42. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)0
Dear Chet, The impending visit of Prime Minister Nehru to Washington in November and recent events of considerable importance cause me to reopen, at this time, the question of possible military sales to India.
Although I recognize fully the reasons for deferring action on this subject, as stated in your letter of 22 July 1961,1 it would appear that we must have a firm governmental position prepared for any high level discussions [Page 97] with Mr. Nehru. In this respect, the discussion contained in my letter of 12 June2 is still valid.
Recent events emphasize the necessity for early reconsideration of our position.
- a.
- The announcement of the provision of new items of military equipment to Pakistan has, on the one hand, had a slight degrading effect on Indian-U.S. relations; and, on the other, has impressed the Indian military establishment with the necessity, within their limited budget, of purchasing military equipment on a qualitatively comparable basis to that of Pakistan.
- b.
- Defense Minister Menon continues to show a predilection for the purchase of Soviet equipment, particularly aircraft. Currently this includes the possible purchase of high performance aircraft to counterbalance the F-104s received by Pakistan, and the search for a jet engine suitable to the Indian-designed HF-24.
- c.
- In response to our continued efforts to interest them in U.S.-manufactured helicopters, IAF officers advise that they have been forced to make “other arrangements” for the purchase of light and medium helicopters. However they are still actively interested, among other things, in the purchase of C-130 aircraft, heavy helicopters, Sidewinder missiles, the MK-44 torpedo, radar and engineer bridging equipment.
- d.
- Most importantly, certain senior members of the Indian military have made informal and unsolicited approaches to representatives of the U.S. Department of Defense with specific proposals for circumventing what they consider to be the negative policies of Defense Minister Menon toward the purchase of U.S. equipment. In general, they appear to be willing to move for closer ties with the United States and consider it essential that some means be found whereby India could purchase U.S. equipment at prices competitive with those offered by Russia. Specifically, an Indian general officer currently in this country for medical treatment has advised that he will contact the Indian Ambassador in Washington to persuade him to take this matter up with the Prime Minister in connection with his forthcoming visit. In effect, the desire and interest of the Indian military is to bring about, if possible, a high level discussion of this subject between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Nehru.
You will appreciate the extreme sensitivity of these conversations, the details of which and the names of the individuals concerned are known to you and are therefore not mentioned in this correspondence.
Our understanding, at the time of Ambassador Galbraith’s last visit, was that the next move was his. It was made clear to him that any sales whatever of classified material to India (this would include Sidewinder notably) would necessarily entail some form of SD/MICC over-all check on Indian security practices; and that any sale on favorable terms which would require an element of grant aid would have to be revealed to the Congress (through the medium of a Presidential Determination) and [Page 98] would also inevitably become known in India so that it could not be represented for other than what it was. The Ambassador realized that these two problems would pose extremely serious obstacles from the Indian standpoint, and so far as we are aware, he has not indicated that they can be surmounted, or even that the chances are sufficiently likely for us to warrant making the effort.
On the question of SD/MICC requirements, this is a matter on which the Department of State has the leading role. We cannot, I should suppose, adopt any policy toward India that is inconsistent with our over-all policy on these clearances. The essential point is that we have insisted on them in the past for our close allies so that it is most difficult to relax in the case of nations not allied to us. However, the more limited problem of releasing classified equipment should not be allowed to block the formulation of a general policy for some form of subsidized sales to India, the advantages of which would be substantial.
Despite recognized problems, the Department of Defense continues to recommend that a U.S. Government position be established whereby military equipment may be offered to the Indian Government on monetary terms at least as favorable as those offered by any other source of supply. It appears most urgent that a firm position be established on this in consultation with Ambassador Galbraith and well in advance of Mr. Nehru’s visit; and that such a proposal be made to him by the President at that time.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/9-1361. Secret.↩
- Not found.↩
- Document 27.↩