117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia0

253. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtels 381, 382, 383, 384.1

1.
On basis your recommendation and Hilsman’s talk Nov. 20 with Nong Kimny,2 Dept. concurs U.S. should immediately agree to Cambodian request. Although agree we should conduct negotiations so as to preserve best relations with Cambodia possible under circumstances, any delay in beginning talks or stalling during them would neither be in keeping with dignity of U.S. or defensible before U.S. Congress and public.
2.
Dept. is cabling separately text of first person note which you should deliver under instructions soonest.3
3.
In delivering note, you should make the following points with respect to charges against U.S. and investigation of them:

The President has a high regard for Prince Sihanouk and does not want any impairment of relations with him. He has therefore, himself, looked into the matter and he can find no evidence whatever of any complicity or involvement on the part of the United States Government or any of its officers. Therefore, if Prince Sihanouk has any evidence to the [Page 259] contrary the President would like to have it. The United States has of course given a variety of arms and communications equipment to the Vietnamese and Thai Governments just as it has to the Cambodians. Therefore, to be meaningful the evidence must be specific—exactly when and where did the Americans give the arms and radios as alleged? What were the names of the Americans alleged to have given this equipment? What instructions were these Americans alleged to have given to the recipients? If arms were received from Americans, what evidence is there that they were given for any purpose other than those related to the normal strategic hamlet program in South Viet-Nam and subsequently misappropriated by recipients? Etc.?

Johnson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) CAMB. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Hannah and Hilsman; cleared in draft by U. Alexis Johnson and Bromley Smith at the White House; and approved by Hilsman. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, London, Paris, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for Secretary Rusk who was in Honolulu.
  2. In these telegrams, all November 20, the Embassy reported on the formal notification it had received from Cambodia on termination of aid. In telegram 381, the Embassy sent the translated text of the note that claimed proof of U.S. complicity with the Khmer Serei, announced cessation of aid, asked for bilateral negotiations to bring about termination, and stated that diplomatic relations would be maintained. (Ibid.) In telegram 382, Sprouse described his discussion with Acting Secretary of State Phurissa upon receipt of the note. (Ibid.) In telegram 383, Sprouse recommended that the United States “meet head-on and forthrightly Sihanouk’s flimsy charges” and work patiently to reestablish better relations. (Ibid.) In telegram 384, the Embassy summarized the specific Cambodian charges of Khmer Serei activity and alleged U.S. and South Vietnamese complicity. (Ibid., POL CAMB-US)
  3. On November 20, Assistant Secretary Hilsman called in Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny. Hilsman denied the charges of U.S. complicity and stated that the United States could not control South Vietnam or Thailand. Hilsman told the Ambassador that Cambodia was about to throw away the opportunity provided by Diem’s overthrow for better relations with South Vietnam. Hilsman left to talk to the President on the phone and then returned to his discussion. He informed Nong Kimny that the President asked what the United States could do to assure Sihanouk that the charges were false and preposterous. Nong Kimny suggested that the situation would improve in time and assured Hilsman that termination of U.S. aid would not mean that Cambodia would fall into the Communist camp. (Telegram 254 to Phnom Penh, November 20; ibid., AID (US) CAMB)
  4. In telegram 252 to Phnom Penh, November 20. (Ibid.)