Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

39. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, September 6, 1961.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Offer of Good Offices to Afghanistan and Pakistan

In your telegram to Karachi and Kabul dated August 31,¹ our Ambassadors were authorized to offer good offices in connection with the dispute brought to a head by the Government of Pakistan’s decision to close its consulates and trade agencies in Afghanistan and the Government of Afghanistan’s announcement that unless the Pakistan Government reconsidered its decision, the Afghans would regard diplomatic relations as terminated within a week (Sept. 6).

On the day the telegram was dispatched, the Afghan and Pakistani Charges were called in and informed of the offer of good offices. Ambassador Rountree informed President Ayub of our offer on Sept. 2. President Ayub expressed “sincere gratitude” for your interest and your willingness to be of assistance, and said he hoped you understood fully the reasons for closing the consulates and his feeling that the consequences of this action need not have been the Afghan decision to terminate diplomatic relations. While recognizing the fundamental difference of opinion between the Government of Pakistan and the U.S. as to the best means of dealing with Afghanistan, he went to some lengths to justify his policy of dealing firmly with the Afghans. He said he had no objection to our telling the Afghans that Pakistan did not seek a break in diplomatic relations, nor had it any intention of setting aside the transit agreement. He said his Government was prepared to work out appropriate arrangements to keep traffic moving, but did not agree that we should suggest to the Afghans the possibility of re-opening the consulates.

Upon receipt of Ambassador Rountree’s report, the Department authorized Ambassador Byroade to inform the King (in the absence of Prime Minister Daud) of President Ayub’s willingness to work out transit arrangements and to suggest that, in response to Ayub’s gesture, the Afghans at least postpone their deadline for termination of diplomatic relations. In his reply to this instruction, Ambassador Byroade expressed the opinion that the suggestion to postpone the deadline would be regarded as a request for unilateral action on the part of the Afghans and would have an adverse effect if it were proposed to the King. He suggested that he be authorized to inform Prince Naim of Ayub’s willingness to work out arrangements to continue the transit agreement, and to convey to Naim our offer of good offices—which he apparently had not done previously. In a cable sent last night, Ambassador Byroade was authorized to talk to Prince Naim along these lines.

I believe further action on our part should await a report on Ambassador Byroade’s talk with Naim. Factors contributing to Ayub’s cocky attitude are his apparent belief that if the Afghans are treated roughly they will come to heel (despite possible Soviet backing), and his realization that we are eager to maintain certain facilities in Pakistan. Many Afghans apparently believe we are conniving with the Pakistanis, but continue to exploit our interest in keeping Afghanistan neutral—in the hope of obtaining increasing aid from us.

As of today diplomatic relations between the two countries have, for all practical purposes, been terminated.² I therefore doubt that a Presidential message could have the effect of preventing the break in relations generated by the Afghan note. The desirability of such a message might well be considered when it appears that the President’s personal representatives in Kabul and Karachi have had an opportunity to make the maximum possible use of the current offer of good offices.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9-661. Confidential. Drafted by Weil.
1. See footnote 4, Document 37.
2. On September 6, Pakistan and Afghanistan broke relations and closed their respective Embassies in Kabul and Karachi. (Telegram 164 from Kabul, September 7; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9-761)