67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan0
1122. For Rountree and Galbraith Only. Subject US sale military equipment to India discussed in position paper prepared Nehru visit follows: “US sympathetic towards India’s efforts to strengthen itself against increasing ChiCom military strength and aggressive inclinations. US prepared to consider Indian requests for certain items of dual-purpose military equipment such as transport aircraft, high-altitude helicopters, radar, engineer bridging and construction equipment, and to supply such items if desired on terms as favorable as circumstances permit.”
Dec. 4 letter from Defense1 states Nehru visit position paper on military equipment sales “appears to provide sufficiently flexible basis for further action,” and that President “while not stating exact text of this [Page 151] position with Nehru did discuss matter of continuing US aid to India in terms which left opening for future discussion on this specific subject.” Citing various AIRA and Embtel New Delhi messages indicating Engineer2 moving towards showdown with Menon also possible imminent arrival Soviet military sales mission to India, Defense believes positive action required now, that US should take steps convey substance our agreed policy sales military equipment to GOI either through Indian Embassy Washington or Embassy New Delhi.
As you aware President has also given personal commitment Ayub to discuss with GOP prior USG decision provide military aid to GOI. We believe Ayub would probably not object USG supplying GOI with dual-purpose military equipment (he had relatively mild reaction to USG supply C-119s in 1960 although this military sale) but we believe Ayub would object strongly USG supply F-104s or Sidewinders. Supply these two items complicated by classification although understand Defense may be able make unclassified version available Indians.
Dept understands Indians prefer pay rupees rather than dollars for US equipment and would probably consider rupee transactions as not inconsistent with India’s “neutralist” foreign policy. However, such transactions in US administrative procedures are considered MAP and India would undoubtedly be classified publicly along with US allies and others who receive US military assistance.
FY 1963 MAP now in initial stages preparation for Congressional presentation, and therefore time important.
Before taking decision on dual-purpose supply Department desires you discuss entire problem during your Dec 11-13 mtg and forward your recommendations. Particularly desire comments and recommendations on (1) advisability; (2) method of approach; (3) timing; and (4) possible repercussions.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/12-861. Secret; Priority; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted in NEA/NR by Marvin C. Kettelhut and Edward A. Padelford on December 6; cleared by Weil and with G/PM and AID; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi.↩
- A copy of this letter from William Bundy to Talbot is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, India 440-702.↩
- Air Marshal A.M. Engineer, Air Force Chief of Staff.↩
- Galbraith and Rountree responded in joint telegram 1038 from Karachi, December 16. The Ambassadors agreed that it was inadvisable to inform the Pakistani Government about the policy concerning the sale of military equipment, as proposed in this telegram. The principal objection was the conviction of the Embassy in Karachi that to do so would cause major damage to U.S. relations with Pakistan. The Ambassadors disagreed on the desirability of indicating to the Indian Government U.S. willingness to receive military aid requests from India. Rountree felt strongly that to accede to such requests would have a similarly adverse effect upon U.S. relations with Pakistan. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/12-1661)↩