Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

124. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State⁰

Phnom Penh, November 30, 1963, 8 p.m.

437. I accompanied Forrestal to audience with Sihanouk 11 o’clock this morning at Palace. Prince seemed unusually nervous and somewhat excitable but showed his usual courtesy throughout hour and quarter exchange. Two major points were discussed, his troubles with SVN and his ardent hopes for international conference (subject septel).¹

After opening courtesies, Forrestal explained that he had come Phnom Penh because of President Kennedy’s great personal interest in Cambodia and leadership shown by Prince. President Kennedy had been gravely concerned at the charges against United States recently made by him especially since had made a personal investigation of them and given his own assurances that they were baseless. President Johnson had directed Forrestal in Saigon immediately after the tragedy in the US to continue with mission and to add President Johnson’s own assurances of continued sincere US concern for the independence and neutrality of Cambodia and his strong desire for continued friendly relations with Sihanouk and his government.

Sihanouk replied that he had never doubted sincerity of President Kennedy or of USG despite differences in political viewpoint toward problems of SEA. Khmer Serei did not represent real threat his regime since they had no support within Cambodia. But their activities were continuing offense to Cambodian people who resented attacks upon their sovereignty. Although US might not be directly involved, fact remained that KS broadcasts and Son Ngoc Thanh activities in SVN continued. Sihanouk could not believe we were without influence there, and could not understand why we and GVN permitted such activities which only helped Communists and enemies of Cambodia.

Forrestal pointed out that for some time US had experienced great difficulties convincing Diem regime in SVN take sensible positions in foreign affairs. Although we had no direct evidence of KS activities in SVN, we had tried hard to persuade GVN to locate and suppress them. New regime in Saigon gave greater hope. Forrestal discussed problem with principal leaders Revolutionary Council earlier this week and had distinct impression they honestly unaware of location KS transmitters. They seemed anxious to cooperate in effort to locate and suppress broadcasts and make effort to neutralize political activities Son Ngoc Thanh. They were also anxious to seek ways of achieving détente in SVN/RKG relations generally.

Sihanouk said he too had great hopes for new regime in Saigon and had made arrangements send three-man delegation headed by Son Sann to open quiet negotiations. This frustrated by disclosures Khmer Serei agent, Preap Inn, which he could not ignore. (Yesterday Nhiek Tioulong and Penn Nouth said break-off was result publication Saigon press of coup rumors in Phnom Penh.)

Forrestal asked if Saigon authorities attempted locate radio, and neutralize Son Ngoc Thanh, would Sihanouk cooperate by suspending jamming KS radio and avoid further attacks on GVN for few weeks. Then it would be possible revive bilateral conversations.

Sihanouk replied he would be happy suspend jamming and observed that all of his five-point request of SVN would have been met if radio silenced and political activities ceased since other points not a problem. Negotiations could then be resumed.²

In separate conversations Forrestal and I had yesterday with elder statesmen Penn Nouth and Nhiek Tioulong, during which Forrestal acquainted them with general trend his conversations in Saigon and impressions of desire new regime be responsive to efforts improve Cambodian-SVN relations, both Penn Nouth and Nhiek Tioulong emphasized that if Khmer Serei radio silenced and Son Ngoc Thanh activities ended, RKG would be most willing resume conversations for improvement relations between two countries. We had impression that they consider these two first steps essential to any effort improve relations.

Sprouse

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) CAMB. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:02 a.m. on December 1 and repeated to Paris, Bangkok, London, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 438 from Phnom Penh, Sprouse reported separately on this topic. Sprouse noted that Sihanouk emphasized that what he most desired was U.S. support of his neutrality proposal. Sihanouk suggested that a newly empowered and enlarged ICC could ensure effective control of the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border and thus reassure the United States about Viet Cong infiltration into South Vietnam. Sihanouk preferred a conference along the lines of the 1961–1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, to be held not at Geneva or Phnom Penh (for cost reasons), but perhaps at Bandung, Indonesia. (Ibid., POL 27–13 CAMB)
2. In telegram 436 from Phnom Penh, November 30, Sprouse reported separately on the discussion with Sihanouk on the termination of U.S. aid. Sihanouk stressed a number of times that the termination did not mean a change in U.S.-Cambodian friendship. Once relations were established on a more solid basis, a new formula could be found to provide aid without a large U.S. aid mission. (Ibid., AID (US) CAMB)