Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

247. Letter From the British Ambassador (Ormsby Gore) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, June 11, 1962.

Dear Mr. Secretary Of State, Thank you very much for your letter of June 8² about the Foreign Secretary’s message on the Congo and the exchange of messages between the Prime Minister and the President.

The Foreign Secretary has found this exchange most valuable, and the definition of the extent of your support for the United Nations in the President’s message is very helpful. But he has the impression that there may still be some misunderstandings between our two Governments which he would like to see cleared up.

For example, we agree that the Congolese constitution must provide the central authority with power to tax and the exclusive power to raise federal armies. We would certainly not ask you to argue to the contrary with the Congolese. Indeed, we hope that the Central Government will act in the sense of a hint which M. Spaak recently gave them and produce detailed legislation about the country’s finances, thus implementing the general provisions of the Loi Fondamentale, providing a legal basis for the division of revenues.

You favour a federal constitution under which Tshombe accepts the authority of the Central Government and under which the provinces are given a considerable degree of autonomy. Again, we agree. Certainly it is not our aim so to weaken the federal structure that it ceases in fact to have any meaning and encourages secession and civil war. As we see it, however, we must be careful to preserve the level of administrative competence of Katanga. If destroyed, the result would be a drop in net revenues which would affect the whole Congo.

The President suggests that we should use our influence with Union Miniere and its affiliates to get them to pay their taxes to the Central Government. As we see it, there is no question of Union Miniere “electing” to support Tshombe in his secession. But they have to take account of the undeniable facts of the situation. Operating in a territory under the sole de facto control of the Katanga Government, they have little alternative but to accept the laws enforced by that Government. They are entirely dependent on Tshombe’s goodwill for supplies of foreign exchange, so far as their operations in Katanga are concerned. They have recently once again passed their dividend because the exchange has not been made available. From a legal point of view, they might have been wiser to place their protests more formally on the record, but that is another matter.

The conversations which Dr. Linner has recently had in Brussels have, so he told us, been hopeful. There is now a better understanding between the United Nations and Union Miniere which the Foreign Secretary hopes will lead to a more equitable sharing of Katanga’s revenues. He does not, however, believe that Union Miniere could simply declare that henceforth they are going to pay their taxes to the Central Government and rely thereafter on the United Nations for protection. Their operations cover such a vast area and their communications are so vulnerable that the United Nations would not be capable of ensuring their unimpeded working if they were to defy Tshombe. And Adoula would not thank the United Nations for returning to him a Katanga in ruins.

Dr. Linner is also canvassing the idea that senior representatives of Union Miniere and Tanganyika Concessions should to go Léopoldville for discussions with the Central Government and the United Nations. At the appropriate moment, of which Gardiner would probably be the best judge, we are in favour of this as being a practical step forward. Other practical steps which we fully support include the reopening of the traditional route for exports from Katanga to Port Francqui and thus to the sea. Once the bridges over the Lubilash have been completed (and we have been able to provide some material for the road bridge for which the United Nations asked us), we would hope to see this route used to the maximum and would be ready to urge both Union Miniere, through Tanganyika Concessions, and Tshombe to that end. This seems to us the least risky method of ensuring that a fair proportion of revenues on copper exports accrues to the Central Government, unless of course there is some agreement between Adoula and Tshombe on the division of revenues meanwhile.³

Yours sincerely,

David Ormsby Gore

1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials’ Correspondence with Secretary Rusk, 1962. Secret.
2. Rusk’s June 8 letter to Ormsby Gore responded to a May 18 message from Home, which declared that only persuasion could bring about a settlement in the Congo, that an attempt to impose a plan by force would be worse than any probable alternative, and that the British felt if pressure was needed, it might be necessary to apply it equally to Adoula and Tshombe. (Ibid., Rusk’s Correspondence with UK Officials and UK Officials’ Correspondence with Secretary Rusk, 1962) Rusk’s letter acknowledged Home’s message and referred to the President’s message to Macmillan (see Document 244).
3. Rusk replied in a letter of June 16, which stated that despite U.S. and U.K. differences, there were significant areas of agreement, and that it was all the more important for the two governments to exercise their influence in pursuit of the objective of a reunified Congo. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–1662)