209. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)0
Dear Alex: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed concern that, if contingency operations were required in sub-Saharan Africa, we would lack assurance of effective communications for command and control of our deployed forces. We would be dependent upon facilities at Kenitra, San Pablo, Wheelus, and Asmara. The use of these facilities to support contingency operations in Africa might be denied or harassed, for political reasons, by the host Governments involved. Accordingly, we attach importance to making arrangements with the United Kingdom under which we could install and operate communications equipment at Ascension Island, when required during contingency operations, and when use of other facilities is not feasible.
Such equipment would be used for command and control of forces deployed to Africa and for ship-shore communications coverage of the South Atlantic and the African west coast. The equipment would consist of transportable transmitters and receivers to be airlifted into Ascension Island on approximately 36-hours notice when required. We estimate that about 80 to 120 men would be required for the temporary operation of such facilities, depending upon the type of equipment selected and the extent to which support could be provided by other U.S. activities on the island at the time.
There are no current plans for the establishment of permanent communication facilities at Ascension Island, nor for any construction in anticipation of contingency use. Any construction later undertaken in this connection would be the minimum consistent with the circumstances (e.g., the preparatory time available during a contingency, the support available from other U.S. activities at Ascension, and the expected duration of the operations). For the present, the requirement is only to identify and have kept available two suitable sites of 4 to 6 acres each, for receiver and transmitter areas. The former could be co-located with existing Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) receivers; the latter would be located and the frequencies used would be selected and coordinated to avoid interference with existing electronic systems on the island.
It is relevant to point out that we have examined the possibility of using existing AMR communications facilities for these purposes. We have concluded that this arrangement would not be practicable. If we rely [Page 320] upon these facilities to carry both AMR traffic and contingency operations traffic between Ascension Island and the continental U.S., we would be risking serious and untimely interruptions in one or the other of these important activities. Moreover, the AMR facilities are not suitable for the essential relay of contingency operations traffic between Ascension Island and the deployed forces themselves.
We would appreciate whatever steps you can take to obtain the agreement of the United Kingdom to make sites available on Ascension Island for possible use as described above. As to the form of such an agreement, we have envisaged an exchange of notes authorizing this use of Ascension Island subject to the provisions, insofar as they are applicable, of the Long Range Proving Ground Agreement (Ascension Island), TIAS 3603, of June 25th, 1956. Your views as to the suitability of this approach would also be appreciated.
We would be pleased to arrange for any further information or assistance you might desire in this matter.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.54/7-662. Secret.↩