227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1
3693. Following based on uncleared memcon:2
Ambassador Nehru and Indian Ambassador designate to Congo Chatterjee (now DCM Washington) met with McGhee at Department’s request May 3 for review Congo situation. McGhee indicated GOI and USG deeply involved together in the Congo. USG therefore wished discuss with GOI our concern re lack progress current negotiations due Tshombe failure make concessions. USG not certain he will negotiate meaningfully until forced to do so.
By same token Adoula has not done as much as he could. Paper he presented to Tshombe not sufficiently forthcoming. Adoula himself becoming desperate and has hinted at bilateral aid, use of force and possibly even UN withdrawal. Adoula whose base depends upon successful Katanga reintegration losing ground politically because, from GOC standpoint, UN has not made any progress in uniting country.
Nehru inquired about Union Miniere promises withhold revenues. McGhee replied they never agreed despite all possible USG pressure. UMHK concerned Tshombe would take retaliatory action against company properties located in Katanga. Nehru inquired if agreement between Adoula and Tshombe was indeed possible without effective economic or military pressure on Tshombe.
McGhee stated this precisely why we desire introduce third element into negotiations if substantial progress not made in next two weeks. Specifically we envisage Gardiner taking more active role, including outlining financial concessions by Tshombe and suggested modifications of fundamental law. In effect Gardiner must find middle ground involving concessions both sides. If governments concerned such as US, UK, Belgian and Indian, find this proposal acceptable all possible means pressure would be asserted on Tshombe. If Tshombe could be convinced his income would be cut off, use of force would not be required.
Ambassador indicated some surprise that we expected Adoula make concessions also. When this confirmed by McGhee, Amb read from MEA cables contents of which made Indian case against Tshombe. [Page 439] Cables reported “dozens” of mercenaries entering Katanga, an airstrip being readied across border Angola, Katanga reinforcements arriving Kongolo and Tshombe making deals with Welensky. Cables also said situation fast deteriorating due US failure support Adoula; if UN forces to be used must be within next few weeks before Katanga forces achieve big buildup. Amb said USG “making it known” it will not support UN military action against Katanga which suits UK and Belgium who do not want reintegration. Said Indian view is, given Belgian reluctance, economic pressure would not succeed without threat arms pressure on Tshombe. Although US money involved, Indian boys would be killed in event fighting, posing same problems for GOI as would for USG if American boys being killed. Added US failure support further action against Katanga gendarmerie destroys realistic basis for negotiation.
Amb Nehru continued that “some of our chaps don’t think much of Gardiner” but in any event mediation no good unless backed up with econ and military force. How much time is there? How much would Adoula be forced give up? The Indians would not go along with autonomy for Katanga.
McGhee recapped US position: We propose allow two weeks for Adoula-Tshombe talks; if no progress made then Gardiner should mediate. We would get proposals which acceptable to India, UK, Belgium that would ultimately include withholding revenues from Tshombe. McGhee agreed with Amb that hints should be dropped that military force would be used if there was no other way. Amb concerned that delays allowing Katanga military buildup would result more UN casualties.
McGhee stated Belgians and British do not feel sense of urgency we do; nevertheless he believed necessary pressures could be applied when acceptable mediation proposals put forward. Although Belgians do not agree on income withholding their attitude could change if they convinced military force was a possibility. We do not take position military force must not be used but use of force a difficult decision which must be carefully considered.
Chatterjee said if Tshombe convinced USG were taking firm stand talks could succeed. McGhee agreed, stating we haven’t yet convinced Tshombe but intended to do so. We think results are necessary by mid-June. In meantime Dept will continue consult with Indians on progress being made and will discuss the mediation proposal with them, McGhee concluded.
Emb may draw on foregoing as desired in talks with GOI.
For Khartoum: Department does not intend call in Sudanese Charge but you may draw on foregoing as appropriate in talks with GOS.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–462. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Robert J. Barnard of the Office of South Asian Affairs and Carlucci; cleared by Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs Turner Cameron, Vance, Officer in Charge of Sudan Affairs Cleo A. Noel, Jr., and McGhee’s Staff Assistant Alan L. Campbell, Jr.; and approved with revisions by Tasca. Also sent to Khartoum and repeated to Léopoldville, USUN, Elisabethville, Brussels, London, Paris, Salisbury, and Athens for Secretary Rusk.↩
- Not found.↩