Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

248. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 25, 1962, 9 p.m.

4110. Congo.

1. Stevenson and Yost met with Spaak, Loridan and SYG this AM to discuss Congo and make presentation of plan as instructed Deptel 3707.² Thant, however, gave latest report he had of situation and then spent most of mtg describing the way he sees next steps. At the end it was agreed reps from US, UK, France and Belgium would meet with Thant tomorrow AM to go over Thant’s view on outlook in Congo.

2. Thant reported he had just received message from Gardiner that Adoula has offered Tshombe Vice-Presidency of Republic (requiring parliamentary action to amend Constitution establishing office of VP). Gardiner reports Tshombe’s first reaction was somewhat negative on grounds his followers would feel he had been negotiating in Léopoldville for his personal future and not interests of Katanga. Gardiner also reported Tshombe scheduled to see Kasavubu on afternoon of 25th; presumably Kasavubu would urge Tshombe to accept position. Thant’s view was that if Tshombe accepted VP and Conakat took two Cabinet posts which Adoula has offered “problem as good as solved” from UN point of view.

3. Thant then gave his views on next steps. He noted present situation hopeful in view of today’s news. However, if UN mediation should not succeed, (a) he would continue to seek ways to get establishment of UN troops in Kolwezi, Jadotville, and Kipushi, (b) urge Belgians to withhold in Brussels export revenue for Katanga. Thant said June 28, before he leaves for Europe, he intends to meet with Congo Advisory Comite to report situation up to date. He would not at that time set forth his views on next steps. Fol CAC mtg, Thant will hold discussions in London, Paris, and elsewhere. If by July 20 when he returns to NY progress has not been made, Thant will, after reviewing situation with UN Reps to US, UK, and France, call SC mtg.

4. In SC Thant would propose economic sanctions to block flow of exports from Katanga except via Matadi. He admitted UK at present unlikely to agree to such proposal. Rikhye (UN military advisor) reports Lubilash Bridge be completed by mid-Aug opening way for use of Matadi for Katanga exports. Thant noted Welensky (Cent Af Fed) appears to have stopped assisting Tshombe, probably because he has too many problems at home. While position of Portugal in Angola doubtful, if SC agreed to economic sanctions, UN force could probably blockade Angola RR route within Katanga near Angolan border; Thant admitted this might involve some fighting but he did not think it would be major military operation. It would depend on logistical support particularly from US for airlift. Thant said main problem for such economic blockage would be opposition from UK and France.

5. Thant then turned to financial problem facing UN. With all pledges UN has received or expects, 165–170 million dollars will be total from bond sales. That would be only enough money to keep UN operation in Congo going at present rate of expenditure until March 1963. Therefore, Congo problem as it now exists must be settled by end of this year. Thant said up to today he had been doubtful that talks could succeed but now he believes they look hopeful.

6. Thant recalled he had discussed with Stevenson US desire to proceed on next steps without SC mtg if talks fail. However, he felt he only had authorization to use force in pursuit of mercenaries and noted anti-mercenary initiative against places outside Eville unlikely to appear justified. He noted probability of strong reaction in UK, France, and Belgium, which were likely also to have effect in Western Germany and Italy, against UN bond purchases. Therefore, he concluded he should not launch important operation without SC res in view political and economic pressures on UN operation in Congo.

7. Spaak emphasized Thant’s policies in recent weeks had been very good. He felt Govt of Belgium could offer two weapons to back up these efforts. One was willingness to withdraw technical aid from Katanga; second would be to support economic blockade of Katanga as envisaged by Thant. Spaak said he would urge UMHK officials to talk to Tshombe about urgency of agreement before such blockage put into effect. Spaak also suggested new statement by UN of its efforts in recent weeks, particularly through Gardiner’s efforts, and revealing problems with Katanga.

8. Stevenson asked Spaak about Thant’s suggestion of freezing in Belgium revenues from Katanga imports. Spaak said UMHK reply would be they had to take into consideration Tshombe’s reaction. Spaak noted he had on several occasions advised GOC to pass laws which would provide basis for such action.

9. Stevenson asked Thant about Nigerian troops. Thant’s reply was virtually identical with his earlier explanations to Yost concerning need for economy and for efforts discreetly to begin process of cutting expenses. He apparently does not want to block Nigerian withdrawal but may delay it.

10. Spaak expressed view Katangans should at least be threatened with economic sanctions as Thant suggested.

11. There was general agreement success of new measures short of military action would depend largely on British acquiescence. Stevenson noted Spaak’s support for economic blockade and suggested another mtg at which UK reps be present in order to impress upon them support for such measure. It was agreed Dean (UK), Yost, Berard (France), and Spaak (Belgium) would meet with SYG tomorrow 10 AM to discuss with Thant his intentions (a) if Léopoldville talks likely succeed, (b) if they fail. We assume at that time we will have opportunity to discuss economic aspects of US-Belgian package which could not be raised before time ran out at today’s mtg.

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–2562. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, Paris, and London.
2. The reference should be to telegram 3307 to USUN, June 22. As modified by telegram 3309 of the same date, it instructed the Mission to suggest to Spaak a joint approach to Thant in order to describe the U.S.-Belgian plan set forth in Document 246, and to urge that Gardiner draw on the U.S.-Belgian package to strengthen U.N. mediation by including “irreversibles” and agreement on constitutional principles as an integral part of an Adoula-Tshombe agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–1962 and 770G.00/6–2262)