Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

68. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, December 10, 1961, 9 p.m.

1664. Reference 1962 December 8.¹ Will see Nehru Monday evening and urge avoidance of force in Goa and also, if climate allows, stress damage that manufactured dustup could do to India abroad. Will emphasize importance of keeping up the threshold to marching armies given present state of the world.²

The foregoing is our strongest line of argument. It remains my view that no decision has been taken for land action and that with second thoughts on relation of action to Indian traditions, danger will if anything recede. However, I keep an escape clause on the effect of some incident, real or contrived and the possibility of some form of sea blockade.

The following points bear emphasizing.

1. We must sharply separate our case against the use of force, which is valid, against any suggestion that we are responsive to pressure by Portuguese. This commits us to support of Portuguese Empire since everyone knows this is the interest of the Portuguese Government. In this connection statement to Ambassador Nehru that we are approaching him at the behest of the Portuguese was ill-advised. Gore-Booth notes that British also anxious to avoid giving impression they are responsive to Portuguese.

2. In asking Indians to forego force on this issue question remains as to what brings the Portuguese to settle. Talbot’s implied suggestion that the apple is bound to fall soon anyway along with our UN stand and known attitudes of President and administration are helpful. A much stronger declaration of non-support to Portugal on colonies would do more to persuade Indians to be patient though I realize practical problem of timing.

3. Any NATO involvement with this issue would, of course, be disastrous. It would do nothing to restrain Indians, would inflame local sentiment, identify us uselessly with antagonism toward erstwhile European colonialism, would damage European powers anew, raise the question of NATO arms in Goa which local enthusiasts are already mentioning.

4. We are surprised by suggestion Portugal will take issue to UN and will have some support from us. It is hard to imagine that Portugal regards UN as a good forum for protecting her colonial possessions apart from some such gesture as the memorandum. In any case, at USUN as here, any support we give to exclusion of force must be rigorously separated from support to Portuguese rule.

Delay in discussion with Nehru unrelated to Goa. Goa was not on my original docket and I later told him that in light of pressures of Parliament and Frondizi visit my need to see him not urgent.

Galbraith

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12-1061. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN, Lisbon, London, and Paris (USRO for Finletter; Embassy pass Dean Brown).
1. Document 66.
2. Galbraith saw Nehru December 11 and argued against the use of force in Goa. Nehru responded by citing Portuguese provocations, and Galbraith observed that it was an odd time for Portugal to initiate a conflict over Goa. (Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12-1161)