121. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State0
416. CINCPAC for POLAD. Viewed in domestic Cambodian context, Sihanouk’s recent actions and statements, notably renouncement [Page 265] US aid but also to certain extent his nationalization measures and pronounced leaning toward Communist bloc, could awaken political consciousness and create active opposition in this country, where for all practical purposes, neither has existed for years, if ever. At moment only few signs indicate this process may have begun. However, there are more signs that Sihanouk’s actions are neither fully understood nor approved by educated class, which for most part lives in Phnom Penh and is also found in armed forces and government service throughout the country. It is same group which individually will feel major economic impact of cessation US aid programs and Sihanouk’s nationalization and other economic measures. They will witness, firsthand, consequences in armed forces, commerce, schools and development projects, as well as to their own urbanized style of life and private fortunes. If, as seems reasonable possibility, substantial portion of this group proceeds from an attitude of not fully understanding and not approving Sihanouk’s behavior to one of positive disagreement, result, in terms of domestic political structure, may be both unprecedented and at this point unpredictable.
Sihanouk himself, as if aware of these reactions and this prospect, has in true demagogic style reached over heads of educated and propertied by holding November 19 Special National Congress, which traditionally is forum of and for masses rather than leaders. Significant that Sihanouk chose this occasion to surface two Khmer Serei agents and, in effect, to announce his decision to cancel US aid programs, all in manner which could only have been calculated to charge mass emotions at risk of shocking less primitive people of Phnom Penh. We have [garble] reports that this emotionally charged meeting and Sihanouk’s public build up of imminent danger KS cum SVN invasion Cambodia have aroused real fear among Cambodians, even to point some express fear for foreigners in Cambodia, particularly Americans, because of Sihanouk’s appeal to masses coupled with inflammatory statements against US. In marathon-like speeches Sihanouk has publicly accused US of plotting against him for years and of direct involvement in plot with Khmer Serei and GVN to overthrow him and has described US aid as humiliating, irritating and source danger to Cambodia, which cannot in honor continue to receive it. His public reiteration these accusations day after day during past two weeks has inevitably had effect on man in street.
[5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] More than ever, one such source of frustration to the better-motivated leaders would be that of border incidents involving South Vietnamese or Thai armed forces. I recommend therefore that Dept, in consultation with Saigon, consider what measures could be taken by US military authorities Saigon, without requiring any approach to GVN, which could reduce to minimum possibility further border incidents, most especially during coming weeks as we engage in negotiations with RKG (including MND) officials regarding [Page 266] phasing out US aid programs. We are now receiving notes from Foreign Office charging SVN violations border by planes and armed units between October 10 and November 11 resulting in deaths three Cambodians. Continuation these incidents can only provide support Sihanouk’s demagogic appeal to masses over heads of moderate elements and could lead to further unpredictable action by him.
Above analysis deals with extremely sensitive situation, public knowledge of which could be extremely damaging under any circumstances, and disastrous if attributed to USG. We are therefore severely limiting distribution this message here and urge similar procedure by addressees.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) CAMB. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. No time of transmission is on the source text; the telegram was received at 8:58 a.m.↩