239. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Our Congo Policy After the London Talks
In the London discussions some measure of agreement was reached among the three parties as to the constitutional arrangements which would be considered reasonable, somewhat less agreement as to the transitional arrangements which would be desirable, and disagreement as to the assessment of dangers which the present situation involves unless the integration of Katanga is achieved and as to the measures to be taken to bring it about.
[Page 463]The British were completely negative on the point of the measures to be taken to promote the integration and it also became fully clear that neither Belgium nor the UK would attempt to persuade the big companies to take any active role in such a policy. The Belgians agreed with us fully that there are serious dangers in the Congo and in the UN if Katanga is not integrated soon, and suggested tentatively it might be necessary to take effective action within one or two weeks. However, the Belgians took a half-way position as to what measures could be envisaged. In particular they consider there would be serious risks if the UN supports the GOC in collecting taxes in Elisabethville, but on the other hand they developed some suggestions on applying pressure on Tshombe, at least in a limited way, and there is reason to believe they would acquiesce in the GOC (with UN protection) cutting of the railway lines in Katanga provided it is done in sparsely inhabited areas west of Kolwezi and southeast of Elisabethville.
Our conclusion is that we have to press energetically for integration of Katanga. We prefer that this be achieved with no military action but we recognize it may be necessary and we are willing to indicate to Tshombe and Adoula that certain forceful steps might be required (exchange and customs collection under UN supervision) if no agreement is reached promptly. We believe that we can develop considerable measure of agreement in bilateral negotiations with the Belgians. We will, however, have to give up for the time being any attempts to bring the British around to supporting our policy although we will keep them informed. We think they might in the end acquiesce notwithstanding their threat of a veto in the Security Council, etc.
The negotiations with the Belgians should concentrate on the pressure elements and on improving the constitutional paper tentatively drafted in London so as to bring adequate elements of irreversible integration into the transitional arrangements.
The UN Secretary General has already been informed on very broad lines about the outcome of the London talks and we intend to make available to him the paper drafted there stressing, however 1) that this is only a working paper and has no status; 2) that in the transitional period envisaged there a greater degree of integration would have to be achieved; 3) that it is the objective of this Government to assure reintegration promptly and that we are prepared to back the UN fully in its mediation efforts even if this involves a risk of renewed fighting; and 4) that the Belgian idea of cutting the Katanga railroads at or near the borders should be carefully explored.
Mr. Gardiner is at present engaged in an attempt to obtain agreement by Adoula and Tshombe on a formal declaration which would announce that the Katanga has rejoined the rest of the Congo and would refer the specific issues of reintegration to committees chaired by UN [Page 464] representatives. In our view, this approach is feasible only if 1) the individual committees develop a reasonable formula for integration, 2) that a very short time element is built into the agreement which would make it impossible for either party to use dilatory tactics, and 3) that the UN’s hand in this negotiation is strengthened by U.S., and hopefully Belgian, assurances of full support.
Prime Minister Adoula is being informed by Ambassador Gullion of the outcome of the talks in general terms stressing that we are exploring further what means of persuasion could be applied on Tshombe and are hopeful that we can come out rapidly with positive results. He will be told we believe the UN will be able to play an active role in the integration of Katanga and we will give it appropriate support. On the other hand it will be necessary for Adoula to make some concessions and recognize the need for achieving the liquidation of Katanga secession on a practical basis. Our aim would be to see that major irreversible steps are taken immediately. We will promise to keep closely in touch with him on our further efforts.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Files, Congo, May–July 1962. Secret. The source text does not indicate the drafter, but according to the Department of State copy, the memorandum was drafted by Eisenberg. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–2162)↩