40. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Transit Problems Between Afghanistan and Pakistan
PARTICIPANTS
- His Excellency Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
- Mr. M. Masud, Second Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan
- The Under Secretary
- SOA—Henry W. Spielman
Mr. Bowles began by mentioning the fact that two days earlier Ambassador Byroade had discussed the Pakistan-Afghanistan problem with Foreign Minister Naim and this morning had called upon Prime Minister Daud. The United States was particularly interested in the continued flow of traffic into Afghanistan. If the border remained closed for any length of time most of our programs in Afghanistan would come to a halt because of a shortage of supplies including asphalt and motor fuels. Mr. Bowles pointed out that our aid to Pakistan had been significant because Pakistan had a well-planned program for economic development. He said it was our understanding that Afghanistan has just completed its development plan and that the planners were hopeful that about one-half of the foreign exchange requirements would come from the West. If the door to the outside world were slammed shut, the Afghans would have to turn to the Soviets.
Mr. Bowles said the Soviets will use the struggle between Pakistan and Afghanistan for their own ends, which could easily bring the Red Army to the Pakistan border and thus jeopardize the whole region of [Page 93] South and Southeast Asia. The Red Army had been an important factor in contributing to the effectiveness of Communist control as witnessed by the fact that Communism had made little progress in areas where it was not assisted by military strength. The Communists had lost ground in Africa, in the UAR, and in Iraq, and were able to maintain their position in East Germany, Hungary, and Poland only with the assistance of the Red Army. Aziz Ahmed replied that his Government was aware of the Soviet threat to South Asia and had mentioned this fact several times in the past but the State Department had not agreed. He said he was referring to the previous Administration.
Mr. Bowles said that in thinking of various possibilities for Afghan windows on the outside world it had occurred to him that it might be worth reviving the idea of a route from Kabul through Iran to the sea involving the construction of a road as well as a port. Such a facility might be rented on a 99-year lease.
Aziz Ahmed said that such an idea suggested that Pakistan had stopped the traffic, which was not true. Also, such a route would shift the problem from one trade route to another but would not solve the real problem, “Paktoonistan.” He asked if there were a historical precedent for such a leasing arrangement. In reply the Suez Canal was suggested.
Mr. Bowles said that if this impasse continues for another thirty days we may be in trouble. He then asked if the trade offices might be reopened. Aziz Ahmed said that he did not see how this would solve the problem unless the required personnel were permitted to operate.
Mr. Bowles reiterated that he was trying to visualize a mechanism for solving the transit problem and if a likely solution could be found he would be willing to discuss it with Daud provided there were a chance of success and provided the Pakistanis were agreeable.
Aziz Ahmed remarked that President Ayub was a Pathan; he understood the Pathan mind and he understood the thinking of the Royal Family in Afghanistan. He was of the conviction that the only effective means of dealing with the Afghans was by following a tough line. Aziz Ahmed suggested that if the United States held back, and gave the Afghans time to cool off, the Afghans would be more likely to take steps to solve their problems. He thought that if Ambassador Byroade said to Daud, “If there is anything we can do, please let us know,” this would be the most effective way to encourage the Afghans to solve the transit problem.
Aziz Ahmed said that he did not believe the Afghans would walk into a Russian trap. Likewise, he thought it unlikely that the Afghans would substitute free world trade routes for Soviet transport. He said if Ambassador Byroade has given Daud the impression that the State Department is disturbed by the transit problem, such an impression would give the Afghans confidence to take a strong line with both the [Page 94] Pakistanis and the United States. Then, he thought, Daud in talks with Americans would try to exaggerate the seriousness of this situation.
Aziz Ahmed wondered whether we had any information on the degree of support the people of Afghanistan were giving the Government on this problem. He thought Daud was the person taking the strong line and that the King and Naim probably were not supporting it fully.
Mr. Bowles said that on this question we were all guessing, but that one thing certain in his mind—the Soviets were going to make the most of this situation, and would develop this opportunity into a diversion action to their probable losses in the Berlin issue.
Mr. Bowles asked if the Ambassador could think of a mechanism that would permit the transit traffic to flow into Afghanistan.
Aziz Ahmed said that he would ask his Government for its suggestions, adding that he would also like to ask the State Department to ask Ambassador Byroade for his suggestions as well.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9-1261. Secret. Drafted by Spielman on September 14 and approved in U on September 19.↩