155. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
I am sending you herewith a rather long-promised paper on Indonesia. Inevitably this is a mixture of an intelligence estimate and some analysis of the implications of this estimate for U.S. policy (this is not, of course, a formal national intelligence estimate). I would hope for an opportunity for some discussion of the issues raised in this paper on an appropriate occasion (either one of the Tuesday lunches or any other group that is reviewing policy toward Indonesia).
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. I, 1/61–3/61. Secret. Also sent to Rostow, McGhee, Nitze, and Amory.↩
- Bissell’s initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Bissell signed the original.↩
- In Attachment B, not printed, the author discounted General Nasution as a potential counterweight to Sukarno. The estimate concluded that the “Sukarno/Nasution axis appears quite durable.” A bloodless victory over the Dutch in West Irian would make Sukarno even stronger among the more conservative Indonesian military. The author concluded that the armed dissident movements “will probably have to be counted out.” In sum, there were no countervailing elements to challenge Sukarno.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- For text,
see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XVII, pp. 586– 589.↩