346. Memorandum for the Record0
Karachi, December 20,
1963.
SUBJECT
- Private Conversation with President Ayub Khan, 20 December 1963
- 1.
- At my request I had a 30-minute private discussion with President Ayub at the close of the meeting which included Foreign Minister Bhutto, Defense Secretary Ahmed, Ambassador McConaughy, and General Goodpaster. I opened by saying that I wanted, as a long time friend of Pakistan and of its President, to express my deep regret over the apparent downward trend in Pak/US relationships over the past year. As an outgrowth of the frank discussions just completed, could we not accept the existence of an honest difference of view as to the rightness of US military aid to India, cease the recriminations which have been souring our relations and move forward together toward common objectives? On the US side we have no reason to apologize for our course of action. The decision has been taken after careful thought and close attention to the views of the Pakistan government.
- 2.
- I stated that on our side we felt that we should put aside the discussion of past disagreements despite the fact that the coming visit of Chou En-lai to Karachi has created for us a domestic problem for the immediate future. President Johnson made this point clear to Foreign Minister Bhutto during his recent visit to Washington, particularly with respect to the impact of the visit on Congressional relations. Right now Congress is in an unfriendly mood toward all foreign aid and could well use the discord in South Asia as a reason to reduce or eliminate aid to both Pakistan and India.
- 3.
- President Ayub responded forcefully that he “loved President Johnson more than a brother” and that he wanted me to report to him the true facts with regard to Pak relations to Red China and the circumstances of the Chou En-lai visit. With regard to Pak/Chinese relations, the US could hardly quarrel with his desire to normalize relations with one of his potential enemies and thus limit his military stakes. After all, the US maintains relations with the USSR and receives their visiting officials in Washington.
- 4.
- I interposed that we received them correctly but did not embrace them. The Chou En-lai visit appears to be a matter of another kind. Ayub will be seen in close company with him on every TV in the world—this to the detriment of US/Pak relations.
- 5.
- Ayub argued heatedly that his motive should not be misunderstood. For him to be on terms with Chou En-lai was a service to the West. He could learn something of Chinese intentions and discover in time any move by the Indians to seek accommodation with Peking—a move he is sure the Indians will eventually make. During the visit, he will be able to talk over important matters with Chou En-lai and turn the attacks which his visitor is sure to make on the US.
- 6.
- Ayub indicated that he too had a domestic problem resulting from US aid to India. His people simply did not understand what the US meant by helping their enemies. I suggested that the kind of joint exercise we had mentioned should have the effect of reassuring his people about US capability and intention to come to the aid of Pakistan. Also Pakistan leadership could help by interpreting the true situation in statements to the public.
- 7.
- He picked up the reference to the joint exercise and after some discussion agreed that I should draw up a proposed scenario for the exercise and send it to him for consideration, possibly by way of General Adams. I felt that he was wary of the exercise as well as of the Indian Ocean Task Force, probably sensing the possibility that a successful reinforcement exercise could be used at some future time as a reason to curtail military aid to Pakistan.
- 8.
- The meeting closed with Ayub’s renewed expression of respect for President Johnson.