225. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1
2726. Cleveland accompanied by Ambassador had hour and half talk with Adoula April 28.2 Presented letter from President Kennedy (Deptel 1829)3 and affirmed US continued support of Adoula and opposition to Katanga secession. Adoula received President’s letter with obvious gratification and read it most attentively.
Noting President’s hope that progress could be accomplished by peaceful means and in conference, Adoula stated he had just received telegram from Tshombe confirming his return to Léopoldville on May 3. Adoula would reply proposing resumption of talks 1000 May 4.
Prime Minister launched into long, willfully imprecise, but nevertheless positive description of prospects in resumed negotiations. He was going to insist Tshombe present without delay a counter-proposal to GOC’s draft conclusions. Adoula agreed GOC draft did not constitute his last words but was first offer which Tshombe should accept or modify paragraph by paragraph. Tshombe knew this but pretended not to.
[Page 433]Adoula tried feebly to tag Tshombe with responsibility for precipitating airport incident saying Tshombe had let him think he prepared resume talks April 21. Instead he had purposely tried to make demonstration of his return to Elisabethville. If he had only informed Adoula he could have left with no trouble.
Adoula thought talks could have positive result but insisted principle must be observed that Loi Fondamentale, whether good or bad, must be accepted as law until modified, as must be case with any law. Process of modification was really well in hand. He showed us very lengthy document which he said was draft constitution which Commission including Conakats had completed just before Tshombe arrival here. Tshombe had copy and knew very well it represented extensive modification Loi Fondamentale. Adoula did not, however, think it would be useful to discuss constitution in bilateral session with Tshombe. This was prerogative of Parliament; if he and Tshombe agreed on new constitution and Parliament failed to adopt it,where would Katanga problem be then? Moreover, when he dealt with Tshombe, Adoula claimed to feel presence of 5 other provincial presidents whose interests would be affected.
To suggestion that he seemed fairly optimistic, Adoula replied he was never optimistic but only skeptical in negotiation with Tshombe, he said Tshombe often seemed “not to exist” at conference table, letting others carry ball.
Adoula observed Kitona Accord had been useless since Tshombe seemed unwilling to take it as basis of discussion despite his own signature and Katangese ratification of Accord.
Adoula was skeptical re appropriateness for Congo of “reserve powers clause”. He claimed there was large area of “shared powers” which could not accurately be defined and thus made it hard to envisage such article.
Asked re his parliamentary backing, Adoula did not reply directly. He intimated he had enough support but took occasion to stress necessity checking any agreements with other provincial presidents. He could not treat Katanga as special case.
Adoula was asked whether his reference in recent speech to assistance by other countries contemplated help outside UN framework. Adoula evaded definite answer. Observed that other countries from whom he had asked help were members of UN and had duty to make resolutions effective including channelling aid through UN. His appeal to them was to make resolutions work. He claimed he was waiting for precise account of attitude of Congo Advisory Committee.
[Page 434]Cleveland and Ambassador stressed importance of cooperation with UN, also fact that UN concept was important to US in support of Congo.
Adoula challenged US reps to suggest date by which results in negotiations might be expected. He warned these talks could not continue much longer without general disintegration of his position and what he called “positive actions and disagreeable surprises.”
He did however stress his allegiance to UN, saying he would continue work through UN channel even though some of his associates did not agree with him on this. He had spoken to SYG and suggested African countries should be asked what increased technical assistance they could give. (Adoula intimated that military aid was to be included in technical assistance.) He argued that aid from other Africans helped morale of Congolese by showing what Africans could do in technical field.
On ANC retraining Adoula referred back to same March 1961 letter from Kasavubu to SYG that Bomboko had read out loud in full to Cleveland and Sisco in prior interviews. This and other comments implied Adoula prepared to do business with UN rather than Belgians on recruitment retraining officers. But like Bomboko (though more calmly) Adoula emphasized difficulty retraining until Katanga issue resolved. Answering question he said eventual size ANC should be 15,000 (or, as afterthought, up 20,000).
At close of meeting Adoula became less rhetorical and more sincere. Asked Cleveland to tell President he was striving to continue line of conduct which he had traced during US visit. Cleveland replied President also firm in support Adoula govt. Adoula said that when question raised of Communist influence in Congo or Communist orientation he could only say he not that much a fool. Only too clear some African countries which had traveled that road had now made about face and were working their way back. If Congo took that course it would merely encounter African brothers homeward bound; Congo would also be compelled to about face if it tried Communism, but only after much suffering. Adoula was going to keep trying to save country but warned he might be powerless prevent disaster if efforts reintegrate Katanga not successful.
In general Adoula seemed in good shape physically and mentally, more poised and in more sanguine frame of mind than during Ambassador’s last several interviews. In presence Washington visitor seemed on good behavior and his implied blackmail was not showing. Perhaps he has had time to meditate on moral of Tshombe airport incident. Moreover, Gardiner’s first interviews with him since return from New [Page 435] York and in pursuance agreed “stronger UN mediatory role” may be having some effect.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4–2962. Secret. Repeated to USUN, Brussels, London, Paris, Elisabethville, and Brazzaville.↩
- Assistant Secretary Cleveland visited the Congo April 25–May 1. He met with U.N. civilian and military leaders, as well as with Adoula and other Congolese officials, and observed U.N. operations in Léopoldville and at the provincial level in Kivu. A May 14 memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk headed “Next Steps on the Congo” is ibid., 770G.00/5–1462. A copy is in the Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Congo-Security 1962(A).↩
- Telegram 1829 to Léopoldville, April 26, transmitted the text of a letter of the same date from Kennedy to Adoula, which recalled Adoula’s visit to Washington and assured him of U.S. friendship and support. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4–2662) A copy of the letter, with attached notes indicating that it was drafted in the Department of State at the President’s suggestion, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo.↩