Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, May 19, 1962, 5:16 p.m.

1953. Re: London’s 4218² and 4228.³

For London: As Ambassador Bruce forecast to British and Belgians, final working paper⁴ unacceptable to Department because Interim Measures in section [IV] 1 and section 2 (Methods of Pressure) inadequate. At same time, we believe efforts devoted to developing “yardstick” for interim and long-term arrangements served useful purpose and section [IV] 1 of paper should be used to best advantage.

In this connection, US had considered presentation to Gardiner of a suggested outline of agreed principles for a settlement would really be meaningful only in context of describing type of arrangement we would be prepared support by bringing our influence to bear on both parties in effort to get agreement. Since no tripartite agreement possible on tactics to be employed in latter regard, we believe only logical way to proceed is for each of us who cares to do so to describe to Gardiner suggestions for settlement based on London papers with any supplemental suggestions desired now or later required by changes in negotiating situation (see section below for Leo), supplemented by indication of what we each prepared to do support his efforts. You should inform FonOff we intend follow foregoing course in effort do what is possible proceeding from discussions in London. We will keep UK currently informed as appropriate on our future efforts.

FYI: In fact British are adamant against any positive steps to persuade Tshombe to negotiate seriously despite Ambassador’s vigorous efforts to secure reversal their position. Dept considers it would be futile to pursue efforts with UK further at this time in attempt establish common approach. End FYI.

For Brussels: You should inform FonOff our foregoing thoughts on use to be made of London working paper with following modifications:

Dept greatly appreciated efforts Rothschild and Hupperts at London to attempt bridge gap between US and UK, and we believe further consultations between US and Belgian governments would be productive. In particular, we welcomed Rothschild suggestion regarding threat withdraw Belgian technical assistance to Katanga at an appropriate time and his tentative suggestion re foreign exchange and customs collection on rail line to Angola and Rhodesia as last resort. Ambassador requested see Spaak and say we most interested latter suggestion. As GOB aware, we had thought foreign exchange and tax collection in Elisabethville would offer fewer risks of hostilities and greater degree protection UN troops involved in view their concentration that area. However, in deference to Belgian concern about possible fighting in major civilian center such as Elisabethville, we giving urgent and sympathetic consideration as to how Rothschild proposal might be implemented. You may inform Spaak we examining for example, what logistics and security problems would be involved in order permit early discussion with him of further details. You may also tell Spaak that in our conversations with UN or others on next steps we make clear Belgians displaying forthcoming and constructive attitude in cooperating in search for solution Congo problem.

For Leopoldville: Suggest you tell Gardiner that on basis London talks we shall shortly suggest to UN any ideas we might have on provisional solution and long-term solution as useful guideline for Gardiner in his mediation efforts. Our ideas appear, however, to coincide with those of Gardiner. (FYI: as pointed out by Spaak (Brussels 2205)⁵ and Gullion (Léopoldville 2876)⁶ End FYI.) So we may have little to add. FYI: as already indicated initial study London paper which has no official status indicates interim measures not adequate. Dept urgently studying paper and will shortly telegraph its comments so that they and paper may be communicated to UN. End FYI.

We recognize current Gardiner efforts designed to result in communique announcing agreement and providing for establishment joint commissions to work out specific problems on reintegration appear at variance with idea obtaining immediate agreement on provisional solution we had envisaged. We consider necessary that certain irreversible steps (particularly sharing Katanga foreign exchange and tax revenues and joint control of gendarmerie) should be agreed at outset. We continue believe such irreversible steps are crucial if we are to avoid mere repetition of Kitona exercise where there was no follow through by Tshombe. We think that this objective can be accomplished within the framework in which Gardiner currently operating provided the joint commissions which he envisages are required complete their activities on at least these two critical subjects within specified period of time. Would appreciate your recommendation, after consultation with Gardiner, as to what reasonable deadline might be. Tentatively appears to us that given good will on both sides, agreement on fiscal and exchange issues and control of gendarmerie could be worked out within two to three weeks.

In talking with Gardiner you may reiterate US is prepared to give full support to UN mediatory effort, even at risk incurring hostilities if necessary, achieve adoption by parties of reasonable proposal. In context your discussion with him about possibilities establishing strong points on railroad lines to Angola and Rhodesia (see separate tel)⁷ you may indicate purpose of inquiry is to permit us on contingency basis, reassess what type of forceful UN action would be most effective and feasible to implement GOC authority over Katanga foreign exchange and tax revenues.

You authorized inform Adoula of outcome of London talks in general terms, stressing US exploring further what means of persuasion might be used with Tshombe and are hopeful we can quickly achieve positive results. He should be told we believe UN will be able to play a constructive role in integration of Katanga, and we will give it necessary support. On other hand, it will be necessary for Adoula to make some concessions and recognize need for working out termination of Katanga secession on a practical basis. Our aim would be to have Tshombe take major irreversible steps soonest. We will keep closely in touch with Adoula.

For USUN: Suggest you fill in U Thant along same lines as Embassy Leo instructed to inform Gardiner.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–1662. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Eisenberg and Buffum; cleared by Williams, Burdett, Cleveland, and McGhee; and approved and signed by Rusk. Also sent to London, Brussels, and USUN and repeated to Paris and New Delhi.
2. See footnote 1, Document 235.
3. Telegram 4228 did not concern the Congo. The reference is apparently to telegram 4225, Document 235.
4. See Document 236.
5. Telegram 2205 from Brussels, May 18, reported a conversation that day between Spaak and MacArthur in which Spaak stated that he felt the main elements of the tripartite paper were included in Gardiner’s proposals and it would be better tactically to support the latter than to introduce separate proposals. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–1862)
6. In telegram 2876 from Léopoldville, May 18, Gullion commented on Rothschild’s May 16 draft aide-memoire; see footnote 2, Document 235.
7. Telegram 1948 to Léopoldville, May 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 870G.11/5–1862)