Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

37. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, September 2, 1961.

Another Afghan-Pakistani Crisis

The long-sputtering Afghan-Pakistani dispute has boiled up into what may become a serious crisis. Phil Talbot says we “may have only 3-4 days to avert what could turn into a major calamity.”

Ayub, perhaps overconfident from what he regards as a highly successful US trip and frustrated over his inability to get any movement from Delhi on Kashmir, is in one of his periodic “get tough with Kabul” moods. Justifiably annoyed at continued Afghan pecking on the Pushtunistan issue, he suddenly decided last week to close all their consulates in Afghanistan,¹ and asked Kabul to close its own within two weeks.² Daud has retaliated by saying he’ll sever diplomatic relations if Ayub doesn’t withdraw his threat by 6 September.

What might happen if we get into an ascending spiral here is anybody’s guess; we could even have a minor border war. Of course the Soviets, who’ve been egging Daud on over Pushtunistan, might choose to pour on some oil to raise tensions a little more.

State has reacted with promptitude and vigor. It has offered our “good offices”,³ and is trying to cool both sides off. It contemplates that we may have to go next to a public statement deploring the crisis and in effect telling both sides to relax. This won’t go down well with the Paks; they have long disagreed with our mediatory efforts, feeling they know how to deal with Afghans better than we do, i.e. be tough. (Which we fear will just drive them further into the bear’s embrace.) The hell of it is that Talbot (just in Kabul) and Byroade feel that the Afghans are just now coming around to realize what we’ve been telling them for years—that they’re dangerously close to becoming Soviet prisoners—and that we may have a new opportunity, with skillfully applied economic baksheesh, to keep them from becoming completely dependent upon Moscow.

State feels that no Presidential intervention is yet required. I strongly concur. This fill-in is only because if our current efforts to cool off the contestants do not succeed, we may want early next week to suggest something like a strong prod from you to Ayub.

R. W. Komer⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 9/1/61-9/14/61. No classification marking. A marginal notation on the source text, in an unknown hand, reads: “Pres. noted. Sept 4, 1961.”
1. The Pakistani Consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar were closed on August 22. (Telegram 333 from Karachi, August 24; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/8-2461)
2. Afghanistan was requested to close its Consulates in Peshawar and Quetta and its trade agencies in Parachinar and Chaman. Pakistan charged that the Consulates and trade agencies were centers for subversion and hostile propaganda. (Memorandum from Talbot to Bowles, September 2; ibid., 689.90D/9-261)
3. On August 31, the Department instructed the Embassies in Karachi and Kabul to offer U.S. good offices to mediate in the dispute that had developed between Pakistan and Afghanistan. (Telegram 411 to Karachi and 85 to Kabul; ibid., 689.90D/8-3161)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.