Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

210. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 60-62

Washington, July 11, 1962.

GUINEA AND MALI AS EXEMPLARS OF AFRICAN RADICALISM

The Problem

To examine the nature and effect of the radical policies of Guinea and Mali and to assess their wider significance.

Conclusions

A. Guinea and Mali, along with Ghana, are the main centers of African radicalism south of the Sahara. Their attitudes and policies are dominated by strong anticolonialism which tends to make them suspicious of the Western Powers and sympathetic with Communist formulas. In domestic policy their approach is militantly nationalistic and revolutionary. In foreign affairs they seek to establish themselves as leaders of radicalism in Africa and to promote policies of neutralism and nonalignment. These policies have given them notoriety and significance out of proportion to their power and resources. (Paras. 1, 6-8, 31)

B. Radical governments are still in a minority in Africa, but the state of mind reflected in radicalism is present throughout the continent. At the same time radicalism itself is changing as a consequence of the clash between its theories and practical realities. The trend is toward a blurring of present distinctions and a converging of the radical and moderate viewpoints, with many of the concepts of African radicalism playing an increasingly important role. (Para. 13)

C. Communist influence in both Guinea and Mali has been extensive. It has greatly influenced government organization, the dominant authoritarian parties, and the mass organizations characteristic of political life in both countries. The Communist countries have supplied Guinea since its break with France with the bulk of its aid from outside sources and have also assisted Mali, though the latter country has continued to receive roughly equal amounts from France. The foreign trade of both countries has been substantially reoriented toward the Bloc, although Mali continues to import heavily from the West. The two countries together have more Bloc advisers and technicians than all other sub-Saharan countries put together. (Paras. 9, 21-22, 25, 29-30, 35-37)

D. Nevertheless, Guinea and Mali have retained their freedom of action under President Sekou Toure and President Modibo Keita. Each heads a group within the dominant Political Bureau of his party which takes a generally flexible and pragmatic point of view, as opposed to the view of doctrinaire pro-Bloc elements. It appears likely that both Presidents will succeed, at least for the next year or two, in maintaining the dominance of their pragmatic approach, which seeks to maintain contacts with the West to balance those with the Bloc. Keita’s position, however, is much less strong than Toure’s. Over the past few months there has been in Guinea some disillusionment with Bloc assistance and mounting concern about the political wisdom of relying solely on the Bloc. Mali’s reliance on the Bloc is likely to be balanced by continuing relations with the West. (Paras. 16, 33, 40-41)

E. The most significant thing about Guinea and Mali during the period since their independence is that, while they have offered the Bloc the best opportunities it has had in Africa, and while the Bloc has made a vigorous effort to take advantage of them, the two countries are not Communist and are, in fact, maintaining a more or less independent position. We believe that this experience is germane to African radicalism throughout the continent and may serve in a general way as a guide to its probable long-term attitudes, policies, and orientation. (Para. 42)

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0. Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on July 11, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.