Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

240. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State¹

Brussels, May 23, 1962, 4 p.m.

2237. Congo. Deptel 3257.² I discussed Congo last evening with Spaak and Rothschild putting to them our views as contained in reftel which dealt essentially with 1) procedures to be followed with respect to informing Gardiner about London papers; 2) withdrawal of technical assistance; 3) possibility of establishing foreign exchange and customs collection posts or rail line to Angola and Rhodesia. Following are Spaak’s comments:

1. Procedures for Informing Gardiner. Spaak was in principle not opposed to our proposal that each of three who care to do so describe to Gardiner suggestions for settlement based on London papers supplemented by indication of what each is prepared to do to support Gardiner’s effort. Spaak said since US found working paper unacceptable he understood our view that each of three had in effect regained its freedom of action.

However, Rothschild said Belgian Embassy London reports British propose three powers not approach Gardiner concerning London discussions. Reason is disadvantage in revealing to Gardiner divergencies among Three. British proposed since Gardiner is aware of discussions, he be given explanation no paper or agreement prepared to show him because he is doing so well already with his mediation proposals that there had been no particular need for development suggestions for him. By this means British said Three could avoid revealing differences among them. This procedure is acceptable to Spaak provided we also agree. Spaak would like our views soonest.

2. Re Threat to Withdraw Belgian Technical Assistance. Both Spaak and Rothschild said Department’s telegram seemed to reflect only partially the results of London meeting. At London meeting there was agreement on principles and certain practical measures looking to Katanga reintegration. However, it had also been envisaged that on basis of agreed principles certain inducements would be used to persuade both Adoula and Tshombe to be forthcoming in reaching agreement. If inducements failed with either or both of parties it had been envisaged but not agreed that certain methods of exercising pressure might be used.

As matters now stand, Gardiner has made proposals to both Adoula and Tshombe which designed to serve as basis of an agreement. Rather than concentrating on pressures at this juncture, the Three powers should concentrate their efforts on inducing Adoula and Tshombe to agree to Gardiner proposals. If, in light of persuasion we exercise, either Adoula or Tshombe refuse to accept Gardiner proposals as a basis for discussion, we should then decide what pressures should be applied on the recalcitrant party. In this connection Spaak said he and Rothschild had both understood that if Tshombe agreed to go along with Gardiner’s proposals and Adoula refused, we would of course apply pressures on Adoula. As a practical matter it seemed probable that inducements and pressures might well have to be applied to both. However, first things must come first and we should be using our persuasion to get Tshombe and Adoula to go along with Gardiner proposals before moving to threats.

Recent news he received from Léopoldville was not too encouraging and there was one unconfirmed report that Adoula is not disposed to use Gardiner proposals as a basis for talks with Tshombe and is creating other difficulties with Katanga del which might lead to breakdown of talks. Spaak assumed that if Tshombe is willing to enter discussions on basis of Gardiner plan and Adoula is not, we will use our influence with Adoula on behalf of Gardiner’s efforts to get talks started on basis of his proposals.

3. Customs Collection Posts on Rail Line to Angola and Rhodesia.

Since Rothschild’s return from London, Belgians are looking into this matter most carefully. Rothschild reminded Spaak and me that he had made unequivocably clear in London re collection posts that, as set forth in London’s 4225 to Department,³ “he was advancing suggestion on his own.” While Belgians are still looking into this possibility, he said that Dilolo near Angola frontier (which is most important exit route) is in Lunda territory (Tshombe’s tribe) and that if post installed there, it might well lead to hostilities with major tribal uprising against UN collection post which would spread to rest of Congo. This is an important and serious consideration.

Spaak indicated he had reservations about whether collection post proposal was feasible and whether it would not result in resumption of hostilities which could spread from collection posts throughout Katanga. In any event, he would wish to study the matter most carefully before reaching any conclusions with respect to it.

In conclusion, Spaak said that he fully agreed with our view (reference telegram) that there should be a continuation of the close consultations between our two governments as our close exchanges over past few months on the Congo had been most useful. He wanted us to know he welcomed our views on this vitally important problem.

Comment: In light failure reach agreement at London, we doubt US can obtain from Belgians advance agreement on program of threats and pressures to which they would be irrevocably committed unless we have first given strong support to Gardiner proposals and used all possible inducements and persuasions with Adoula and Tshombe. US has taken position that London paper is unacceptable and therefore dead. We must remember that we have in London and elsewhere taken position that threats and pressure would only be resorted to as last resort after we had first made major effort to induce Adoula and Tshombe to go along with solution along lines of Gardiner proposals and London paper. If either Adoula or Tshombe refuses to play ball, we will be in much better and stronger tactical position to press Belgians to agree to pressure program if we have first made major effort with inducements and persuasion. We fully realize that in a perfect world it would be preferable to have agreement in advance of threats and acts of pressure, but we doubt such agreement can be obtained in absence of first playing out persuasion and inducement string.

We believe there is possibility Belgians will be reasonable re pressures if Adoula is forthcoming and Tshombe refuses to play. On other hand, if Adoula is obstructive, we obviously will get nowhere with Belgians re putting pressure on Tshombe unless we are also willing put pressure on Adoula.

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–2362. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, London, Paris, New Delhi, and USUN.
2. Telegram 1953 to Léopoldville (Document 238) was repeated to Brussels as telegram 3257.
3. Document 235.