which (it is
argued above) is the probable prelude to a constitutional Communist
take-over. Under these difficult circumstances we believe that the
least unsatisfactory policy for the United States is to apply
pressures, but politely and without public recrimination, to offer
favors, but only on tough conditions, and in these ways to create
such inducements as we can for the Indonesian elite, both civilian
and military, and for Sukarno
himself, to behave in a more constructive fashion.
- 10.
- At the very minimum we should not now entertain any major
increases in the scale of economic or military aid to Indonesia and
we should lose no opportunity to make clear that the reason for our
negative action is that the Indonesians are in no position to make
effective use of such resources in pursuit of goals we can support.
Perhaps this pressure can best be applied affirmatively by giving
the impression that we would consider substantial economic aid if
difficult but essentially technical conditions were met and that we
would consider increased military aid if we had confidence that
Indonesia would not resort to aggression against the Dutch and that
their military services had not already become dangerously dependent
on Communist Bloc support. Our attitude on these major matters, and
on specific political issues as they arise, should be made known,
using all available contacts, to the military establishment and the
leading politicians as well as to Sukarno himself. Such a hardening in our posture,
without overtones of hostility or anger, would serve to alert the
conservative elements among Indonesia’s leadership to the
ineluctable necessity of choosing between absorption by the
Communist Bloc and association as an equal within the comity of free
Western and Asian nations. To take the opposite position—to appease
Sukarno on the West Irian
and other questions, and to compete with the Bloc in economic and
military aid in the vain hope of gaining time—would, we believe,
finally destroy the resolve of conservative elements to oppose
Sukarno’s policies and to
act as a brake on the leftward and downward course of
Indonesia.
- 11.
- The coming talks between the President and his Indonesian guest
offer an important opportunity to convince Sukarno of the firmness
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of the United States position on an occasion
when the treatment accorded him should be flattering and should
itself convince him of the importance this government attaches to
the future of his country. It is important that “red carpet”
treatment and the circumstance of a Presidential meeting should not give him the impression that the United
States is prepared to support him in the basically hostile and
unconstructive course he currently pursues.
