Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan⁰

Washington, September 3, 1961, 7:19 p.m.

88. Reftel Karachi 406;¹ to Kabul 43. Karachi 407;² to Kabul 44. For Kabul: You are authorized request audience with King. While Department wishes avoid conveying impression of undue excitement over Afghan actions, it believes that in absence of Daud its views should be brought to attention of King.

You may discuss Pak-Afghan relations along following lines:

1. As result USG offer of good offices President Ayub has told US Ambassador he is agreeable to USG informing RGA that GOP does not intend to interrupt transit; that GOP does not desire severance diplomatic relations; that he does not intend to close borders. Furthermore Ayub has expressed willingness to work out appropriatearrangements tokeep traffic moving. This is clear evidence that GOP is not trying to destroy the Afghans economy or to interfere with Afghan development projects.

2. In light of dangers to both countries generated by the recent exchange of notes, and in light of President Ayub’s willingness to continue transit agreement and to work out pertinent arrangements, the USG ventures to ask His Majesty whether he would not be justified in conveying to President Ayub through USG channels his government’s willingness to discuss at the working level ways and means keeping traffic moving.

3. With a view to creating an appropriate atmosphere for working level exchanges, the USG believes the RGA would have nothing to lose and much to gain if it responded to President Ayub’s gesture by at least extending the deadline for abreach in diplomatic relations. Modification of this unilateral action would indicate to Ayub the good faith of the RGA and encourage the GOP to make a genuine effort to cooperate.

4. The USG has been impressed by the RGA’s recent assurances that it wishes to remain independent, and does not wish to be dominated by any foreign power. An impasse in relations with Pakistan could lead to only one ultimate result—dependence on the Soviet bloc and eventual absorption by the bloc. President Ayub’s position offers an opportunity for the RGA to avoid this danger without loss of prestige. The USG devoutly hopes that His Majesty will appreciate the fact that a favorable response to President Ayub’s gesture will be in the national interest of the RGA.

If for any reason you do not obtain immediate audience with King you should discuss foregoing with Foreign Office.

For Karachi: Department gratified your success in obtaining some assurances from Ayub which may open way for eventual GOP-RGA accommodation; and concurs in your proposed approach to Foreign Secretary (Your 407).

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9-361. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Weil and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi.
1. In telegram 406 from Karachi, September 3, Rountree reported on conversations with Ayub September 1-2. Ayub welcomed the offer of U.S. good offices and indicated that he did not intend to sever diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, nor to close the borders between the two countries. He was prepared to work out arrangements to facilitate transit across the borders, but was not prepared to reconsider his decision to close the Consulates. (Ibid.)
2. Rountree assessed his conversations with Ayub in telegram 407 from Karachi, September 3. He concluded that Ayub was firm in his refusal to reconsider the decision to close the Consulates in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He thought that Ayub felt equally strongly about closing the Afghan trade agencies. But, in light of the importance Afghanistan attached to trade, Rountree hoped to persuade Ayub to use the trade agencies as bargaining counters to prevent a break in diplomatic relations. He planned to explore the possibility with Foreign Secretary Dehlavi on September 4. (Ibid.)