Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State⁰

Kabul, September 13, 1961, 4 p.m.

192. Had conversation last night with Abdul Hai Aziz as predicted my telegram 187.¹ He advised me take what I had told him to Daud personally as quickly as possible. Accordingly I saw Daud briefly again this morning.

Told Daud I had not come for answers but wanted to give him three additional points for consideration.

(1) I wanted make certain that he and Naim had not misunderstood our offer good offices in connection with transit traffic. Explained I had not had in mind simply formal meaning of term or just using our facilities to get Pakistanis and Afghans together to talk about problems. We had in mind far broader concept whereby not only our channels of communication but American personnel and facilities on both sides of the border were available to assist both sides if any way possible to keep goods moving.

(2) Then told Daud had received personal message from Bowles.² After expressing concern for developing situation, Bowles had indicated to me that he willing launch serious consideration Washington of opening up feasible transit route through Iran port. This would of course take some time, but it would mean that, if Afghan did not now cut itself off from sea, there was hope of being able to look forward to alternate lifeline in the future.

(3) Also I said that Bowles had expressed to me his hope that further aid assurances might be given to Afghan if our present lifeline of supply not cut. I explained carefully to Daud that I was not giving him at this stage formal assurances by US Government, but rather the intention of Bowles to start working on these things if we could make arrangements to keep things going in interim.

Daud said he much appreciated what he had been told. Even though he understood informal nature of what I had relayed he would consider it carefully and discuss with Cabinet. He said, however, even though what I had said of great importance, he afraid Washington did not quite understand problem. Daily movement of goods, even though extremely important, was not as important as cause of tension between Afghan and Pakistan, which had resulted in present situation. Grateful though he was for our present efforts, he wished we could devote equal energy to core of problem itself. He said “the Pakistanis think that if they are given free hand they can settle Pushtunistan problem by force. As sincere friend of US I wish tell you that if Pakistanis are proceeding on this basis this is greatest mistake you can imagine, and if they persevere in this policy it is certain to cause disaster for whole area.” He went on to say that world apparently knows very little about Pushtunistan problem while it sometimes seemed to him that concerted effort was made to keep veil of silence on it. World opinion knew nothing of Afghan side this issue. What little was known all came unilaterally from Pakistan side. Said in his own view RGA had never asked anything inconsistent with UN or US principles. He referred to Kennedy’s statements on self-determination. He said Afghans had always looked to US as country which had greatest desire to protect weaker countries in freedom and important principles such as right of self-determination. He did not feel RGA position unreasonable. Pakistanis say Pushtun tribes happy under Pakistan domination. RGA maintains they are not. All he asks is that Pushtuns be given chance express their honest view. If it were proved that Pushtuns wished to be under Pakistan rule, he would give me his word of honor that RGA would abide willingly by their decision.

Under circumstances did not wish give appearance no consideration would be given Daud’s views. On other hand did not feel could remain silent. Therefore general discussion followed with effort on my part make him understand difficulty his position from US point of view, along lines general principle self-determination one thing, but US support to one of its friends attempting apply principle inside territory of another was quite another. Also made reference, as had to Naim, of lack of evidence available to us to indicate a real indigenous independence movement.

Comment: It obvious Daud’s preoccupations are not primarily on such subjects as consulates and trade agencies. He must be concerned Pakistanis will, as Shah Wali predicted, occupy frontier area in force right up to Durand Line, and quickly extend Pakistan administration thereto. Do not know whether Pakistanis are about to do this, but there no doubt in my mind that if they do, Daud will fight with everything he has, regardless of consequences.

Believe you and Department now in best position decide whether trip to this area by Bowles would be good idea or not. He would of course be welcomed here. Seems to me key factor to consider is what assurances for future he could get from Ayub under these circumstances, and whether these could be in form which Daud would believe, even if he could secure them.

Byroade

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9-1361. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only.
1. Dated September 12. Abdul Aziz was the interpreter during a conversation between Byroade and Daud on September 12. Byroade saw Aziz after the conversation to make certain that the U.S. offer of good offices had been fully understood by Daud. (Ibid., 689.90D/9-1261)
2. Transmitted in telegram 100 to Kabul, September 11. (Ibid., 689.90D/9-1161)