226. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Athens1
Tosec 43. From Acting Secretary. Usumbura for Williams. The President and Macmillan discussed the Congo on Sunday2 and agreed that renewed efforts should be made by the US-UK-Belgium as soon as possible to concert pressures for a favorable outcome of Adoula-Tshombe talks. They agreed that Tshombe is unlikely to make a reasonable settlement except under pressure supported by British and Belgian economic interests. For such pressure to be exerted, there must be a clearer tripartite understanding and agreement on basic policy and objectives.
We believe the elements of such a policy exist in agreement on reintegration of Katanga in a Congo more loosely federated than current fundamental law provides, together with economic arrangements sharing tax revenues between central and provincial governments. The President and the Prime Minister believed that such an agreement could best be reached if the locus of internal 3-Power discussions could be in London, to facilitate participation by Spaak and acceptance by Tanganyika Concessions and Union Miniere.3
At the same time, since mediation between Tshombe and Adoula continues to be Gardiner’s responsibility, and because relations with [Page 436] UN are best maintained from Washington and New York, we must obviously retain overall U.S. control here, as well as 3-Power liaison on progress of mediation.
The President and Prime Minister agreed that you and Home and Spaak should discuss these problems at Athens. President’s hope is that you will support the notion of talks in London which might lead to effective joint pressures on all concerned.
Both London talks and our diplomatic relation to mediation should be based on agreed appraisal of prospects if Tshombe and Adoula do not soon reach agreement. We hope you may be able to press our appraisal with Home and Spaak in Athens. Possibility of agreement on degree of risk to run in exerting pressures if needed to bring reintegration about would be dim if we are not in agreement on the nature of the risks which would be incurred if reintegration is not promptly attained.
Tshombe has said he will return Léopoldville May 3 to resume talks and Adoula has said he welcomes this prospect. We hope two leaders, with Gardiner’s help, can negotiate settlement reasonable to both. We believe Adoula still can persuade his govt accept settlement that recognizes legitimate Katangan interests. However, we fear his capabilities this regard will soon diminish sharply, as will ours to influence events.
Our assessment follows of developments we foresee and which already shaping up if reintegration not achieved shortly. In essence, we believe time has almost run out for moderate control of Léopoldville Govt in absence material progress on reintegration. Adoula has been in power for nine months under a strong mandate from parliament to end the Katanga secession at all costs. In the light of Tshombe’s refusal recognize Kitona (where personal prestige of President involved) as a basis for negotiation, his continued demand for virtual internal sovereignty while “studying” means to end secession, and reports mercenary forces again on rise in Katanga, Adoula has concluded Tshombe stalling for time in hope that Adoula will fall and/or UN operation will fail. Adoula beginning believe unfriendly counsels that we insisted on Kitona before Tshombe militarily hurt in order to save him and Govts like Indian, Sudanese, Tunisian, Nigerian beginning suspect this also.
Adoula has expressed his disillusionment with UN and policy of peaceful integration which has produced no concrete results. Two days ago he challenged Cleveland and Gullion to suggest date by which results in negotiations might be expected. He warned talks could not continue much longer without general disintegration of his position and what he called “positive actions and disagreeable surprises.” Stated he would continue trying save country but feared he might be powerless prevent disaster if efforts reintegrate Katanga not successful.
[Page 437]Reacting to heavy pressures, Adoula already shows signs accommodating his position in order remain in office. He has publicly stated GOC has told Afro-Asian states and “other friendly countries” it may have to ask for increased assistance to put final stop to secession. We believe such unilateral intervention would be disastrous, but Adoula has already indicated he may ask for UN withdrawal. We also have unconfirmed reports Adoula will visit Moscow in mid-May.
Another danger is SC meeting on Congo which Soviets would turn into instrument to divide West and GOC by demanding UN use force to end Katanga secession immediately. In past Adoula has blocked Soviet efforts in this direction but under circumstances assumed here GOC would be pressing for stronger UN mandate. Bloc would welcome opportunity place any Western powers in position of appearing to favor Tshombe who has come to be regarded as a stooge in Africa and Asia.
If present trend continues GOC will be forced to ask for Afro-Asian help with or without UN umbrella. If Adoula refuses to swing with this tide he will be swept away along with other moderates and opening would reappear for Bloc to exploit to tear Congo apart once again with resulting grave dangers for US and UN and influence and posture entire West in Afro-Asian world. Should extremists gain power in Léopoldville they virtually certain turn against UN as did Lumumba and accept help from radical Afro-Asians and probably Soviet Bloc. Violence in Katanga would be inevitable and could involve big powers. Western business interests throughout Congo would risk expropriation by extremist leaders.
UN prepared play active mediatory role (see Deptel 2800 to New York repeated London 5709)4 but they unlikely be effective with Tshombe if he remains persuaded he can continue stalling with total impunity.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–262. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Vance and Carlucci, who at this time was Officer in Charge of Congo (Léopoldville) Affairs; cleared in draft by Fredericks, Wallner, and Burdett and cleared by McGeorge Bundy (see footnote 2 below); and approved by Ball. Repeated to Léopoldville, London, Brussels, USUN, Paris, New Delhi, Lagos, Tunis, Khartoum, and Usumbura.↩
- April 28; see Document 224.↩
- A May 2 memorandum from Bundy to Ball states that he had talked to Kennedy and found him “very clear in his conviction that the center of talks with the British and Belgians should be in London.” Bundy had accordingly redrafted the first two pages of the draft telegram (to this point). (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–262) A memorandum by Colonel Julian J. Ewell of the White House Staff of the May 2 staff meeting states that McGhee and the Bureau of African Affairs wanted discussions in Washington, where pressure from African representatives at the United Nations could be brought to bear, but that “Bundy seemed to feel this was the wrong approach, that we were primarily trying to get the Europeans and their financiers to move towards the middle, and that pressure from the left would probably not do this.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 24, Daily Staff Meeting)↩
- See footnote 1, Document 223.↩