241. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy1

Dear Friend, The Congo situation seems to be threatening us again. I had hoped that the talks between your people and ours, on which we agreed in Washington and which took place recently in London, would bring our two points of view closer together, but if anything they seem to have had the reverse effect. If the Congo talks fail it looks as if the United States and Britain will find it difficult not to be in open disagreement. I do not see how we in the United Kingdom could support a further United Nations operation in present circumstances. If there were to be a United Nations operation about which we were in disagreement, I fear bad effects not only in the United Nations and in Africa but in Anglo-American relations. Whatever resolutions may be passed in the United Nations, people here feel that the Organisation itself is dependent on United States financial support and that the operation in the Congo would be impossible without United States logistic support particularly in aircraft. I therefore venture to send you this message to see if we cannot prevent this awkward situation from developing.

Our position about the Congo is quite simple. We agree that it ought to be a united country, but feel that it should have a federal constitution, leaving the provinces in general, and Tshombe in particular, a [Page 468] considerable degree of local autonomy. We think this is right, because the country is so large and the tribes so different, and because Tshombe is the best hope of keeping Katanga prosperous and therefore supplying some money for the rest of the country. So what we want is an agreement between Adoula and Tshombe, in which Tshombe will accept the authority of the Central Government and supply some money, and in return Adoula will agree to amend the loi fondamentale.

At the moment I must say that Adoula seems to be more unreasonable than Tshombe as he seems to be rejecting the proposed Commission of National Reconciliation and is trying to hold Tshombe incommunicado. We are prepared to use our influence with Tshombe but we could not accept another United Nations military operation against him. In the first place we do not think that such an operation would be successful because of the likelihood of guerilla warfare developing, or if it did succeed the price in terms of casualties and chaos in Katanga would be unacceptable. And we fear that a new United Nations operation might well result in the destruction of Tshombe which, for the reasons which I have explained above, we do not wish to see. And if Tshombe were to disappear, the United Nations would find itself committed to running Katanga as a sort of colony. So we feel that at the moment Gardiner should be encouraged to put pressure on Adoula to accept the idea of amending the loi fondamentale as well as pressing Tshombe to make concessions to the Central Government notably on revenue and gendarmerie, and that the two sides of the bargain should hang together in time as they do in logic.

I hope very much that you will feel able to give instructions to your people to work in this sense. Gardiner has brought about a remarkable improvement in the political atmosphere and I would hope that we can both give him the maximum support with Adoula and Tshombe.

[Here follow brief comments on Chinese refugees and British Guiana.]

With warm regard,

Harold Macmillan2
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo General, Tripartite Congo Talks, May 1962. Secret. Filed with a covering note from Ambassador Ormsby Gore to the President.
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.