122. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Action Program on Moroccan Base Issue
After long haggling1 State and Defense have agreed on a program designed to (a) preclude further Soviet air assistance to Morocco; (b) establish a favorable climate to help ensure the Moroccans live up to the base agreement until the end of 1963 and possibly extend our use in some form beyond; and (c) generally insure a reasonably favorable posture on the part of this highly strategic country.
The chief means to this end would be to offer aid to the Moroccan air force. As you know, Morocco accepted last year two MIG-15s and 12 MIG-17s, along with technicians. The new king has informally suggested to us that US aid for his air force would be preferable to reliance on Moscow. He also has ideas about running a training program for other African countries. Ambassador Bonsal recommends that we agree in principle to provide such aid and send a survey team to see what the Moroccans would settle for. He believes that Morocco should be asked to put up a substantial portion of the cost. Our share cannot be costed for these reasons, but could run to a total of $20-50 million over several years.
Why aid to the air force? Giving Morocco advanced US jets will create real problems elsewhere (see below). We are already giving it on the order of $40-50 million in economic aid and $4 million in military. Could we increase this instead? The trouble is that we want to preclude a Soviet-supported air arm, and believe the King is otherwise highly likely to continue to accept such Soviet aid. Moreover, a US air mission, etc. in Morocco gives us a leg up on continued access to the bases and facilities after 1963.
What kind of air force? State and the Ambassador believe that the Moroccans may not settle for anything less than a squadron of Century series fighters, i.e. F-100s. Giving F-100s to Hassan would at a minimum [Page 188] generate Spanish demands for more advanced types. Spain only has F-86s, although several squadrons of them. We currently contemplate giving Spain one squadron of 104Gs in 1964-1965, but our base rights there too are up for renegotiation by 1963 and will probably generate larger Spanish demands. In any case no F-100s are currently available because of our Berlin build-up, and Defense would oppose F-100s because of the implication for many other areas where we are resisting demands for advanced fighters, e.g. Thailand. The compromise recommendation is that we try hard to sell the Moroccans on F-86s, but if the survey team discovers the price is higher, we’ll re-examine our position.
Aid to the Moroccan air force is agreed by all concerned to be a gamble, but State and Defense believe it one we should take. On the plus side are the arguments that Morocco is itself highly important real estate because of our SAC bases, which the JCS say will be needed through 1966. We want to preclude a Soviet military presence so close to our Spanish and Moroccan bases, and at the entrance to the Mediterranean. Navy and SAC communications facilities in Morocco are also highly important, and DOD is anxious to arrange for their continued use, perhaps on a civilianized basis, after 1963. The proposed aid would help create a favorable atmosphere for such negotiations.
On the other hand, there are so many uncertainties in this highly complex and volatile situation that nobody can guarantee that US aid will ensure any hold on these bases after 1963, or even until then. King Hassan has shown more staying power than we thought he would last February when the old King died, and Bonsal thinks that he is a good bet to stay in power, but the Leftist opposition is strong and Hassan may make a false step at any time. Thus any promises made now by his regime may not be worth much later on. Many other developments might take place which could so upset US-Moroccan relations as to render any aid of limited bargaining value. Morocco has designs not only on parts of Algeria and Mauritania but on the remaining Spanish enclaves. Continued friction with Spain is inevitable and fighting may break out. Our position in this event might completely overshadow the positive gain from an accelerated aid program. Moreover, developments in Algeria might also force Morocco to take an anti-Western stand. In the endeavor to rid itself of Spanish enclaves and remaining French bases, Morocco might find it necessary to put pressure on us too.
So offering air force aid to Morocco would create serious problems with Spain and even France. The Ambassador argues that Spain should realize that a US-supported air force would be less of a threat to it than a Soviet-supported one. However, the Spanish doubt that we would buy much with a US air force and have no confidence in Hassan’s regime.
Finally, can we be sure that US aid would in fact preclude acceptance of further Soviet military aid? Bonsal believes that we must make this in [Page 189] effect one of the terms of the deal, though we should handle it privately with the King.
I urge that you read State covering memo and pp. 6-8 of basic paper.2
Recommendations:
- 1.
- That you approve the State/Defense proposals as our best bet; it’s frankly a gamble but a good one in view of the military importance of the real estate to us.
- 2.
- That, as State recommends, you see Bonsal for a few minutes at New York or Newport.3 He’s been cooling his heels for a month while State and DOD worked over his program, and must return to Rabat before Mennen Williams gets there on 2 October.
- 3.
- That you give him a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] message for Hassan. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] If you approve in principle an air force program, Bonsal urges the message stress the preclusive angle along the attached lines.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 34. No classification marking.↩
- Interagency meetings to discuss Bonsal’s recommendations were held on August 29 and September 1. These discussions were recorded in memoranda of conversations that are in Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, 1961-, M-12, Preparations for Continued Use of Communications Sites, and ibid., Central Files, 771.56311/9-161. Final consideration of the resulting policy recommendations took place at a joint State-Defense meeting on September 22. This discussion was recorded in a memorandum of conversation that is ibid., 771.5622/9-2261.↩
- On September 23, Acting Secretary Bowles transmitted the paper, “Recommended U.S. Policy Concerning Bases in Morocco,” to the President attached to a covering memorandum entitled “Moroccan Bases and Soviet Penetration of the Moroccan Air Force.” (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34) Pages 6-7 of the paper contained recommendations that were subsequently approved by the President in NSAM No. 102, printed as Document 123.↩
- Ambassador Bonsal discussed these policy recommendations with the President in New York on September 25. Their conversation was recorded in a memorandum for the files is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩