Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State⁰

Phnom Penh, November 13, 1963, 6 p.m.

348. CINCPAC for POLAD. This message represents my evaluation present situation following soundings taken since my return November 10 among diplomatic colleagues and senior members my staff. Principal factors leading Sihanouk issue his ultimatum regarding cessation US and French aid¹ were:

(1) Sihanouk’s real fear of assassination and attempted overthrow his regime in wake of coup d’etat at Saigon and death of Diem.²Sihanoukconvinced of US complicity in coup d’etat and of CIA backing Khmer Serei activities.

(2) Sihanouk’s strong resentment French failure to provide desired economic and financial aid, which he had hoped would serve to replace US aid as it gradually phased out. French Ambassador denies any knowledge of direct Sihanouk request for such assistance but says that assiduous courting of France by Sihanouk over long period was evidently designed to produce French offers of financial aid. French are convinced he expected such aid.

(3) Foregoing two factors must be viewed in conjunction with Sihanouk’s own physical and mental state. Rigid diet cure taken at time he was already overworked and exhausted has left him in highly nervous and overwrought state of mind. This black mood coming at time of Diem overthrow and death helped to set in motion events which followed.

Sihanouk issued his ultimatum in his speech of November 5 without any consultation with his senior advisers or Cabinet ministers, who were all taken by surprise. Moderating influences are now at work on him, principally the Queen, Monireth, Penn Nouth, and perhaps Nhiek Tioulong, consensus of informed observers is that black mood will have to work itself out and that for time being best course is for foreign governments affected to avoid strong reaction and remain calm; moderating influences seeking to bring Sihanouk around to a more reasoned approach and economic and financial facts of Cambodia life (which are already beginning to come to surface with closing of banks and weakening of riel, being reported in separate telegram) should be given chance to bring him to face up to inevitable results of his proposed course of action. Implications of cessation US aid, as they become apparent to govt leaders, should serve useful purpose in weeks ahead in this connection.

Implications of situation remain serious with respect prospects continuation US aid programs. French Embassy Counselor says Sihanouk has asked Peiping for economic and financial experts to replace French advisers. Sihanouk continues speak of termination US economic and military aid by January first and in latest speech suggested French military advisers might be kept on under another guise. Tragedy of situation is that he has created crisis where one did not exist and in process may be opening up Pandora’s box which could serve (1) to create very internal opposition he fears (we have not yet had any evidence of organized opposition but many influential Cambodians are seriously concerned over these developments) and (2) to pave way for Communist regime and his own eventual elimination. In latest speech he says he does not intend to abandon his policy neutrality and nonalignment. Problem will be to find some avenue of retreat which would allow him to reverse his field without great loss of face.

One hopeful straw in wind is reliable report he is considering taking brief leave of absence, which might be spent in France. Although difficult to see how he could leave Cambodia at this stage, his presence in France would enable de Gaulle’s influence to be brought to bear on Sihanouk and this could be decisive in reversing present trend.

Expect to present in near future recommendations, on Country Team basis, for actions we should take in implementation economic and military aid programs during period prior December 31. In meantime all members of Country Team are continuing take maximum soundings regarding developing situation.

In light foregoing and until situation further clarified I recommend we make no representations to RKG for time being, either here or in Washington, although I expect see Acting SecState Foreign Affairs and Nhiek Tioulong and seek clarification latest developments. To join issue with Sihanouk now might push him out on limb and make more difficult, if not impossible, his retreat at later date. In meantime I strongly urge that serious consideration be given to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] effort to halt Khmer Serei activities, particularly broadcasts which helped to set off Sihanouk’s outburst. While they may no longer be decisive factor, continuation these broadcasts could still affect seriously situation here with very adverse effect on US position. While recognizing problems this will pose for Bangkok (Bangkok’s tel 724 to Dept),³ I consider US interests involved warrant such an approach.

Sprouse

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) CAMB. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:07 a.m. and repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, CINCPAC, Saigon, and Vientiane.
1. On November 6, the Embassy reported that Sihanouk had published a public ultimatum stating that if Khmer Serei broadcasts were not ended by January 1, 1964, he would terminate United States and French aid to Cambodia. (Telegram 331, November 6; ibid., AID (FREE WORLD) CAMB)
2. Ngo Dinh Diem’s government in South Vietnam was overthrown on November 1.
3. In telegram 724 from Bangkok, November 11, the Embassy reported that Thanat had taken the Deputy Chief of Mission aside at a dinner in Bangkok to pass a message that Thailand believed Sihanouk would not join the Communist camp. Thanat stated that Thailand was not at fault and did not want the United States to get “jittery” and press Thailand on the matter. Thanat pointedly asked if the DCM got the message. When he received an affirmative reply, Thanat added, “Do you read me loud and clear?” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–13 CAMB)