Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

69. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Acting Secretary of State Ball⁰

Washington, December 12, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Goa Situation: Situation Report as of Morning of December 12

1. Our latest reports from India indicate there has been an Indian Government decision at least at the Cabinet Defense Committee level to proceed with an armed attack on Goa. The Indian military forces appear to be very nearly in position for such an attack which could be made this week. The reports stress that the final decision has not yet been made and Prime Minister Nehru is capable of calling off the action at the last minute. However, the build-up for an attack has already gone so far that it would create a morale problem among the public as well as in the armed forces if the attack were to be withheld without any progress being made towards freeing Goa from Portuguese control.

2. On December 8 I called in Ambassador Nehru and made clear to him the United States opposition to the use of force by India in the Goan situation. On that day Secretary Rusk, at his press conference, made the same point and added that we welcomed the indications then evident that both sides wished to avoid force. Ambassador Galbraith spoke to Prime Minister Nehru yesterday afternoon, urging him not to use force in the Goa situation, emphasizing that in the present state of the world we felt it would do a serious disservice to peace for India to put its armies in motion. He reports that the Prime Minister gave no impression as to any effect of this plea. Yesterday afternoon I made a similar plea to Ambassador Nehru when the latter called on me to report the answer he had received from New Delhi in response to his transmittal of my conversation with him on December 8. This morning Ambassador Galbraith made a further, written statement to the Indian Government. As a result of these actions we believe the Indian Government is fully aware of the U.S. position.

3. The United Kingdom has also seen to it that the Indian Government is aware of its opposition to the use of force through conversations of their High Commissioner in New Delhi with the Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The U.K. feels that because of their close relationship with Portugal they are unable to do more.

4. The Brazilian Government has made a public plea to the Indian Government to avoid the use of force.

5. We do not have hard information as to the situation within Goa but our best estimate is that the majority of Goans are relatively passive in the present situation. There are a small number of members of Goan activist groups within Goa who are capable of some subversive action although they appear to be poorly armed.

6. As of this morning it appears there is a real possibility that pressures on Prime Minister Nehru from various services (including communist-influenced “Goan Nationalists” and Krishna Menon, who is running for Parliament) will prevail and that an armed attack may take place if there remains no indication that Portugal is willing to consider any change in status for Goa.

7. Meanwhile, the Portuguese have been in close touch with us in Lisbon and here. The Foreign Minister told us on December 9 of his proposal to have impartial international observers (not under UN auspices) go to the border area to examine the situation and report, presumably publicly. We indicated this appeared to be a constructive step. The Portuguese press reports that the Indian Foreign Office rejected this proposal out of hand. The Portuguese have indicated they would like our public support for their international observer proposal, but we have not yet given an answer. The proposal may be a dead issue.

8. The Portuguese Government sent an information communication to the President of the Security Council on December 11, but stopped short of asking for a meeting on the Goan situation. The Portuguese Ambassador said they wished to see how the situation developed. (Probable Soviet support of India in the Security Council and the general anti-colonial tendencies of the UN, as well as the fear of establishing a precedent that would apply to Angola and Mozambique, will make Portugal wary of taking Goa to the UN.)

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12-1261. Secret. Drafted in NEA by Horgan and in EUR by Starrs.