Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, June 2, 1962, 3:51 p.m.

6425. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Verbatim text. Please pass following message from President to Prime Minister:²

“June 1, 1962

Dear Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of May 25.³ As you know, we attach great importance to a peaceful solution in the Congo and I have been giving this subject my close personal attention.

I am confident that we both have the same ultimate objectives. We both want a free and undivided Congo, prosperous and at peace. Where we differ is with respect to how the objectives might be achieved, the amount of autonomy which can be safely allowed to component parts of the country, and the role of the UN.

We, too, favor a federal constitution under which Tshombe accepts the authority of the Central Government and under which the provinces are given a considerable degree of autonomy. We do not believe, however, that this autonomy should be so great that it could lead to a resurgence of secession and outbreak of civil war with several factions backed by great powers.

We are convinced that the longer Katangan separation is maintained the stronger centrifugal forces in the country will become while moderate nationalist elements grow weaker.

We, too, pin our hopes on a reasonable agreement between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe, but we fear perhaps more than you the consequences of indefinitely protracted negotiations and the possibility of an illusory agreement.

The former condition can, and probably does, mask aggressive preparations by both sides in which Katanga, unimpeded by allegiance to the UN and supported by taxes paid exclusively to it by foreign companies, has an advantage. It could also mean either the downfall of the Adoula Government or perversion of its policy. Despite a few real successes and some superficial improvements, the erosion of Adoula’s political and financial strength is already well advanced. The Soviet Bloc confidently awaits the outcome of this development.

An agreement which turned out to be illusory would have the same bad effects and worse. It would only make inevitable the conflict we seek to avoid in circumstances much more disadvantageous.

Unhappily, after Kitona and similar previous experiences, the possibility that an agreement could be sabotaged must be taken with utmost seriousness. For these reasons, we believe an agreement must come soon and it must contain elements of genuine federal authority.

In our own national history, our experience with non-federalism and federalism demonstrates that if a compact of government is to endure it must provide the central authority with at least the power to tax and the exclusive power to raise armies. We could not argue with the Congolese to the contrary.

In the Congo, we believe that the Katanga gendarmerie must be reliably integrated with the army of the Republic. The tax collection system should be one in which the federal government participates. It is not enough that an autonomous Katanga pay tribute to Léopoldville. In our judgment, the Central Government could not be bought off with these monies. So long as an unfederated Katangese Army is intact, these payments could be cut off at any time and any other obligations entered into by Katanga could be nullified.

Mr. Tshombe can indeed play a useful part in the future life of the Congo. But, if he reaches an agreement and holds to it, he must be finally convinced that the UN will have full support in its effort to bring about integration, and secession in any guise is no longer possible.

For our part, we are doing our best to persuade Mr. Adoula to be reasonable. He and Mr. Tshombe appear to have agreed to drop the Commission on National Reconciliation to which you refer in your letter. Also, the question of security safeguards for the Katangese delegation seems to have been resolved, partly as a result of the efforts of our two embassies at Léopoldville.

We have lost no opportunity to impress on Mr. Adoula the dangers of civil war during the present negotiations and throughout his tour in office. We have told him that he ought to be patient, even beyond the expectations of most reasonable men. We have argued with him strenuously, urging him to accept the Kitona accord and we are pressing him to reach an agreement in the present negotiations.

Should current negotiations fail, however, the time could be near at hand when Mr. Adoula will no longer heed or be free to follow counsels of restraint. When he has exhausted every reasonable possibility of negotiation, or if Mr. Tshombe having made an agreement fails to live up to it, the Chief of the Congolese Government will be obliged to assert his authority.

We have told Mr. Adoula, after consulting with Mr. Gardiner, that the United States is prepared to give full support to the UN mediatory effort even at the risk of hostilities, if this is necessary to achieve agreement on a reasonable basis. In concrete terms, our support would extend this far: if the Government of the Congo follows a reasonable line and if Mr. Tshombe refuses to negotiate, or if a sound agreement is reached which Mr. Tshombe refuses to honor and if Katanga then contested the establishment of the authority of the Government of the Congo (for example, its right to collect taxes) and if the UN backed the Government of the Congo, the US would back the UN.

The effect of our assurances thus far on Mr. Adoula has been positive and he has become more, not less reasonable.

Indeed, just at the moment the sky has lightened and these gloomier prospects have at least temporarily receded. This is primarily owing to the remarkable achievements of Mr. Gardiner and his UN team.

The United States, as you are aware, has supported the efforts of the UN as the best insurance against the conflict of great powers in the Congo. We also supported the Security Council Resolution of November 24, 1961, and are presently backing the UN consistent with that policy.

When it comes to accepting ‘another UN military operation against Tshombe’, we have, of course, never contemplated offensive military initiative by the UN.

We should regret it very much if the ‘awkward situation’ you describe should arise in the Security Council revealing our differences of opinion in this isolated issue. Yet, our powers to prevent this development are limited. Unless the Katanga issue is soon resolved, it seems evident that some other country is bound to raise the question about non-application of the Council’s November mandate.

It occurs to me that there is an additional step which might lessen awkwardness in the Security Council and also contribute to a peaceful settlement.

Mr. Tshombe’s government (and effectively his resistance) is almost wholly financed by revenues paid to him by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga which elects to make no payments to the Central Government. I hope you and the Government of Belgium can use your influence with this company and its affiliates to cause them to reconsider this policy. If, as it has been reported, they fear reprisals from Mr. Tshombe, I believe they should apply to the United Nations for protection.

I am aware that there is some risk involved in any course of action available to us in the Congo. I do hope, however, you will agree with me that the risks presented by the kind of support we believe should be given to the United Nations are less than the risks of inaction.

I am encouraged by reports reaching me of some progress in the negotiations at Léopoldville. It seems to me that, with the situation developing as it is, now is the time for all of us to exert the maximum pressure to insure that these negotiations are successfully concluded. Let us hope these efforts will spare us the difficulties that we will have to face if the Congo crisis is not abated.

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy”

White House does not intend to publish. Letter should be classified Secret.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–262. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cleveland, Vance, and Carlucci; cleared in draft by Williams and Wallner and in substance by Tyler; redrafted in the White House and approved by the President on June 1; and approved by McGhee. Repeated to USUN, Léopoldville, and Brussels.
2. A draft message was sent to Bruce, Gullion, Stevenson, and MacArthur for comment in telegram 6346 to London, May 29. (Ibid., 770G.00/5–2962) Their comments are ibid., 770G.00.
3. Document 241.