Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

123. National Security Action Memorandum No. 102⁰

Washington, October 6, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR

• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Concerning Bases in Morocco

1. The President has approved the following State/Defense recommendations:

(1) While being prepared to fulfill our commitment to withdraw our forces by the end of 1963, we should exploit every feasible opportunity to retain the use of the facilities beyond that date. In the interim we should continue to evaluate the need for these facilities to determine whether it would be in the overall US interest to use extraordinary measures, such as a major political concession at an appropriate time, to retain the use of the bases after 1963.

(2) Given the present trend of developments in the Near East and Africa and the internal political uncertainties in Morocco, we should not base important military plans upon the expectation that we will be able to retain the military use of any facilities in Morocco after 1963. We should realize that the continued use of these facilities in Morocco, a non-aligned country, is subject to many hazards even under present conditions.

(3) There is little evidence that the King is now prepared to grant us, except on presumably unacceptable political conditions, an agreement which would assure the post-1963 tenure of communications sites. Additionally, such an agreement if consummated could become the immediate target of political attacks, and of course there can be no assurances such an agreement would be honored in the political circumstances prevailing at the end of 1963. Nevertheless, the Ambassador should explore the question further with the King on the basis of a detailed Defense proposal as to what would be acceptable after 1963.

(4) With due regard for financial costs, we should assist Morocco in the effective utilization of the bases after 1963 and, in this regard, endeavor to preserve some form of U.S. presence (civilian or military) on the bases after 1963. The objectives should be to:

(a) insure that the bases will not be made available in any way to hostile forces,

(b) insure that Moroccan utilization of the bases would be compatible with possible US use after 1963 and that the bases would be suitably maintained for such use, and

(c) make maximum use of the bases in connection with US programs of economic and technical assistance in Morocco.

(5) We should continue:

(a) to endeavor to improve our intelligence coverage regarding the activities of the Soviet pilots and technicians associated with the Soviet aircraft;

(b) to impress on appropriate Moroccan officials our deep concern regarding the presence of these pilots and technicians and to recall to such officials the King’s statement regarding the termination of the Soviets’ mission, and

(c) to consider whether we are in a position to take any sort of “retaliatory” action.

(6) In the light both of the King’s demonstrated determination to have a modern Air Force and of his demonstrated willingness to accept Soviet bloc assistance in this field, despite his professed interest in US support, we should be prepared to offer US support in the expansion of the Royal Moroccan Air Force, bearing in mind the effect which such support would have on our relations with Spain and France as well as African countries. Such support should be subject to the following general conditions and limitations:

(a) We would inform the French and Spanish of our intention to offer assistance to the Moroccan Air Force.

(b) If feasible the size of the program should be held down in the initial years to permit us to evaluate the success of the program in achieving US objectives before we become too heavily involved in the support of the Moroccan Air Force.

(c) The character and extent of any US assistance should be kept at the minimum consistent with our aim of precluding further Soviet support of the Moroccan Air Force. We should first endeavor to ascertain whether the establishment of a flying training facility and provision of aircraft to improve Morocco’s air transport capability would suffice. If it nevertheless appears necessary to provide jet fighters and training, we should limit our offer to F-86s. If the King of Morocco, despite our best efforts, insists on an improved type of jet we should at that point weigh carefully whether or not to proceed further with our offer. We should bear in mind, on the one hand, that an offer of Century Series aircraft would provoke demands from our allies and other unaligned nations for comparable assistance. However, we should, on the other hand, bear in mind that our failure, in these circumstances, to make available this type of aircraft would probably hasten Moroccan recourse to the Soviets, setting an example for other unaligned nations. In addition, although the King would probably carry through on the agreement permitting us tenure at our bases until the end of 1963, it can be assumed he would feel less inclined toward willing cooperation if we turned him down on his air force requests.

2. The following courses of action to implement the above policy have also been approved by the President:

(1) That an AID survey group be sent to Morocco in the near future (timing to be decided by the Ambassador after his return to Rabat) to study and make recommendations, with DOD advice and assistance, regarding the ways in which the US could assist the Moroccan Government in the post-1963 utilization of the bases by Morocco. The survey recommendations should point towards the retention of a US presence on the bases after 1963 and terms of utilization which would not preclude post-1963 military use if circumstances later warrant.

(2) That the Ambassador, on the basis of a detailed memorandum from the Department of Defense indicating how we would propose to “convert” and “civilianize” the communications sites near Kenitra and Sidi Slimane, should seek such arrangements, under mutually acceptable conditions, which would permit the continued use of these facilities after 1963.

(3) That actions in the political field to which the King might attach importance should be continually examined.

(4) That the US, through Ambassador Bonsal, offer in principle to support the expansion of the Moroccan Air Force provided the Moroccan Government makes clear its willingness to bear a reasonable proportion of the costs.

(5) That a French-speaking Air Force senior officer be sent to Morocco with the agreement of the King to examine ways in which US support to the Moroccan Air Force might be furnished, this officer to be fully conversant with the effect such an effort to substitute the US for the USSR in Moroccan reliance on aviation equipment and training would have both on the possibilities for longer retention of our bases and on our relations with our allies and other African countries.

(6) That, based on his recommendations, the US draw up a program of assistance for the Moroccan Air Force to begin in FY ’62.

(7) That active steps be taken so that the Embassy and USOM may be in a position to initiate negotiations with the Government of Morocco for the FY 1962 Economic Aid Program as soon as possible after October 1.

(8) That similarly we speed up procedures to permit the initiation of negotiations for the third slice of the current Military Assistance Program during the fall of this year.

3. The program of aid for the Moroccan Air Force will be predicated upon satisfactory private assurances from Morocco that no further Bloc Air Force aid will be accepted. If these assurances are not forthcoming, or if at any future date the Moroccans do accept further Bloc aid of this nature, the US program will be reviewed.

McGeorge Bundy ¹

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1 Sept.-Dec. 1961. Secret. Information copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
1. Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.