Office of the Historian

224. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, April 28, 1962, 3:30–5:15 p.m.

Prime Minister Macmillan’s Visit to Washington, April 27–292

SUBJECT

  • Congo

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • The President
    • Under Secretary Ball
    • Ambassador Bruce
    • Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House
    • Mr. Pierre Salinger, White House
    • Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
    • Mrs. William C. Burdett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
    • Mr. Joseph Sweeney, BNA
  • British
    • Prime Minister Macmillan
    • Sir Norman Brook, Secretary of the Cabinet
    • Ambassador Ormsby Gore
    • Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
    • Mr. Harold Evans, Public Relations Adviser
    • Mr. M. A. M. Robb, Information Minister, British Embassy
    • Mr. John Thompson, First Secretary, British Embassy
    • Mr. Philip de Zulueta, Private Secretary to Prime Minister

Mr. Ball said that the Congo continued to cause us anxiety. We would like to approach the problem with the British and the Belgians. We hope that the discussions between Tshombe and Adoula would be resumed and that there might be some resolution. Otherwise the situation would deteriorate. There were strong pressures for military action on the part of the Afro-Asians and a weakening of the Adoula Government. We were less hopeful than we had been a month or so ago.

The President inquired what could be done outside the Congo. Tshombe was receiving reports from Katanga agents such as Streulens which encouraged him to wait. These reports said that the U.S. would not support another military operation. We should not look like we were prepared to use force when we were not, but if Tshombe believes that we would not then the pressures would be off. We should consider measures short of force.

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Mr. Ball commented that he had the impression that the Union Miniere hopes for a white enclave in Katanga had been revived. We should make it clear that this was not possible. It would only invite chaos.

The President said that we should give high consideration next week to the Congo. He did not want matters to come to a military action. He wanted to avoid this. If necessary we would face up to it but it would be tough. We should get the Belgians in.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore remarked that the exertion of pressure depended largely on Belgium. The Prime Minister said it was quite a dilemma. The U.K. could not tolerate another military action but if Tshombe believes we would not use force, he would be under no pressure and would just stall. Relations between Belgium and Adoula were improving. Spaak was being quite helpful. We should try to work out an American-British-Belgian policy.3

The President asked whether it would be desirable to send someone to Brussels from here and London. He noted that the Prime Minister had said Britain could not support a military action. A substantial body of opinion here would not do so either, but if there is no military action why would Tshombe do the right thing? We needed some other form of pressure.

The Prime Minister remarked that he had talked to U Thant on the problem. The Acting Secretary General was very anxious to reduce the U.N. presence in the Congo.

The President asked what contribution Rhodesia could make, What are the pressure points on Tshombe? The Prime Minister thought that Adoula and Tshombe just did not like to agree. He did not see what the Union Miniere could do. We should exert pressure on both Adoula and Tshombe. The Belgians, Americans and British should find a reasonable settlement. It would be necessary to change the Loi Fondamentale to provide for a confederal not a unitary state. Britain had faced the same problem in Nigeria. If it had insisted on a unitary state there would have been trouble. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The only hope is a confederal one but it is hard to see how this can be brought about now. One side is bound to the Loi Fondamentale, the other side has all the money.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore inquired whether Brussels was the right place rather than Washington to try to work out a plan.

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The President asked whether we could have it understood that the Prime Minister and he felt that the Congo should receive great priority. The Prime Minister assented. Ambassador Ormsby Gore suggested that Secretary Rusk, Lord Home and Spaak agree at Athens4 on how to organize to attack the Congo problem. This was agreed to.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2084. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved in the White House on May 4. The meeting was held at the White House.↩
  2. Additional documentation on Macmillan’s visit is ibid.↩
  3. Stevenson had reported in telegram 3571 from USUN, April 27, that at dinner with Macmillan in New York on April 25 he had proposed “that U.S., UK and Belgium working together in full agreement and in pursuit of agreed plan of action could be far more effective in Congo and with Union Miniere. Prime Minister expressed lively interest in joint effort with Belgium to bring about early settlement of Katanga secession and indicated would discuss it with President in Washington.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4–2762)↩
  4. A NATO Ministerial Meeting was to be held in Athens May 4–6.↩